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ABSTRACT. Natural resources are in abundance but have not benefited resource-
based communities. The mining industry, especially in developing countries, has 
fallen short of working towards sustainable community practices. Different 
governance initiatives adopted by governments to make the communities beneficiaries 
of these resources are yet to bring sustainable results. Government is seen as the sole 
actor on policymaking and its implementation, and the production and delivery of 
goods and services. Acknowledgement is not given to the roles and responsibilities of 
the resource-based communities to work as co-partners towards sustainable 
community development. Hence, this thesis argues that government policies should 
move away from seeing resource communities as recipients and representatives in 
policymaking towards co-partnership. As such, this thesis aims to explore the 
dynamics between resource use and achieving sustainable community development 
by exploring the barriers and potential for sustainable community development in 
diamond mining communities in Kono, Eastern Sierra Leone. To do this, the thesis 
uses data from a wide rage of indebt semi-structured interviews, documents and focus 
group discussions from four case studies representing four chiefdoms to point out a 
shift from the governance approach of institutionalisation to adaptive governance 
approach that will make the resource communities self-determined and sustainable. 
The thesis deals with three objectives. First, a focus is put on the relationship between 
resource exploitation and community governance in mining communities through an 
analysis of key actors and their roles at a range of scales. Second, in an attempt to find 
out the scope of sustainability in resource-based communities, attention is given to the 
ways mining communities utilise their assets and undertake practices that contribute 
towards sustainable community development. Third, in finding answers from issues 
arising in these communities and the prospect for effective mining policies, the thesis 
attempts to identify both the structural and community-based barriers to promoting 
sustainable community development in mining communities and then make policy 
recommendations for community development in such communities.  
Key Words: Resource Exploitation; Community Development, Community 
Governance, Sustainable Development, Sustainable Community Development 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis explores the potentials and barriers for sustainable community 
development in diamond mining communities in Kono, Eastern Sierra Leone. It aims 
to explore the dynamics between resource-use and achieving sustainable community 
development. In an attempt to achieve this, the thesis argues that achieving a 
sustainable diamond mining industry that can benefit present and future communities 
requires a governance initiative that incorporates co-governance and co-production in 
these resource-based communities. The former is the community’s capacity to be able 
to play a partnership role with the state on policy formulation and implementation, 
and the latter is focussed on production and management of goods and services 
(Osborne and McLaughlin, 2004) and (Brandsen and Pestoff, 2006). Whilst resources 
are a requirement for achieving development, over the years the mining communities 
have experienced degradation of community assets by the actions and reactions of 
both domestic and external actors that have undermined the prospect of sustainable 
community development. Over the years, various governments have attempted to 
make the mining communities benefit from natural resources through the Kimberley 
Certification Scheme (global initiative) and the Diamond Area Community 
Development Funds (internal initiative) governance initiatives. Despite these 
governance initiatives the state has been the sole determinant of resources and 
development policies. There is an absence of ‘transitional’ community governance 
and sustainability practices. To further simplify this, I have used the term 
‘transitional’ to explain that despite the central government’s decentralisation Act of 
2004, overwhelming power still rests with them. In spite of the amendments made to 
mining policies, these resource-based communities have been seen as tools or 
instruments of the state, dictated to and provided for. In such circumstance, the 
communities’ capacity is undermined. According to Somerville (2011), the capacity 
of the community is subject to its ability to the command and unity it exercises on 
available resources and the organisational capacity to organise those resources 
efficiently. 
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Sierra Leone is endowed with an abundance of natural resources. It was ranked the 
tenth producer of diamonds, by volume, in 2010 (Kimberley Process Rough Diamond 
Statistics, 2011). Ironically, it is ranked 177 out of 183 countries in the human 
development index (HDI) in 2012 (HDI Report) with 70 percent of its 5 million 
population living below the $1 poverty line; 65 percent of the rural population is 
without pure drinking water, and it has 54.47 years and 59.56 years life expectancy 
for men and women respectively (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/sl.html). Paradoxically, I can state that Sierra Leone is rich in natural 
resources but poor in economic development. The vast wealth has paid insignificant 
economic gains to resource communities in particular and the national economy in 
general. Since diamonds were discovered during the colonial era to independence, the 
industry has been marred by looting and smuggling of diamonds, involving state 
actors, internal non-state actors and external non-state actors. With the activities of 
some of these actors, the resource-based communities have become ecologically 
unsustainable and the sustainability approaches are neither strong nor weak. Hence, 
the optimism for sustainable community development, drawing on their vast natural 
resources since the post-colonial period, is at a crossroads.  
 
Some commentators like Collier, Hoeffler, and Le Billon attribute the problems of 
natural resources to portability, abundance and conflict, and have seen those resources 
as a curse to countries that have them. Collier and Hoeffler (2005) and Campbell 
(2003) examined the links between lootable resources, poor governance and 
underdevelopment in sub-Saharan Africa. Their proposition on lootable resources 
such as diamonds, underdevelopment and poor governance is linked to large alluvial 
mineral deposits (abundance) that are not monitored effectively. Le Billon (2002) 
argued that developing economies with vast natural resources have experienced 
underdevelopment, political instability, corruption, and this has often resulted in 
violent conflict. That is why Ocheje (2006) argued that the answer to the resource 
curse lies in good governance whereby government and extractive companies working 
in the resource rich economies must commit to “higher standards of transparency and 
accountability” (Maconachie, 2008, p 3). In addition to Ocheje’s argument, Gberie 
(2002) argues that the problem with Sierra Leone’s diamond industry over the years is 
corruption. He concluded that the only remedy depends on how the diamond industry 
or the extractive industry is managed.  
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Efforts have been taken to make the extractive industry profitable and sustainable 
through governance initiatives to assist resource communities to gain from the 
resources. Internationally, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPSC) was 
adopted in 2002 to curb the flow of illicit diamonds and increase international 
transparency in the diamond industry. Though this approach was seen as a governance 
and economic strategy, it has security impetus emanating from fears of resources 
being used by clandestine or shadow actors for destructive purposes. Internally, the 
government in collaboration with NGOs through the Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) implemented the Diamond Area Community 
Development Funds (DACDF) in accordance with the ‘What you Pay initiative’ 
adopted during the 2002 Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg 
(Maconachie, 2008; http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org) 
 
The purpose was to transfer a stipulated percentage of funds from the export revenue 
gained from the sales of diamonds to resource communities. It failed to consider the 
role the community can play towards this aim. All the stakeholders involve are elites. 
There is no involvement of the wider community members in the process. Thus, the 
governance initiative, though it is a step in the right direction, is limited and 
unsustainable. The initiative is marred by corruption and unaccountability from 
community elites (Chiefs). At national level, the Minerals Advisory Board is charged 
with the responsibility for advising and making recommendations to the Minister of 
Mines on licences, exploration, mining, processing, import and export, marketing of 
minerals, and monitoring and implementation of government policy relating to 
minerals (Ministry of Mineral Resources and Political Affairs, 2009; 2011). This top-
bottom approach excludes the community. Hence, it undermines the capacity of the 
communities to determine how issues affecting them can be resolved.  
 
Globally, one of the worst affected natural resource areas in the developing world is 
Africa, which has been experiencing resource-based conflicts since the post-colonial 
era. Despite the revenue gain from the sales of these resources, Africa’s minerals have 
become more of a burden than a blessing and the continent’s communities suffer 
underdevelopment. For instance, Sierra Leone, Namibia, Angola, Nigeria, D.R. 
Congo, and Chad have experienced wars and retrogressive development owing to 
their abundant natural resources (Kabia, 2006). The natural resources have 
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empowered the political elites and their cohorts through patrimonialism and 
clientelism against the interest of the resource-based communities.  
 
Like Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe is an example of bad governance initiative on diamond 
mining, while on the other hand Botswana is a good example of good governance 
initiative on diamond mining. The latter has been called the ‘African Miracle’ because 
of the great socio-economic and political successes associated with the use of their 
natural resources. After a protracted (1965-1979) civil war, the country which in 1980 
changed its name from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe deteriorated into a grave economic 
crisis (The Worldfact Book, 2011). Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe share some features 
in common on their natural resources. They both have natural resources to provide 
investment environment and prospective growth and development; they both share the 
Kimberley experience or governance initiative but not effective policy regulation and 
implementation of its mining industry.  
 
Zimbabwe is rich in natural resources (Department of State, 2011) and an exporter of 
diamonds (McMahon, 2010). But international monitors accused the government of 
running smuggle syndicates and providing falsified information (The Worldfact Book, 
2011). Like Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe’s rich natural resources could have led to its 
economic recovery and prosperity if only there is an effective governance initiative 
and viable economic distribution of wealth. Zimbabwe had had a 14 year civil conflict 
(Shillington, 2005) industrial strike that included civil servants, health workers by 
mid- 1990s and rising food prices (Department of State, 2011). By 2000 the economy 
contracted by 40 percent (Department of State, 2011) due to agricultural decline (The 
Worldfact Book, 2011). With evidences of economic and political shocks, Zimbabwe 
was measured as the worst performing of African mining countries in 2008/09. Unlike 
Botswana’s $3.6 billion sales of diamonds in 2009, Zimbabwe’s legitimate sales 
accounted for $20 million (Mutsaka et al., 2010). Zimbabwe’s economic woes are 
often associated with their controversial land reforms undertaken by the ZANU PF 
and linked to patron-client land distribution (Robb, 2012). I acknowledge that the land 
issue has varying effect on agriculture, national economy and political situation (The 
Worldfact Book, 2011) but that effect can not be directly linked to the poor diamond 
revenue. The policies governing mineral resources are top-bottom and highly centred 
on the state as a sole policy determining and implementing actor. Robb (2012) argues 
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that the ability of providing investment from diamond revenues depends on effective 
regulation of the diamond sector. He (2012, p11) states that Zimbabwe’s Mine and 
Mineral Act (ZMMA) “is a needlessly complex document, resulting in poor 
transparency”, despite her voluminous 27 sections of 125 pages, that are three times 
that of Botswana’s Mines and Mineral Acts (Mines and Mineral Act, 1961). Like 
Sierra Leone where the Minister of Mines has vested rights on mineral resources 
(Mines and Mineral Act 2009), ZMMA has vested mining rights in the President of 
Zimbabwe (Mines and Mineral Act, 1961) and the Minister decides on what is and 
what is not a mineral, the sole authority to market prices, regulate royalties, 
determines representations from the Chambers of Mines and regulate on matters 
arising when necessary (Robb, 2012). From this analogy, co-governance and co-
production in resource communities is highly undermined and determined by the state 
as a dominant player with little or no empowerment from resource-based 
communities. However, few countries have made a difference.  
 
Unlike Zimbabwe, and Sierra Leone, Botswana is a good model of countries with 
good reputation of natural resource use. Its economy depends more on diamond 
mining (The Worldfact Book, 2011) with effective mining laws that have benefitted 
the entire country (Robb, 2012). From its precarious and poverty-stricken economic 
state in 1966 (Lewis 2006), Botswana was labelled by Abdi Ismail Samatar as 
‘African Miracle’ (Samatar, 1999). A combination of efficient economic and political 
factors has contributed to this admired wonder. Botswana’s diamonds were 
discovered by DeBeers in the early 1960’s and became a dominant industry in early 
1980s (Department of State, 2011). Unlike Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe’s staggering 
economic growth, Botswana’s economic growth grew at an annual average of 9 
percent, largely from diamond revenues (Department of State, 2011). The country has 
a stable economy and effective regulations governing the mining industry. The 
country’s diamond exports account for 30 percent of world diamond sales which is 
one-third of the GDP and 70 percent of the country’s export (Our Diamonds, 2012). 
In 2009, the country earned $3.6 billion from its diamond sales. In contrast, 
Zimbabwe’s legitimate sales accounted for $20 million (Mutsaka et al., 2010). 
Botswana’s diamond sector accounts for 33 percent of the country’s GDP and 76 
percent of its export revenue with an annual growth rate of 7 percent. Namibia’s 
diamond industry accounts for 10 percent of GDP and 40 percent of export revenues 
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while Canada produces C$1.5 billion worth each year (http://www.diamondfacts.org). 
Unlike those discussed above, these countries have made remarkable use of their 
resources and have demonstrated evidence of strong sustainability.  
 
The disparity between Botswana and Sierra Leone/Zimbabwe is not only on the 
economic growth but also on the structure of mining. Firstly, Botswana has an 
effective partnership relationship with DeBeers called Debswana (Department of 
State, 2011) under the Diamond Trading Company (DTC) and assigned to sort 
diamonds. Sierra Leone had a similar investment partnership with DeBeers that was 
extended to the defunct SLST in Kono district. In contrast, the investment was 
characterised by mass patron-client corruption under the leadership of Siaka P. 
Stevens and J.S. Momoh who used diamonds resources for greed purposes. The 
second part is that Botswana has moved from exploration and extraction to cutting, 
polishing, and marketing, providing incremental jobs opportunities and revenue for 
the economy (Department of State, 2011). Hence in 2008, the former President of 
Botswana, Festus Gontebange Mogae was awarded the Mo Ibrahim Prize for 
Achievement in African Leadership (Howden, 2008) for the country’s strong 
democracy enshrine in the rule of law and the frantic effort in combating corruption. 
In spite of the high rate of HIV/AIDS pandemic, the former ‘development leader’, as I 
would like to name him, led and maintained the country’s continued stability and 
prosperity, distribution of wealth, poverty declination  and equitable opportunities 
across other sectors without being engulf in the so-called ‘Dutch Disease’.  
Notwithstanding, these examples are enhanced by the need, desire and value of 
diamonds through their demand and supply.  
 
The demand for diamonds could be for two main purposes but the means of getting 
the diamonds have varies, ranging from official and unofficial means. The demand 
and supply of diamonds is driven by wants/desire, purpose and price. Diamond prices 
often fluctuate due to economic shocks, especially during the great economic shock 
that affected most developing countries including Sierra Leone between 1980 and 
2000s. Overtly, the economic and social yarning for the gem stone has led to 
spontaneous environmental impacts.  
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The demand and supply of diamonds commenced in ancient times in India around 
2000BC in alluvial pits and rivers (Harts, 2001). In modern era, by 1720 AD, alluvial 
deposits were discovered in Brazil (Haggerty, 1999) and by the 19th Century Brazil 
dominated India and became the world’s leading diamond producer (Hart, 2001). By 
1880, De Beers Mining Company Limited was formed by Cecil Rhodes (Hart, 2001) 
after purchasing a firm originally owned by de Beers brothers (2001). The new 
formed company, “De Beers” gained full control of the assets of the competitive 
companies such as Compagnie Francaise des Mines de Diamond du Cap de Bon 
Esperance and Kimberly Central Diamond Mining Company (Baldwin and Webster, 
2005).  
 
By 1990, De Beers controlled 90 percent of the world’s diamond by controlling the 
flow of production and sales to boast prices by strategising planned scarcity in 
diamonds through what Baldwin and Webster called “Supply Management” (Baldwin 
and Webster, 2005). De Beers enforced this through the establishment of ten world 
largest cartels, and succeeded in influencing the supply and prices of diamonds 
through the allocation of certain percentage of output in exchange for market data.  
De Beers gauged demand and supply to maximise price (Stein 2001). The Central 
Selling Organisation (CSO) purchased the diamond output of the De Beer’s mines and 
properties around the world (Baldwin and Webster, 2001) and transferred to their 
London headquarters, and separated the diamonds into lots called “boxes” according 
to their quality and quantity. The cartel members called “sightholders” regularly 
conducts weekly inspection of these segregated boxes. DeBeers sets a non-negotiable 
price for each box in advance and determined the quantity and quality of diamonds 
each sightholder could get (Baldwin and Webster, 2001). By the end of the 20th 
century, DeBeers diamond hegemony declined from 90 percent to 66 percent (Kay, 
2001). Subsequently in 2004, De Beers cut down the number of cartel members by 20 
percent (Jeweler, 2004).  
 
Diamonds are needed for jewellery and industrial uses. It is estimated that 50 percent 
of extracted gemstones are used for jewellery. Polished diamonds account for about 
440 percent of all jewellery, manufacturing and engagement (Diamond Industry 
Report, 2011). The demand side encourages supply; the supply of diamonds is largely 
connected to its discovery and commercialisation. In 1870 South Africa commenced 
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commercial production, and was engaged in the diamond rush (Hart, 2001). Since 
then, diamond mining has expanded to four continents and by 2005 to include Russia, 
Canada and Australia, producing 133 million carats in 2010. Russia’s commercial 
production accounts for nearly one-quarter of global diamond output, followed by 
Botswana. In Australia, the geologists discovered the largest diamond deposit in the 
world in Argyle pipe in 1979. In 1994, the Argyle mine produced 43 million carats of 
diamonds (Diamond Industry Report, 2011). In recent times, Canada has had new 
diamond discoveries as huge deposits were found in 1992 at Point Lake in Northwest 
Territories. Consequently, it has become obvious that the discovery, demand and 
supply of diamond resources are mutually inclusive. However, although diamonds are 
needed for jewellery and industrial purposes, in recent times it has been linked to war 
in countries such as Sierra Leone, DR Congo and Angola. From their purpose of 
being transformed into consumer and industrial goods, diamonds have become a tool 
of war in these countries, leading to widespread deaths and destruction by those I call 
‘Blood Diamond Merchants’, dealing in so called ‘Blood Diamonds’ by some 
political scientists like Kabia (2009) and Francis (2001).  
 
The demand for diamond resources provokes its supply through various financial 
actors to the international market. Roberts (1994) claims that the demand for 
diamonds is one of lust. In their famous slogan “A diamond is forever” DeBeers tried 
to convince women in America that they needed a diamond ring to get engaged or 
married. However, the demand did not take into consideration the source and process 
of supply. The source of supply in developing countries have been characterised by 
violent conflicts at community and national scales, and it is marred by 
underdevelopment. International calls came from environmental groups to address 
human needs and resource sustainability, such as Friends of the Earth during the 
Brundtland report in 1987 (WCED, 1987), Global Watch in 1998, Partnership Africa 
(PAC), the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) in 2002. The calls are 
not often heeded to with the utmost attention because of geo-politics and global 
interest. Internally, for example, the call for urgency in regulating natural resources 
such as the ‘blood diamond trade’ in Sierra Leone was ignored until tens of thousands 
of civilians were killed. Externally and for security reasons, the United States and the 
West became interested in enforcing anti-blood diamond policies when, it was 
alleged, that Al-Qaeda was involved in the trade (Douglas, 2002). The global players 
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showed interest where interest pays off and neglected the resource-based 
communities. Accordingly, I could argue that a global commitment to sustainable use 
of mineral resources might arise when those resources become a threat on a global 
scale. 
1.2 Background and Context: Statement of the Problem 
Environmental problems are not limited to any particular country in the world. 
However, the degree of the problems differs, and the willingness and capability of 
responses to such threatening impacts in our societies is inadequate and variable. In 
natural resource-rich countries, environmental problems start from the exploration to 
the extraction of minerals from the earth’s crust and by the cutting down of flora and 
the dissipation of the ecosystem.  
 
From an economic point of view, the mining industry is a viable sector for economic 
development. The rate and volume of extraction of these minerals should be 
commensurate to the scale of development. Ironically, the revenue from resources is 
parallel with the development and colossal ecological misery in resource 
communities. With the resource-based communities having unprecedented adverse 
socio-economic impacts and environmental injustice, the resource revenues from the 
trade have benefited only a few actors. There is a widening gap between the rich and 
poor with the majority of the population surviving on less than US $2 per day 
(MMSD, 2002). The governance initiatives undertaken so far have not addressed 
fundamental issues affecting the diamond industry and the resource communities in 
particular. The latter are often subjected to ‘privileged options’ to make them 
vulnerable and submissive. Assistance given to these communities is not taken as 
mandatory but rather as a charitable gesture. As such, socio-economic conflicts 
arising from community and national greed have ensued at a community scale. The 
conflicts have often occurred in two forms: on one hand, among the community 
actors; on the other hand, it ensues between the community and corporations. From 
this correlation, I have distanced this community conflict from the national scale 
conflicts that Collier, Francis, and Kabia denote as armed conflict. These community 
conflicts have not been managed effectively and, in the case of Sierra Leone, they 
became a source of attraction by warlords to recruit actors of various capacities who 
destroyed almost all forms of capital or assets to get to diamond resources.  
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Political influence and control of mineral resources by the state has superseded 
ecological interest. The state acts as a sole actor capable of determining policies and 
development. This state-led approach emanates from the post-colonial era when most 
African economies adopted the statist conceptions of development, economic 
nationalism and political patronage to enhance state-owned enterprises (Bayart, 
1982). Hence, the communities’ access to resources in their locality is restricted by 
government policies. There is disparity between ownership of diamond resources in 
cultural and legal terms. Culturally, the land belongs to the community; legally the 
resources belong to the state. This contradictory analogy, characterised by greed, 
often leads to discontent, community conflict, visible and invisible (‘shadow’) 
scrambles for diamonds, leading to the exploitation of resources and the unbearable 
ecological destruction. As such, governments, NGOs, academics, and 
environmentalists advocate for mitigation and solutions through environmental 
policies or governance initiatives. 
 
As a result, the government often enacts and implements policies to project 
sustainable mining that would regulate the mining industry. Despite this attempt, the 
gap that excludes the resource communities from the co-governance and co-
production governance approach still exists. For instance, various mineral Acts (1994; 
amended 1999; 2009) have been enacted to the effect. The 2009 new Mines and 
Minerals Act vested ‘all rights’ of ownership and control of all minerals in the state. 
The Act, like the previous legislations, ignores the community capacity to deliberate 
on their common future. In addition to the exclusion of the resource communities, 
Gberie (2002) says that corruption has been a problem in the diamond industry since 
the pre-independence era. With the state at the centre of natural resources, the 
industry is affected by various actors with varying capacity and interests. Hence, the 
implementation of these policies has become ineffective. Gouldson and Murphy 
(1998) posit that the effectiveness and efficiency of policies depend on how they are 
planned and implemented. According to the 2009 Minerals Act, the state controls and 
implements everything. Policies made to curb environmental problems are influenced 
by technocrats at ministerial capacity. This top-down approach adopted is tactical, 
mechanical, gradual and end-of-pipe (Cater, 1994). The approach only seeks the 
consultation and participation of the elite in resolving environmental problems. It 
ignores the consultation and participation of the majority that are affected by 
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ecological damages and resource exploitation. Sustainable mining industry is not only 
a matter of policy formulation; rather, it is about the cooperation between the 
communities and government on policy formulation and implementation, and on the 
provision of goods and services. Often, when it comes to discussing resources in those 
resource-based communities, the communities are misrepresented by individuals who 
are not accountable to them. The government of Sierra Leone, having the post-
colonial statist conceptions of development and political patronage (Bayart, 1982) has 
seen itself as the sole actor in addressing environmental problems, and planning and 
implementing mining policies. The role of the resource communities is marginal and 
polarised. Even the pretext of a bottom-up approach through the 2004 
Decentralisation Act lacks information capacity, consultation and acknowledgment of 
community actors. The resource communities cannot take independent or 
collaborative actions; they lack the community governance structures to provide and 
deliver community services (co-production) and create joint policies (co-governance). 
In essence, a mutual power relation is required in order to promote the supply and 
demand of natural resources wherein the community’s capabilities, participation, and 
empowerment become effective. Hence, this thesis will explore three theories on 
governance, community development, and sustainable development. These theoretical 
concepts will be addressed in the literature review chapter, which assesses the 
pluralism of political ecology and sustainable development. The next sub-section will 
discuss governance. 
 
1.3 Governance (good or bad) 
It is expedient to give some definitions of governance in order to provide a better 
understanding for those who might be contemplating what governance is all about at 
both national and community levels. In this thesis, the focus is not on governance on 
the communities but on governance within the communities. Some may perceive 
governance as democracy of the elected few to govern the majority. As these elected 
few are embodied with the legitimacy to rule through established institutions, they 
should give in return the legitimacy that is to be questioned and account for their 
actions. It is not about democratisation through the right to vote and be voted for. 
According to the secondary sources and historic political narratives discussed in 
chapter 3, democratisation or legitimate power can be used for coercive purposes and 
resource exploitation. Whatever the views of people may be, in this thesis, 
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governance infers a relationship between state actors and the governed, and between 
the community actors (authority) and the wider community members. In addition, it 
warrants knowing how answerable these actors are to those they govern and how 
answerable the people are to their communities and the state. Furthermore, 
governance is not only about establishing institutions which are defunct. Following 
this account, I examine the World Bank’s definition of governance as ‘the traditions 
and institutions by which power in a country is exercised for the good of all’ 
(Kaufmann and Kraay 2002, p. 5). This definition centres on state authority. Often, 
the central authority tends to transfer power through institutional establishments in the 
form of decentralisation. In this case, power is projected to be transferred from the 
central government to local governments. But the question is how decentralised is the 
local government in relation to the local people at community level? In Sierra Leone, 
the decentralised government cannot pass laws on mining. All they can do is 
implement orders from the Ministry of Mines and Mineral Resources. In that case, 
any focus on institutions to justify governance has limitations. Institutional 
establishments alone will not enhance equal opportunities to exercise power between 
various actors in order to determine the use of community resource for sustainable 
community development. The actors of these decentralised institutions are answerable 
only to the central government because, as the reader will notice in chapter 5, there is 
a high level of political allegiance of local councillors to the central authority. The 
stakeholders’ involvement is ineffective and the rules of the policy are a zero-sum 
game where those who agree gain whilst those who disagree are bound to lose or be 
penalised. The idea of governance is about who makes a decision, who sets the rules, 
how, and when. Graham et al. (2003) further explained that governance is: ‘the 
traditions, institutions and processes that determine how power is exercised, how 
citizens are given a voice, and how decisions are made on issues of public concern’ 
(Graham et al., 2003, p. 1).  
 
Whilst I agree with Graham and colleagues’ commentary on governance, I criticise 
their proposition on the basis that they focus on governance as the interrelationship 
between the state and the people. They ignore the governance that happens within the 
community or that should exist there. Focusing on any forms of governance that 
ignores the purpose for which communities exist undermines community capacity. 
Graham and his colleagues ignore the fact that governance cannot be effective without 
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the communities being incorporated in decision-making and in ‘equity’ participation 
on goods and service delivery. Communities should be able to operate in partnership 
with other actors on policies, production and service delivery. Without this, we cannot 
talk of community development.  
 
How people can be heard and contribute to decision-making is very important in 
governance. Their involvement has to be active and not passive; it has to be 
participatory and not representative. As Gaventa (2004) argues, citizen participation 
has to move people from being users or choosers of public service policies deliberated 
by others and made by others, to ‘makers and shapers’ of decision-making themselves 
on matters affecting them all. This demonstrates that the process has to move away 
from indirect participation towards direct participatory involvement. Such a process 
changes the monopoly role of the state, moving towards an enabling environment in 
which everybody is involved (Moore and Putzel, 2002). There should be a shift from 
national control over on communities to allowing non-state actors (communities) to 
control decision-making and implementation (Hutter, 2006). This will mean a shift 
from government as the sole determinant of policymaking and implementation (co-
governance) and as a service provider (co-production), to ‘deliberative’ governance 
with communities for effective sustainable community development. Other 
commentators such as Hyden et al. (2004, p. 50) note that governance is about: ‘the 
formation and stewardship of the rules that control the public realm – the space where 
state as well as economic and societal stakeholders interact to make decisions’.  
 
Like Graham and others, this definition focuses on ‘macro-governance’ - governance 
considering the arms of government, probably though electioneering. I presume that 
interaction in making decisions does not imply equality in participation. There is often 
participatory inadequacy in communities in developing countries when it comes to 
governance on development issues.  
 
1.4 Community Development 
Here, I consider community development on the basis of political, socio-economic, 
and ecological nomenclature. Taking into consideration the ideal of empowerment, 
with emphasis on social and spatial dimension of development, community 
development approaches place people and communities at the centre of development. 
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According to Wolfe (1996), community development refers to any act of development 
that enhances the improvement of the living standards and general infrastructure of a 
community. Frank and Smith (1999) define community development as the planned 
fruition of the economic, social, cultural, and environmental factors of community 
well-being. This can be achieved by encouraging communities to organise and take up 
inventiveness of their own (Friedmann, 1992). It involves the interaction between 
various actors working towards that common goal that will benefit all in the midst of 
viable institutions. Such interaction has to be for the interest of present communities 
without compromising the needs and welfare of future communities. However, the 
evidence from this study identifies how the mining activities in these resource-based 
communities have endangered the environment, (resources), assets and communities 
(people). In the diamond mining industry, there has been action and reaction between 
the state and the communities. On one hand, the state actors utilise the natural 
resources for political and economic gains. On the other hand, because of unfair 
distribution of wealth, the various community actors pursue the resources with 
different self-interest in different ways. Hence, these have caused unprecedented 
social and ecological damage in these communities. Apparently, to a certain extent, 
the resource-based communities have become victims of natural resource and policy 
exclusion. But according to their actions, they are perpetrators of ecological damage 
and depletion of assets.  
 
Over the years, the interrelationships between local people, investors, government, 
and resource-based communities have been questionable. The government and the 
investors or corporations have become the economic leaders, determining what is to 
be done and how, while the resource-based communities have become the economic 
followers, accepting the dictates of the state-corporate collaborative concessions. 
From this perspective, Somerville (2009a) categorises such communities as being 
weak. From an economic point of view, Joseph differentiates communities from what 
she called the capitalist society. She maintains the differences on the basis of 
alienation, rationality and bureaucracy (Joseph, 2000). Joseph argues that a 
community is autonomous from a capitalist society but that they are linked to each 
other. Joseph emphasises that the economic factors fall short of recognising a 
community as an agent of social change. In addition to this critique, Strickland (2004) 
posited that Joseph ignores the traditional class difference and likeness that form the 
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basis of identity politics. In essence, Joseph’s argument of community and capital 
society undermines Frank and Smith (1999) argument of community development 
that calls for planned fruition of the economic, social, cultural, and environmental 
factors of community well-being. However, I want the reader to know that the scope 
of the thesis limits itself to just the community capacity of the internal community 
actors. Their roles will explain whether governance has shifted from the state to the 
communities. This is because, over the years, the government has awarded mining 
contracts and concessions to corporations without the communities’ approval (NACE, 
2009). Both the public (government) and private actors (corporations) have failed to 
act responsibly by signing investment contracts that take no consideration of 
sustainability of the resources and the co-role of the resource-based communities to 
attain sustainable community development. Instead, the government has used state 
security institutions to bring mayhem to communities when their level of discontent 
over lack of social and environmental justice perpetuated by corporations reached 
saturation point. Such actions occurred in the diamond rich Kono district in December 
2007 between Koidu Holdings Limited (KHL, but now called OCTEA), and the 
community (NACE, 2009) and recently on December 19th 2012. In all these incidents, 
the state used its institutions to primarily protect the corporations at the expense of 
killing the community workers. Contextualising this from a theoretical perspective, in 
accordance with the principles of sustainable development and some relevant theories, 
the people’s entitlement, capacity and welfare are affected. This undermines people’s 
legal rights and public benefits (Gore, 1993) and runs contrary to Gwin’s (2005) 
capacity explanation that people should have the ability to administer their affairs 
successfully. There is a desperation and need for the state to achieve development 
goals and the rent-seeking agenda by corrupt regimes (Ebrahim-Zadeh, 2003) who 
collaborate with corporations and who have also failed to adhere to their corporate 
social responsibilities, which has subjected the “resource-based communities” to 
become mere hosts of natural resources. They are restricted by unsustainable mining 
policies, in which they are neither fully represented nor fully informed (Goodland, 
2004). Such actions have undermined the prospect of community development, and 
these effects will affect the capacity, capital or assets, living standards and 
infrastructure of future communities (generations) as well. 
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1.5 Sustainable Development 
In the section above on community development, I identified the capacity of 
communities to work on improving their living standards and infrastructure. However, 
such a process must not compromise with succeeding communities. Considering the 
Brundtland report (1987), achieving development at the cost of resources and human 
capital does not meet the fundamental principle of sustainable development. The 
definition of sustainable development, according to the 1987 United Nations World 
Commission on Environment and Development’s document, which was entitled ‘Our 
Common Future’, is to ‘meet the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (WCED, 1987). Therefore, as 
we aspire to have a better life through strong and or weak sustainability approaches, 
our actions should not affects the chances of future generation to meet their own 
welfare needs. In contrast, the increasing exploration and extraction of natural 
resources in resource-rich communities in the developing world has affected intra-
generations and inter-generations. Evidence shows that intra-generations have 
witnessed social upheavals, neglect, economic shocks, and land degradation. 
Subsequently, in the case of the Kono district in Sierra Leone, decades of mining in 
the past have affected the present generation and may affect the future generations if 
the communities remain incapacitated to co-govern in policymaking and 
implementation, and co-produce in producing and delivering community services.  
 
Acknowledging this anomaly surrounding resource- based communities, this thesis 
identifies the long overlooked mechanisms within the resource-based communities in 
order to work towards the principles of sustainable community development based on 
the community’s needs and priorities, and their related capacity to undertake 
collective action in individual resource-based communities. This draws upon the 
specificities of the role of the different identified actors, their capacity as individuals 
and as a community, their activities, and their knowledge about sustainability practice 
which leads towards sustainable development.  
 
1.6 Theoretical Approach 
In this thesis, I have combined political ecology and sustainable development. The 
choice of these two interrelated literatures as a theoretical framework for this thesis is 
justified on the basis that they both explore the use of resources and sustainability 
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approaches undertaken by different actors of varying power roles in the exploitation 
of the resources. They also consider the role and limitations of the resource-based 
communities to provide, deliver, and participate in sustainable development practices 
without compromising the needs and welfare of future generations. In this respect, as 
the outcome of this thesis is determined by the role of various actors, this piece of 
work is based on the stakeholder approach to a wide range of ecological discourses 
drawing on the 1987 Brundtland report. These diverse aims and interests of the actors 
have affected most resource-based communities and have limited their sustained 
development over time contrary to the Brundtland report (WCED, 1987), which 
argues that present actions should not affect the welfare of future generations. 
Evidence from the diamond rich district of Kono in Sierra Leone shows that mining 
activities have affected present-day communities (intra-generation) and will 
subsequently affect succeeding generations through the activities of different actors 
(see chapters 5 & 6). This scenario is exacerbated by the absence of co-governance 
and co-production strategies that have been adopted by the government of Sierra 
Leone since port independence from what Bayart (1982) called the statist conceptions 
of development. In the pluralism on political ecology and sustainable development, 
the thesis will identify both the roles and interests of different actors on natural 
resources by acknowledging the impact of their activities, and the strategic 
approaches of sustainability through governance structure. From the 
interconnectedness between political ecology and sustainable development, the thesis 
will identify the governance issues of who participates, how, and where, on policy 
formulation and implementation in order to achieve sustainable community 
development. Furthermore, it will suggest procedures and present credible evidence, 
clearly define priorities, and demonstrate approaches for achieving them. Since the 
availability, access and control of natural resources is influenced by a network of 
actors, and the aim of the thesis is to explore the dynamics between resource-use and 
achieving sustainable community development, it becomes explicit that the two 
theoretical literatures are relevant to this study. 
 
1.7 Contribution to Existing Literature 
The aim of the thesis is to explore the dynamics between resource-use and achieving 
sustainable community development. The thesis seeks to understand and contribute to 
the existing literature on political ecology and sustainable development. In achieving 
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this, the thesis takes into consideration the literature on governance and community 
development. Years of resource exploitation in the past have affected the present 
generation and resulted in the current circumstances. This is likely to affect the future 
generations as well if no substantive action is undertaken. The thesis attempts to 
understand political ecology and sustainable development as a theoretical framework 
linking natural resources and sustainability approaches. It will also deliberate on the 
community capacity of the different domestic actors in achieving sustainable 
community development. Often, the existence of natural resources and the role of the 
domestic actors have led to conflict of interest, parallel communities and 
unsustainable activities. As such, despite continual mining policy reforms and 
Minerals Acts by every succeeding government, and the repatriation of minimal funds 
to the mined communities through the EITI governance initiatives, the principles of 
sustainable development do not exist. These principles have not been achieved 
because of limitations in community governance. Legally, through Acts of 
Parliament, the government has become the sole determinant of how the community 
resources should be managed and contracted. This legal leverage on resources has 
incapacitated the resource communities’ ability to consent and participate in decision-
making and implementation. The limited services in these communities are 
government-controlled. The question is how and when will these communities 
overcome these limitations and become sustainable?  
 
Many writers or theorists have contributed to specific sustainable community 
development literature, but little or nothing has dealt specifically with the case of 
Sierra Leone’s diamond mining. Instead, we have got substantial literature on the 
political economy of conflict diamonds (blood diamonds) and resource-curses. I have 
deviated from the argument on resource-curses and conflict diamonds and will 
contribute to the wider debate of natural resources and sustainable community 
development that calls for the role of the resource communities at the centre of 
community development. The contribution emanating from the findings will assist 
researchers, academics and policymakers in both the public and private sectors to 
develop sound and effective response mechanisms to ecological problems within 
communities, especially in developing countries.  
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It is argued that natural resources are often a prerequisite for economic development 
and this has been the subject of many articles, book chapters and reports. Natural 
resources, especially non-renewable resources, have become more of a burden than 
benefit in most resource-based communities in the developing world, with the 
communities given short-term lip service. Inferring from that, I will just be dealing 
with some specific contributors; a full literature reviews is provided in chapter 2. 
Collier and Hoeffler (2005) examined the link between what they called ‘lootable’ 
resources, poor governance and underdevelopment in sub-Saharan Africa, which are 
centred on greed and grievance. Like Ross (2003), they explained that abundant 
natural resources in Africa reap limited reward for the resource countries. Rather it 
has brought political instability, corruption, underdevelopment, and sometimes 
insurgencies. Therefore, in an attempt to resolve these upheavals, Ocheje (2006) calls 
for a high standard of transparency that both the government and the extractive 
corporations investing in these resource-rich developing countries must conform to. 
But there is unwillingness to achieve this because of corruption. Gberie (2002) 
supports this argument by stating that the scourge of Sierra Leone’s diamond industry 
is corruption. This justifies my earlier assertion that unlike the resource-curse 
hypothesis, there is a ‘state-corporate’ curse situation. The ‘state-corporate’ curse 
hypothesis goes beyond corrupt policies to include a situation whereby the state uses 
its institutions to suppress social, economic and environmental descent.  
 
However, not everybody or every institution agrees that resource abundance, greed 
and grievance are the causes of underdevelopment and armed conflict in Sierra 
Leone. Unlike Collier and Hoeffler (2005), who attribute the cause of armed conflict 
to greed, the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in its 2004 
report titled ‘Witnessed to Truth’ espoused the idea that the cause of the war was the 
result of years of bad governance, endemic corruption and denial of basic human 
rights, which created the appalling situation that made war inevitable (TRC, 2004). 
This neglect resulted in young people fending desperately for natural resources at the 
expense of the environment. On this, Zack-Williams (2001), argues that youths who 
were helpless and marginalised before the war experienced control as they grew to be 
perpetually involved in fighting sprees, which offered them the opportunity to 
empower themselves and coercively take back natural resources that the government 
had deprived them of. In this juncture, I see the greed factor and the reaction through 
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grievance as evidence of bad governance that is demonstrated through inequity 
distribution of wealth. In a similar contribution, Le Billon, (2001) and Collier and 
Hoeffler (2000) argue that the relationship between resources and human activities, 
especially in developing countries, have led to a breakdown of control, 
mismanagement, and ecological destruction. That is why some proponents argue that 
resources have become a curse (Humphrey et al., 2007; Ebrahim-Zadeh, 2003), 
leading to violence and conflicts (Collier, 2000; Ross, 1999), and leaving behind 
unsustainable communities with declining social, economic, environmental 
conditions and an unequal use of power (Doppelt, 2003). In contrast with Collier and 
Hoeffler, Francis (2010) disputed this ‘greed proposition’ and argued that the 
situation was caused by fundamental political, economic and socio-cultural 
differences. In an attempt to address these fundamental issues, Maconachie examined 
the institutionalisation strategy adopted to salvage the on-going problem with 
diamond resources in particular. In a 2008 Working Paper for the Brooks World 
Poverty Institute, Maconachie examined diamond mining and governance initiatives 
and post-conflict development in Sierra Leone. This working paper assesses the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) and the Diamond Area Community 
Development Fund (DACDF) as the two main governance initiatives in the country’s 
diamond sector. In summary, they see the establishment of institutions as a 
governance strategy for the long-term diamond resource problems in Sierra Leone. 
Although the above body of literature has argued that an abundance of resources is 
counter-productive in sub-Saharan Africa’s development, and Maconachie’s 
concludes that diamonds in Sierra Leone will continue to be a ‘double edged sword’, 
they have ignored the indisputable role of the community in the governance process. 
In this thesis, I have argued that the resource-based communities should not just be 
seen as a recipient of development promises through the DACDF, but as an indelible 
element in the co-provision of goods and services and in creation of policy for the 
sustainable community development that is indispensable to the extraction of 
resources and the development of the community. The communities should not be 
seen as followers and recipients but as leaders and joint actors of their own 
community goals. This is why political ecologists have been working to understand 
the interconnectedness between different actors, what they do, how they do it, and 
under whose control it is done. By this, the interests and welfare of present and future 
communities are not compromised. Accordingly, political ecology explains the 
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dynamic and changeable interaction between society and natural resources in the 
midst of class disparity (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987). In Blaikie and Brookfield 
(1987), political ecology is used to look at the interrelationship between local people, 
national and political economies, and the ecosystem. This demonstrates the use of 
power, the right to use resources and control resources, and the protection of the 
environment (Bourdeau, 2004).  
 
In addition, these contributors discussed above have failed to acknowledge the social 
networking that has collapsed within the communities owing to conflict over 
resources in recent years. They have failed to different between community conflict 
emanating from socio-economic factors at community level and armed conflict 
driven by political and economic factors. It is evident from the study that the 
communities are at a crossroads with one set of actors blaming another. The absence 
of functional social networking coordination among community actors on one hand 
and the state on another becomes detrimental to the communities’ ecological 
discourses and the governance structure. This existing inter strife cannot be ignored if 
we are to successfully work towards sustainable community development. This is 
why Somerville (2011) argues that a community should be a place of common 
interest, common characteristics, values and culture. 
 
As such, some proponents acknowledge the different stakeholder interpretations and 
strategies relating to social issues and environmental hazards connected to resource 
extraction in developing countries (Eggert, 1994). The communities are 
acknowledged only as grassroots participants. As such, less emphasis has been laid on 
the ability of weaker stakeholders at the grassroots level to compete with powerful 
actors on political and economic issues (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). The weaker 
stakeholders are passive in pursuing their own community goals, and are often 
suppressed and rejected in issues that affect them. Apparently, the relationship 
between government, society and resources in political, economic, social and 
ecological issues has often been inadequate. As such, the so-called grassroots 
stakeholders have often resorted to avoidance behaviour (Adas, 1981) and sometimes 
this results in violent conflicts. This is evident in the recent August 16th 2012 
Marikana violence in South Africa that left 3 dead and 78 wounded. Also the Koidu 
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community riot against the KHL (now OCTEA) in 2007 left 2 dead (NACE, 2010), 
and another two dead on the 19th December 2012 by state security.  
 
Political ecologists have attempted to link local social oppression and environmental 
degradation to wider political and economic concerns (Blaikie, 1985; Bunker 1985). 
Cliffe and Moorsom (1997), Hedlund (1979) and O’Brien (1985) in their publication 
titled the Review of African Political Economy discussed unequal power structures, 
identified local environmental conflicts in terms of class interactions and linked 
surplus extraction to global capitalist production (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). Within 
these prevailing circumstances, the local communities have become or have been 
ascribed the role of hosts of the natural resources. They have only customary control 
of the land but are not legally owners of the resources. In spite of this they are 
adversely affected by actions of government and other actors within the communities. 
The communities lack community capacity in the form of empowerment, entitlement, 
information, active participation and trust to determine what affects them and how, 
and how to avoid being exploited and made vulnerable. According to Holmes, 
(2003a), participation brings sustainable practices. Therefore, the broad research aims 
and objectives relating to the issue of resources and communities in this thesis are 
focussed on working towards the principles of sustainable community development in 
the resource-rich communities as stated below.  
 
Aim and Objectives 
Aim: This research aims to explore the dynamic relationship between resource usage 
and the aim of achieving sustainable community development in the Kono district, 
Sierra Leone. 
 
Objectives:  
1. To identify the relationship between resource exploitation and community 
governance in mining communities through an analysis of key actors and their 
roles at a range of scales. 
2. To examine if and in what ways mining communities utilise their assets and 
undertake practices that contribute towards sustainable community development. 
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3. To identify both the structural and community-based barriers to promoting 
sustainable community development in mining communities and to make policy 
recommendations for community development in such communities. 
1.8 Methodology 
In this section, I have given a summary of the methodology, with details explored in 
chapter four. The research was entirely qualitative using a multi-case study approach 
and employed triangulation techniques for data collection (see chapter 4). The 
discussions are centred on the adoption of an inductive approach to theory building 
from evidence collected in the data. The inductive approach attempts to establish new 
theories in order to explain resource use and community sustainability instead of 
testing an existing theory in a deductive manner (Blaxter et al., 2001). I have 
constructed theories using induction, abduction and retroduction by looking for 
regularities common to social (community) and political actors, their roles, and their 
involvement in sustainable community development. 
 
Qualitative research centres on events in a social world through the eyes of the studied 
group (Bryman, 2008). Yin (2009; 2007) explains that qualitative methods create 
knowledge that is more socially useful and can contribute to a more effective 
development policy. It provides a better understanding of human interpretations and 
interactions. Hence, I find it justifiable to use it in this study. The triangulation 
techniques used include semi-structured interviews, documents, and focus group 
discussions. Since some actors are unwilling to participate in in-depth interviews, the 
combination of these techniques provided the opportunity for cross-validating the data 
from different sources. I used the case study approach because of its usefulness. Yin 
(2009) argued that case studies are appropriate as they offer a vivid story of what 
happened and how. Case studies are concerned with how and why things happen, 
allowing the investigation of contextual realities and the difference between what was 
planned and what actually happens. The approach conforms to the triangulation 
technique I adopted in an attempt to achieve a balanced representation through using 
semi-structured interviews, documentary data (secondary data), and focus groups 
discussions to complement the data generated. The case study approach adheres to the 
understanding of post-positivism relating to the bases of reality and it being socially 
constructed (Yin, 2009; Nee and Taylor, 2000). It was of interest to the researcher to 
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analyse the disparity between what is in the documentation and what actually happens 
in the communities. 
 
Limitations 
Qualitative methodology is not without limitations. It has the tendency of being 
protracted with unnecessary issues. Lofland and Lofland (1995) argued that there is 
the peril of deviating away from the purpose of the study. But this has been overcome 
with the adoption of triangulation techniques. 
 
Case Study Approach 
The research adopted the multiple case study approach, which helps the researcher to 
be more focussed because of the potential proximity to real life situations (Yin, 2007). 
Yin (1993) argues that studies on multiple-cases should follow a replication, and not a 
sampling logic. The use of multiple-case study enhances confidence in results (Yin, 
1993). Unlike other researches or commentaries on diamond mining in Sierra Leone, 
this research undertakes a relatively new direction to exploring the problems 
associated with the mining industry in Sierra Leone. The study is not aimed at 
investigating land degradation and conflict diamonds. Instead, the research is aimed at 
achieving a sustainable diamond mining industry that can benefit present and future 
communities and requires a governance initiative that incorporates co-governance and 
co-production in the resource-based communities. In that respect, four chiefdom 
headquarter towns or communities that are actively involved in mining were explored 
in detail.  
 
Research Design: Strategy and Approach 
A research design is “a logical plan for getting from here to there” (Yin, 2009, p. 26). 
It helps the researcher to avoid moving away from the focus of the study. It is a 
“blueprint” for a study addressing important problems: what question to study, what 
data is appropriate, what data to collect, and the analysis of the results (Robson, 
2003).  
 
Cases Studied 
I investigated four mining chiefdoms (Nimiyama, Gbense, Nimikoro and Tankoro) in 
the Kono district in the eastern part of Sierra Leone, which are instrumental in 
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drawing generalisations on sustainable community development. The first diamonds 
were discovered in this district in 1930 and since then all forms of mining have been 
taking place on small and large scales, legal and illegal (Smillie et al., 2000; Bangura, 
2006, 2008), by domestic and external actors, in the form of alluvial and Kimberlite 
(NACE, 2009; Zack-Williams, 1995). These resource-based communities have been 
affected environmentally, socially, politically and economically.  
 
Conducting the Research 
The researcher visited the Ministry of Mines and had discussions with mines officials. 
I had an insight into the operations of Sierra Leone’s artisanal diamond mining and 
the efforts made by the government to achieve community development in mining 
communities. I also visited the ‘Network Movement for Justice and Development’, 
who are an advocacy NGO for ‘just mining’. I also attempted to contact the Local 
Authority/Councillors who were presumed to be representatives of the communities. 
They are aware of traditional norms. I contacted an official of the most powerful 
corporate mining company, Koidu Holdings Ltd (now OCTEA) in Koidu town 
(Gbense and Tankoro Chiefdoms). The next focus was on the artisanal mining actors. 
They were selected at random taking into consideration their relevance and access.  
 
Case Study Timetable and Data Collection Procedures 
The research was undertaken between February and July 2011. The timetable for 
collecting documents, conducting interviews and meetings for focus groups was not 
consistent. With officials reluctant to speak, most of the documents were accessed 
online at the Mines Ministry websites, Koidu Holdings Ltd, and the Network 
Movement for Development and Justice (NMJD). The artisanal participants showed a 
willingness to cooperate despite being busy with their mining activities. I also had a 
random selection of them for the focus group discussions. Due to their busy mining 
schedule, the numbers for each focus group was uneven. However, the information 
collected from them was credible as it shows consistency, as a case report was 
produced and analysed for each case. This conforms to Charmaz’s (2005) principles 
on data collection and analyses where both are presumed linked and work 
simultaneously. The method of data collection and analysis was appropriate because 
of the homogeneity of the problem, the, actors and activities in all the cases 
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Data Collection Techniques and Process 
This entails the nature of data collection, the techniques and the process used to 
analyse the data. I used documentation, semi-structured interviews, and focus group 
discussion. I drew a table where necessary for each of the techniques explaining the 
demographic description of the respondents interviewed, and coded the focus groups. 
I used at most two focus groups for each case.  
 
Documentary Analysis 
Documents are significant in collecting data (Yin, 2009). Documents used in the 
thesis included those from the Ministry of Mines and Mineral Resources, the Network 
Movement for Justice (NMJD) and other articles including those by Partnership 
Africa Canada (PAC). 
 
Key Informant Interviews 
I used interviews to get primary data from credible respondents. Interviews are used 
as a medium of conversation with a specific purpose. Robson (1993, p. 228) defines 
interviews as ‘a conversation with a purpose’. The researcher adopted semi-structured 
interview with eight focus groups in the four chiefdoms, and 20 individual community 
members. A total of 37 respondents were engaged. Subsequent questions depended on 
the previous answer given by the respondent. 
 
Focus Groups 
According to Powell et al. (1996) a focus group is a group of individuals identified 
and gathered by the researcher to discuss an issue and comment on it from their 
individual understanding of an area of study. The focus groups were met at 
convenient locations. Using focus groups helped to minimise the chances of 
inconsistencies. The researcher used the focus groups to ignite discussion and provoke 
answers in order to get better responses.  
 
Data Analysis and Interpretation 
After data collection, I reviewed, coded, categorised and analysed the raw data to 
achieve the aim and objectives and answer the research questions. According to 
Gohar (2002), data analysis is the construal of raw data to understand the causes and 
effects of problem under consideration. Recorded information and semi-structured 
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interviews were transcribed, coded and analysed thematically to explain conformity 
and disagreements on the research propositions and new theories that emerged. The 
researcher adopted an inductive approach to theory building, coding and categorising 
the themes to arrive at the conceptual ideas by using theoretical contributions, which 
guided me to formulate the research questions.  
 
Categorising the Data 
The next step was to categorise the data and link the relating concepts to each other. I 
was more interested in the general issues related to the research aims and objectives 
than developing them into meaningful theoretical concepts. The text is simplified into 
three coded data sources and then used for theory building, playing with and 
investigating these codes and building data into significant pattern of relationships 
(Coffey and Atkinson, 1996). I used category structures around the thematic concepts 
of the actors, community governance, and sustainable community development. These 
themes go alongside concepts such as roles or activities of actors, sustainability 
practice and assets. These themes or contexts were used to categorise all the cases, 
and linked the issues across these multiple case studies one at a time, bringing the 
categorisation together. Because of the responses being almost the same in each 
context, I used a theoretical comparison between the reviewed bodies of literature in 
the theoretical chapter (2). 
 
Theory and Narrative Building 
I started the theory building from particular or specific issues. I identified the 
phenomenon and related it by using ideas and theories for all of the cases. I used 
diagrams and tables where required to identify the questions and the sources of data. 
With this, I was able to give emphasis to certain differences from the empirical data of 
the participants, the role of the actors and their activities on the available asset limits 
of sustainable community development and I then made analytical generalisations. 
According to Yin (2005), these generalisations help the researcher to understand the 
process and the relationship between the various concepts arising from the data. 
Conclusively, I link the interrelationship between the groups of concepts on 
community governance and sustainability practice in building my theories. 
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Ethics of the Research 
Research should work with the whims and caprices of research ethics with 
considerable respect for human dignity. Creswell (1994, p. 165) states, “...the 
researcher has an obligation to respect the rights, needs, value and desires of the 
respondents”. This research involved various actors who were key sources of 
information. They included government officials, businesses, miners and community 
people. Hence, the ethical issues and challenges were taken into consideration whilst 
undertaking the research with the respondents. 
 
Researching a topic relating to diamonds in a country that where their presence had a 
contributory negative influence on a decade-long brutal war, which was largely 
fuelled by the trade in ‘blood diamonds’, is obviously difficult. The district is 
inhabited by people who depend either directly or indirectly on diamond mining and 
trade as their main source of livelihood. There were ethical issues with a high sense of 
moral responsibility for the researcher relating to the security, privacy, and wellbeing 
of the interviewees (Bryman, 1988). Taking these issues into account, there was a 
sense of responsibility needed in order to adhere to the required ethical standards 
when conducting the research under review.    
 
I took into consideration issues like informed consent, confidentiality and anonymity, 
security risks, and social status. I also considered the high rate of illiteracy when 
conducting semi-structured interviews with community participants. The local Krio 
language was used to communicate and solicit their consent. The purpose of the 
research was explained before the interviews and respondents were informed of their 
freedom to withdraw their consent at any stage of the interview. With these measures 
put in place, the interviews and discussions were friendly and productive. 
 
Despite all the efforts aimed at protecting participants, there were some difficulties 
getting government officials and members of local authorities to express themselves 
like the other community members. This is due to the nature of what I call ‘political 
psychology’. This remains an issue and most people are often afraid to respond to 
key issues especially when they may risk their job. This was evident in the brief 
discussions with some government officials and the administrator of Koidu Holdings 
Ltd, who all made several references to their websites for the information sought. 
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These websites provide information that fine-tuned the work of the institution. The 
information was not always comprehensive. This is often true of government 
information which is drafted and published in order to suit the needs of the 
government of the day. However, using the triangulation technique, effort was made 
to secure information and protect respondents without identifying them by name. 
This was done in my work by giving prefix code of S for Sewafe, K for Koidu and Y 
for Yengema, and the suffix-coded letter shows the status of the respondent.  
 
1.9 Organisation of Work 
The thesis is organised into eight chapters. The first four chapters are theoretical and 
include the conceptual framework chapter (2) and the methodology (chapter 4). The 
rest of the four chapters include the analysis chapters (5, 6 & 7) and the conclusion 
chapter (8).  
 
The introductory chapter has outlined the research focus and the core arguments as 
well as the theoretical approach, the aim and objectives, a summarised methodology 
(see details in chapter 4) and the organisation of the thesis. Chapter two is a combined 
theoretical framework chapter of political ecology and sustainable development. In 
this chapter, I have justified the combination of the two literatures subject to the 
objectives of the research. I have looked at the conceptual issues and approaches of 
political ecology, resource curse, and community governance and sustainability. In 
addition, I have discussed the concept of sustainable development using the 
Brundtland report, the strong and weak sustainability approaches, community assets, 
sustainable community development, and the challenges. Chapter three discusses the 
political geography of Sierra Leone’s mining industry. In the chapter, the roles of both 
state and non-state internal actors, including non-state external actors, are discussed. It 
gives a brief background political history of Sierra Leone and its diamond industry. 
This chapter is a theoretical platform to chapter five, which limits its scope on internal 
actors. 
 
Chapter four is the methodology. It highlights the approaches, the data collection and 
how the data was analysed. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 deal with the analysis of the data 
collected and addresses the objectives of the research, respectively. Chapter five 
includes resource exploitation and resource curse, environmental impacts, the actors, 
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and community governance. Chapter six deals with sustainable community 
development, community assets and how the various actors’ activities affect 
sustainability approaches according to the Brundtland report. Chapter seven looks at 
the outcome of the findings in chapters 5 and 6 and addresses the structural and 
community-based barriers to promoting sustainable community development. In it, I 
have made suggestions and recommendations on policy for community development 
in the mining communities. The last chapter (8) deals with the comprehensive 
summary of the thesis findings and suggests areas of possible future research. It is a 
preparatory chapter for more work that can be investigated in the wider field of 
political ecology and sustainable community development. Specifically, it is an 
exploratory chapter on further research in developing resource-based communities, 
with development that brings gains in the present without compromising the well-
being of future communities. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Assessing the Sustainability in Political Ecology 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter focuses on two main bodies of literatures: political ecology and 
sustainable development. It attempts to harmonise the ideological and epistemology 
of how the two inter-connected concepts embrace pluralism and how they contribute 
to the outcome of the research objectives. Political ecology has incorporated a series 
of methodological approaches that interprets and assesses sustainability. Among these 
include intergenerational equity (Padilla, 2002) and the concept of strong versus weak 
sustainability (Neumayer, 2003). In that case, political ecology may be understood as 
an attempt to refine and apply the basic idea of sustainable development using the 
Brundtland report, which calls for how our present actions should not be 
compromised in reference to the needs of future generations.  
 
In an attempt to harmonise these two literature sources, I will define the concepts of 
political ecology and sustainable development. In addition, I will review the pluralism 
on specific literature on sustainable development using the Brundtland report (1987) 
and political ecology. The Brundtland report (WCED, 1987) is used in the thesis as 
the pivot of sustainable development within the bulk of the literature because of its 
inclusiveness of actors’ present actions and the possible effect and reactions in the 
future. In essence, it conforms to the stakeholder approach adopted in political 
ecology, in order to determine how the actions of various actors affect the present and 
future communities. From an ecocentric point of view, sustainable development 
shows the relationship between humans and the natural environment they find 
themselves in. The human factor implies the role of actors and how their activities 
influence others.  
 
Secondly, I will look at the conceptual issues or paradigm shifts in political ecology in 
three debatable questions. Thirdly, the next section will discuss the conceptual 
approaches of political ecology with key references made to the stakeholder approach. 
The fourth section that follows will examine community governance and 
sustainability practice. Here, I will include social capital, and the resource abundance 
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and curse debate. The fifth section will deliberate on sustainable community 
development and the concept of community. In the sixth section, I will discuss the 
strong and weak sustainability approaches in the context of political ecology. In this 
section, I will discuss the various assets within the communities, and end it with the 
challenges of sustainable community.  
 
Though I discuss the need for the resource-based community to exercise their right to 
partnership in policymaking and implementation, and for them to determine the 
production and delivery of services, I will discuss three main theoretical propositions 
in the nexus of the literature. Firstly, sustainable development is universal but the 
approaches towards achieving it vary and are subject to the process of achieving it at 
micro level (of community). This is why so many conferences have yet to confer on a 
conclusive agreement for a comprehensive strategy for sustainability. Secondly, 
focusing on the issues at macro level (international policies) or internal governance 
initiatives without taking into consideration the co-governance and co-production 
approaches is unproductive. Thirdly, because of the north-south divide or differences 
between the developed and developing countries in the composition, culture, and 
governance structure, real solutions for sustainability are yet to be achieved. As such, 
focus should be a shift from state-led governance to state-community governance. 
 
2.2 Understanding Political Ecology and Sustainable Development 
Before discussing the theoretical pluralism between political ecology and sustainable 
development, I will discuss their definitions and interpretations to give a summarised 
scope of these two theoretical concepts used in this chapter. This will make the 
discussion on the interdisciplinary relationship clearer. I will start with political 
ecology and subsequently discuss sustainable development using the Brundtland 
report. 
 
Political Ecology 
The concept commences as a framework involving the intricacy between local people, 
national and global political economies, and the ecosystem (Blaikie and Brookfield, 
1987; Schmink and Wood, 1987), and how their interrelationship alters the 
availability of resources and control over resources amid conflict of interest, conflict 
of control and use of resources (Peterson 2000). In addition, political ecology 
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addresses ecological issues and the political economy by way of harmonising the 
changing dynamics between ecological changes and humans (Walker, 2005; Peterson, 
2000).  
 
According to Peterson (2000), ecological change caused by, influenced by, or 
controlled by human action alters resources and services. Hence, political ecology 
incorporates the dynamics involving humans, institutions, and natural resources in 
both geographical and non-geographical ways over time. This dynamics between 
humans and resources require political decisions, economic activities, and 
management of resources that should benefit the host, the producer, and the advocator 
(government, local authority, the buyer, and the consumer). This means that political 
economy cannot ignore ecology nor can ecology ignore the political dynamics in 
achieving sustainability. This shows that political ecology can interconnect with other 
discipline. Zimmerer and Bassett (2003b, p. 2) and Neumann (2009, p. 1) cited from 
Neumann (2009) in ‘Political ecology: Theorizing scale in the Journal of Progress in 
Human Geography’, argue that: “Political ecology is discipline based; there exists a 
‘productive tension’ between the field and its home discipline that can be explored for 
potential theoretical advancement.”  
 
In that case, political ecology is a discipline which has the potential to go beyond the 
present parameters of its study. Hence, I think it can justify my decision to use it aside 
sustainable development, which considers the role of actors, resources and 
communities in this thesis.  
 
Sustainable Development: The Brundtland Report 
This section will broaden our understanding of the concept and principle of 
sustainability used in this chapter and in the thesis by discussing a generally 
acceptable and working definition. Like other disciplines, there is a problem in 
gaining a consensus definition acceptable to all. Regardless of that, the 
appropriateness of the definition matters to its context. After years of environmental 
concerns globally, the United Nations World Commission on environment and 
development produced the report titled ‘Our Common Future’ in 1987, and 
sustainable development emerged undoubtedly as a global policy instrument to ‘meet 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
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meet their own needs’ (WCED, 1987). That is why, for the purpose of this thesis, I 
have chosen the Brundtland definition as the appropriate conceptual definition 
because of its inclusion of present activities and how they must not be detrimental 
now (intra-generation) and in the future (inter-generation). Also, the Brundtland 
definition includes the actors (generations) who, as discussed in chapters 5, 6 and 7, 
have played diverse roles in resource-based communities. At national community 
level, I argue that present activities must not be detrimental to intra-community and 
inter-community interests. In the following section, I will deliberate further on the 
relationship between political ecology and sustainable development. 
Theoretical Pluralism: Political Ecology and Sustainable Development 
This section shows the relevant common factors that can be used in this thesis to 
justify the use of political ecology and sustainable development. To substantiate this 
link, I consider the contributions on political ecology given by Blaikie and Brookfield 
(1987), and Peterson (2000) as a framework involving the intricacy between local 
people, national and global political economies, and the ecosystem (Blaikie and 
Brookfield, 1987). This concerns how their interrelationship alters the availability of 
resources and control over resources amid conflict of interest, conflict of control and 
use of resources (Peterson, 2000), and the Brundtland report, which ‘meets the needs 
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs’ (WCED, 1987). The analogy between political ecology and sustainable 
development deliberate on the actors, the resources and the short and long-term 
effects. Development processes fosters community development in people and 
resources at but how the actions of the actors in achieving their development goals 
affect future generation or communities cannot be ignored. This relation is 
summarised in the table 2.1. The table is divided into three columns showing the 
actors, their actions and the effects on present and future communities. From this 
table, I will discuss how each of them interrelates with each other from a political 
ecology and sustainable development point of view. 
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Table 2.1 Theoretical Pluralism: Political Ecology and Sustainable Development 
Actions Effects Actors: there are diverse 
actors with varying 
interest.  
 
The dominant actors give 
unsustainable activities a 
sustainable outcome 
a) Use of power: 
legitimate power could be 
used for (i) coercive 
purpose (ii) reward 
purpose (patron-client 
relation) 
 
b) Use of resources: this is 
determined according to 
how the actors exercise 
power 
 
 
a) Present communities: 
the actions of the actors 
affects present 
communities in diverse 
ways, e.g. assets depletion 
 
b) Future communities: 
there is a spill-over effect 
on future communities 
 
c) Sustainability approach 
is neither strong nor weak 
in resource communities 
 
Author’s construct 
 
In the first column, I have divided the actors into three categories with each having its 
sub-categories. The second column shows the tool (power and resources) these actors 
use and which approach of sustainability it is used, and the third column identifies the 
effect on present and future communities arising from the first two columns.  
 
Political ecology has incorporated a series of methodological approaches that 
interprets and assesses sustainability. Among these include intergenerational equity 
(Padilla, 2002) and the concept of strong versus weak sustainability (Neumayer, 
2003). On the other hand, Sneddon et al. (2005) explain the theoretical and normative 
aspect of sustainable development as a policy discourse and development practice that 
is simultaneously accustomed to the peril of dominant actors hoping to give 
unsustainable activities a sustainable outcome. They call for decision that overhauls 
everything in a world where decisions over environmental governance prevails. 
Drawing from this proposition, it brings the role of actors in an ecologically unstable 
world where economic value on resources has become a bone of contention. The 
resources have been used by various actors, for diverse needs, and through ethical and 
unethical means. Some of these actors include communities, state agents and capitalist 
business. Their actions have often proven detrimental especially in resource-rich 
communities with neither a strong nor a weak sustainability. Most of these actors, like 
the proponents of weak sustainability, focus on the economic value of nature than the 
qualitative improvement of all forms of capital (Baker, 2006). Subsequently, the 
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effect transcends one generation to another. Hence, the essence of pluralistic 
sustainability requires the acknowledgment of the political nature of the conflicts that 
arise among actors. Such interventions have been in the form of environmental 
policies through various global conferences on man and his environment. As such, 
political ecology may be understood as an attempt to refine and implement the broad 
idea of the role of actors in sustainable development using the Brundtland report that 
calls for our present actions not compromised with the needs of future generations. 
Achieving this requires a flagrant use of the forms of power within the capacity of the 
actors. 
 
The role of power from local to global scales maintains a consistent scale in political 
ecology and transcends through the need of how actors and communities use power 
on people and resources to either benefit present development needs without any 
compromise of future communities or destroy present development needs and 
compromise the resources and needs of future generations. Thus, the analysis of how 
power is used and its relationship between various actors is a central concern of 
political ecology and sustainable development. Guha (2000) has provided leadership 
and intellectual contributions to political ecology by addressing the social and 
ecological implications of power relations. Flynn (2011) and Price (2009) state that 
power has the ability to influence others decision either in a positive or negative way. 
In that case, it can be used for either moral or immoral purposes. Robbins and Judge 
(2011) contributed to the acquisition of power, stating that people who have power 
deny it; people who want power try not to look like they are seeking it; and those who 
are good at acquiring it are secretive about how they got it (cited in Lunenburg, 2012, 
p. 1). This shows that power is a natural process in the framework of organisational 
way of doing things (Haugaard and Clegg, 2012; McClelland and Burnham, 2003). 
The process involves various ways depending on how it is acquired, used and 
purposed. Power could be legitimate and acquired through a position of assigned 
authority and the right to govern. It could be in the form of a reward that gives the 
individual the ability to influence the behaviour of others by luring them with things 
they may appreciate. The latter is associated with the patron-client relations whereby 
the client exercises the political leverage of the patron in self-interest (Kabia, 2006). 
This form of power develops gradually to coercive power and gives the patron or 
client the ability to influence the behaviour of others by inflicting direct punishment 
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or through implied threat to do so (Lunenburg, 2012). Evidence from both primary 
and secondary data has proven that legitimate power could be used to reward or 
coerce others. In many cases, especially in the developing world, evidence has shown 
how patron-client relation has affected resources and other subordinate actors.  
 
2.3 Conceptual Issues: Paradigm Shift in Political Ecology  
Like other disciplines or theoretical concepts, political ecology has attained prominent 
recognition in the field of human geography and sustainability in both developed and 
developing countries. However, it has remained at a crossroads and is interpreted in 
varying ways. Understanding of the concept has evolved over the years. The concept 
developed as a framework outlining the interaction between local people, national 
economies, global political economies and the ecosystem (Blaikie and Brookfield, 
1987; Schmink and Wood, 1987). For some commentators, political ecology is often 
linked to ecological issues from a political economy perspective by way of 
harmonising the changing dynamics of ecological changes and humans (Walker, 
2005; Peterson, 2000).  
 
The dynamics of political ecology have changed over time. In my attempt to 
incorporate it in this study and show the shift in ideas about the discipline, I ask many 
questions and raise concerns in my discussion of the literature. I use the questions as a 
way of systematically highlighting the various ideas according to their theoretical 
contributions. My first area of concern is exploring if political ecology is trans-
disciplinary. Here, my concern is to see how the adoption of political ecology as a 
theoretical framework can connect with the literature on community governance and 
sustainable community development, which is described in chapter three. For example 
(Zimmerer and Bassett, 2003b, p. 2) and (Neumann, 2009, p. 1) cited from Neumann 
(2009) in ‘Political ecology: Theorizing scale in the Journal of Progress in Human 
Geography’, argue that: “Political ecology is discipline based; there exists a 
‘productive tension’ between the field and its home discipline that can be explored for 
potential theoretical advancement.”  
 
Thus political ecology is a discipline which has the potential to go beyond the present 
parameters of its study. Hence, I think it can justify my decision to use it in this thesis. 
However, there are more questions which need to be answered in order to demonstrate 
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the body of ideas within the discipline. I am still interested in how far it can connect 
with my theoretical areas. An attempt to fill this gap was the contribution of Paulson 
et al. (2003), which links the discipline to political economy and cultural ecology. 
Even though this work is not focused on the conceptual side which links political 
ecology to political economy and cultural ecology, the discourse qualifies political 
ecology as being inter-disciplinary or trans-disciplinary. With these contributions, I 
surmise that the appropriateness of using political ecology can be transferred to 
sustainability.  
Political Ecology: Is it about people or places? 
My other question is whether the study of political ecology is about the geography of 
humans and places? Fundamentally, I am trying to find out if we should only pay 
attention to the welfare of people who live in a place or should we be interested in 
understanding how they live with each other and coexist with their environment? On 
this aspect, and in trying to find salient contributions to the piece of work, my focus is 
on how they can coexist as a social entity. In my quest for answers, I note how 
Neumann (2009) attempted to integrate the discipline of political ecology with human 
geography that connects with places and region. In addition, Neumann (2005) and 
Zimmerer and Bassett (2003b, p. 2) quoted from Neumann (2009) in ‘Political 
ecology: Theorizing scale’ in the Journal of Progress in Human Geography noted that 
“the field of political ecology has involved significantly the study of human 
environment relations”. Drawing from the contributions by Zimmerer, Bassett, 
Neumann, and Paulson and their colleagues, the above discussions demonstrate the 
relevance of the revolving issues to political ecology and its relationship with other 
disciplines, and the connection between humans and their environment. They fall 
short of identifying that human relationships with the environment are sometimes not 
equal. Some humans exert more influence than the others. In normal circumstances, 
we expect some form of authority among humans. Therefore there is a likelihood of 
having to pass laws. This therefore provokes another question that asks whether the 
focus of political ecology should be on questioning whether it is really political, or 
whether it is more relevant to focus on how power or politics determine issues such as 
the sustainability of the ecology and the environment.  
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Political Ecology: Is it political or ecological? 
Walker (2007) questions whether political ecology is satisfactorily political. By 
contrast, Vayda and Walters (1999) state that political ecology has become politics 
without ecology. I see both Walker and Vayda and Walters discussing the same issue 
but with a different focus. Whilst Walker was more interested in the political side but 
critical of the political fulfilment in political ecology, Vayda and Walters critique a 
focus on the political which omits considering the ecology. They see the political 
aspect of political ecology as being concerned with the issue of power whilst ignoring 
the influence of power on ecology itself. I agree with their discourse since my area of 
concern, as discussed above, is about how power or politics can determine the 
sustainability of resources and communities. This we shall also observe in the analysis 
chapters later, which show how politics has dominated ecology. In those chapters, I 
explained how the state has given more control of natural resources to the minister of 
mineral resources to preside over mining policies and the level of community benefit 
from the resources. Alongside my commentary, Paulson et al. (2005) explained that 
power is attributed as a social relation built on the unbalanced distribution of 
resources. Indeed, though their contribution is of relevance, they failed to show who 
has the political leverage to determine the distribution of resources. There are various 
actors in play when it comes to natural resources. Often, as this work has discovered, 
the community actors are subdued by political influence and political submissiveness 
or loyalty. Inferring also from the contribution of Walker (2007, p. 2) that: “the verbal 
commitment in political ecology to not only to study but to wield political power to 
make a difference, ‘to plant a seed’ for both the humans and nature appears not to be 
in question”.  
 
2.4 Conceptual Approaches of Political Ecology  
The approaches of political ecology are essential for harmonising people in the 
community with their natural resources. Despite having similar political, social and 
economic perspectives, political ecologists have attempted to adopt different 
approaches in dealing with the interrelationship between humans and their 
environment in developing countries (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). Taking into 
consideration the issue of resource burden and sustainability, these approaches outline 
the differing viewpoints or commentaries from different contributors on how to work 
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towards political ecology. This difference, according to my argument here, is 
understandable because there is variation in the development process between 
developed and developing nations, as people’s environment and culture influence 
their way of life, and there is variance in governance structures across nations and 
communities. As a result, approaches to ecological issues are bound to differ. In some 
instances, political ecologists combine two approaches in examining human and 
environmental issues. This could be appropriate, because no one approach is regarded 
to be the most suitable, apart from where it is deemed to be the most applicable. 
Indeed, it suffices to say that the outcome of any approach is determined by its 
effectiveness.  
 
Rangan and Kull (2009) outline three approaches of social action in political ecology, 
which are operation, observation, and interpretation, and how they can work together 
to produce an outcome of material process and power (scale). Through this, 
ecological, social and economic changes are made political, transformative, 
descriptive and evolutionary at local, national and international levels. In this 
commentary, we can see the concerns of these commentators for a desirable outcome. 
Nonetheless, this commentary does not say how much control the communities have 
and how their operation, observation and interpretation could transform the 
communities. However, this could be a workable approach in an already functioning 
sustainable community. Elsewhere, some commentators have argued that political 
ecology approaches have developed around three sets of concepts: first, marginality, 
in which political, economic and ecological expressions may be mutually reinforcing 
whereby “Land degradation is both a result and a cause of social marginalisation” 
(Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987, p. 23). Secondly, based on the pressure of production 
on resources that is transmitted through social relations resulting in the imposition of 
onerous demands on the environment (Watts, 1983b). Third, there is “the plurality of 
positions, perceptions, interests and rationalities in relation to the environment” 
(Blaikie, 1985, p. 16). In this case, there are critical analyses of institutional and 
development processes informed by movements for social and environmental 
injustice (Bryant, 2002; Zimmerer, 2000). Like Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) and 
Watts (1983b) the discourse is concerned with the physical side of ecology with a 
specific focus on land degradation. Land degradation has been Blaikie’s concern since 
the early days of political ecology. This concern did not go beyond considering the 
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socio-political relationship between the community and the actors they interact with. 
In addition, their commentary was centred on mitigating environmental impact 
instead of the inaction of community governance and the sustainability of the 
communities, including the various assets in the communities. In addition to the 
approaches outlined above, and in an attempt to conceptualise them in theoretical 
argument, there are three other approaches I am going to discuss below. They have 
been comprehensively categorised, issues in them identified and explained, along with 
the critique or contribution I have made on them. 
Geographical Approach 
This approach is directed at understanding the human impact on physical geography 
(Goodie, 1993) but according to Bryant and Bailey (1997) it is associated with the 
political economy. This is one of the approaches adopted by political ecologists in 
developing countries, which focuses on a specific environmental problem or set of 
problems such as tropical deforestation, land degradation, soil erosion and water 
pollution. Blaikie (1985) researched the political economy of soil erosion and 
identified hierarchical issues linking social, political and economic forces taking place 
at local, regional and global scales (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). Like Blaikie and 
Brookfield’s (1987) research on land degradation, studies were also carried out in 
Brazil by Hecht and Cockburn (1989), in Indonesia (Daurergne, 1993/4), on 
rangeland degradation in Sahelian Africa (Turner, 1993), and on water scarcity in 
Botswana (Peters, 1984). This approach, though appropriate for its context and 
specific environmental problems, does not include the use of natural resources and the 
role of the actors in the socio-economic setting. In an attempt to further simplify it, 
the approach does not take into consideration aspects of governance and 
sustainability.  
 
Stakeholders’ Approach 
Another form of approach adopted by political ecologists focuses on a range of 
questions, which take into consideration the different stakeholders and how their 
influence or discourses affect the participation of other stakeholders and their interests 
(Escobar, 1996). This is the approach adopted in this thesis to expound on the 
different actors as discussed in chapter 5. The actions of the actors could have either 
positive or negative effects. That is why stakeholder interests, their characteristics and 
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actions are significant in understanding political-ecological conflicts (Bryant and 
Bailey, 1997). This approach seeks to argue that such conflicts are an outcome of 
diverse aims and interests (Long and Long, 1992). Putting this in perspective, the 
interest of the government may differ from that of the community, and the interest of 
a corporation may be entirely based on profit maximisation, unless there are workable 
regulations protecting the communities and the environment. The interest of a 
political ecologist should not be on resource conflict resolution. Rather, it should 
focus on acknowledging the scope and limitations of each actor to avoid conflict. For 
instance, Leonard (1988), Pearson, (1987) Mooly (1996) and Morehouse (1994) 
investigated the interrelationship between local political conflicts, transnational 
corporate strategies and environmental degradation in Mexico, Papua New Guinea, 
India and Namibia. Similar work was done to identify the struggle of different 
stakeholders with the state, as well as inter-sectoral conflicts (Bryant and Bailey, 
1997). The categories of actors involved in ecological issues are both internal and 
external. Whilst some theorists shift the cause of the problem to external actors, others 
ascribed it to internal actors such as the state or their associates. Girvan (1976) links 
environmental problems to what he called the ‘new imperialism’. According to 
Girvan, the ‘new imperialism’ is associated with corporate imperialism, which sees 
the external capitalist actors dominate, control, and exploit the periphery (internal). 
Girvan (1976) explains the instrumental theories of Marxism, where power as an 
instrument is exercised by government and business elites over the people, protecting 
corporations during instances of ecological damage. Girvan sees no difference 
between the political imperial actors and the economic imperial actors’ domination 
and exploitation of natural resources and their method of cleverly subduing the 
resource rich nations. Girvan’s study on mineral exporters or the resource rich ‘South’ 
concludes that: “in spite of the supposedly favourable conditions for economic 
development represented by the resource flows from the mineral industry, these 
economies remain both structurally underdeveloped and externally dependent” 
(Girvan, 1976, p. 11).  
 
Accordingly, Girvan (1976) argues that the developed nations give political protection 
to their corporations in developing countries and, often, ignore the devastating socio-
ecological damage inflicted on communities. I agree with Girvan on corporate 
protection given to multinational companies investing in developing countries. For 
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instance, the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico (May 2010) in the United States of 
America is being taking seriously because of the location of the damage, unlike a 
situation in Nigeria where oil spills or pollution are the order of the day with little or 
no international attention for decades. Practically, observing past and present events 
of environmental crises, a premium is laid on developed economies or core states, 
whose populations lobbied for the protection of their ecosystems. In contrast, little or 
no attention is paid to the environment by governments in developing countries. 
However, Girvan’s explanation is not without criticism. Like Blaikie, Girvan is 
focused on the role of the structuralists or capitalists and their corporations in 
developing countries. When this is the case, finding a sustainable ecological solution 
in the source of resources becomes difficult. Girvan focussed on the roles of external 
actors and overlooks the role of internal players that are as equally devastating as the 
external actors.  
 
Socio-Economic Approach 
This approach explores political-ecological questions through a socio-economic 
framework that includes ethnicity, class and gender. Such an approach highlights the 
structural legacy associated with the local conflicts under the parameters of a 
capitalist means of production and the ensuing class conflict (Bryant and Bailey, 
1997). The issue of ethnicity is very sensitive and falls under the parameters of this 
thesis. Bryant (1996b) and Smith (1994) made a remarkable contribution on the 
situation of ethnic minorities that are politically and economically marginalised, and 
carry the burden of environmental degradation when they looked at the impact of 
state-sponsored logging on local people and communities in Sarawak (Malaysia) and 
the impact on ethnic minority groups in Burma. However, in this thesis I am 
emphasising the issues of class and gender roles. These two are either systemic or 
structural in the communities I have investigated owing to existing cultural and power 
roles. Bourdeau (2004) argues for the use of power, the right to use resources and 
control resources, and the protection of the environment. The way power is used by 
internal actors in process of governance can maintain a strong internal community that 
can influence the role of external players. That is why I have focussed on the internal 
actors in this thesis. Looking back at what is stated about political ecology, there is 
emphasis on the significance of the interrelationship between local environmental 
issues and global political and economic processes (Walker, 2005; Nightingale, 
 51 
2002). However, this interrelationship is only substantial where there is the ability and 
capacity of communities to act and react on issues of governance and sustainability 
(see 2.5) below.  
 
2.5 Community Governance and Sustainability Practice 
In the commentary above, I have discussed the various approaches that could be 
adopted in addressing ecological issues. Among the three approaches discussed, the 
thesis focuses on the stakeholder approach because of the role played by various 
actors in the utilisation of natural resources. Here, I am going to review the aspect of 
the literature that connects community governance and sustainability.  
 
The body of literature on community and sustainability is enormous. Hence, my main 
focus here, as the focus of this thesis is on sustainable community development, is to 
connect community governance to sustainable community development. This is 
important because the research is focused on resource-rich communities, which, after 
years of mining activities, are underdeveloped and lack sustainability practices. I will 
focus on two viewpoints in this section. One is how government sees itself a sole 
agent of resource policies and the other will be on what happens when the community 
is ignorant of what government is doing. Put another way, what is the importance of 
the community’s involvement in governance? 
 
Government Perspective 
From the first viewpoint, the government’s role is appreciated in a community 
development agenda but it excludes the community as a potential partner in 
controlling and managing resources. This exclusive control by the central government 
is made obvious through legal means enshrined in the mining policy Acts. This action 
by the state in neglecting the community on issues of sustainability implies the 
absence of community development. The exclusion shows the decision of the state to 
perceive the community as an instrument of the state. When the community is seen as 
a tool or instrument of the state, it implies a shift from co-governance to government 
rule (sole-governance). In that case, in contrast to Osborne and McLaughlin (2004) 
and Brandsen and Pestoff (2006) on co-governance and co-production, the 
community will not be able to play a partnership role with the state in policy 
formulation and implementation, and in production and management of goods and 
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services. For instance, in Sierra Leone, the government has incorporated community 
development into mining policy and introduced the Diamond Area Development Fund 
(DADF) (MMR, 2012). There seems to be much optimism in the shift in mining 
regulations compared to past mining policies. However, this optimism overlooks the 
role of the resource-based communities in promoting sustainability. The communities 
are mere recipients whilst the government is the decider of policies. The vested 
powers to formulate and implement mining policies still rest on the central 
government institution.  
 
Social Capital or Community Capital 
The next point of consideration remains on the community’s capacity to involve and 
contribute on issues that concern them. We have seen above that the state has seen 
itself as the dominion over matters of development and sustainability practice. 
However, the community is seen by some commentators to be inseparable and worthy 
above the state. Hopkins (2008) and McCarthy (2005) made discourses on the need to 
bypass the state and/or market processes, with the conviction that the community is 
more efficient on managing resources than the state. In addition, their ideas, which are 
linked to those of neo-liberals, call for the role of the state to be diminished. As such, 
the communities are required to have the requisite ability to act on matters affecting 
them. This demonstrates the importance of social capital or community capital, as 
Robbins and Rowe (2002) called it, which argues that communities should have the 
capacity to act without fear or intimidation. Evans et al. (2004) states that there should 
be a network of strengthened relationships between the people that leads to trust and 
reciprocity. Apparently, the basis for such a social relationship requires the shift of 
authority from central control to the communities in legal and practical terms. Within 
the literature on social capital (Murray, 2000, pp. 100-101) noted that: “building 
social capital rests on a foundation of three requirements: (1) a sense of hope by 
citizens that a solution is possible; (2) sufficient opportunities for engagement with 
those with the necessary motivation and skills; (3) opportunities to nurture community 
service life-skills.”  
 
I agree with Murray’s explanation when I consider the co-governance and co-
production discourses made by Brandsen and Pestoff (2006) and Osborne and 
McLaughlin (2004), as discussed above. Working towards policy or service delivery 
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under the taxonomy of community governance and sustainability requires hope for a 
solution to a problem, a favourable political atmosphere of engagement at community 
level, and also between the community and the state at another level, and the 
sustainability of the process and the outcome of actions taken.    
 
The discourses show that a community’s role is not limited to the relationship 
between networks of individuals, but is inclusive of the process of engagement, with 
the capacity for dialogue to reach a desirable outcome. Seyfang and Smith (2007) 
perceive the community as an opportunity to new practices and norms, which are 
generally accepted by the community with regard to sustainability practice. While this 
is a useful contribution to the field of study, the limitations are political, legal and 
customary. In most communities in the developing world, like those discussed in the 
methodology chapter (4), community actors are very likely to be politicised, mining 
policies have a legal limitation on ownership of natural resources, and the customary 
role of women limits them when pursuing an active community role (see chapter 6). 
Whilst these vices prevail, the framework of sustainability is questionable. Hence, I 
argue the role of the community in sustainability is linked to participation in decision-
making by all without limitations. Relating to this, Agyeman (2005), in an attempt to 
explain environmental justice and public participation, discussed two models called 
the ‘information deficit’ model, and ‘deliberative and inclusionary process 
procedures’ model. The former explains the behaviour paradigm or the concept of 
‘attitude-behaviour gap’ (Southerton et al., 2004; Agyeman, 2002) to explain the 
discrepancy between stated attitudes and behaviour on environmental issues. As 
(Agyeman, 2003, p. 347) noted when explaining public participation, this: “...stresses 
the interdependency of contemporary environmental, social and economic issues that 
are the focus of sustainable communities and calls for a civic renewal and power 
sharing between communities and local governments with new forms of public 
participation to create innovative solutions.”  
 
Agyeman (2003) included three components of sustainable development, which are 
economic, social and environmental, and justifies the role of the community in 
sustainability through participation. Even though Agyeman did not include the 
cultural and physical issues or assets, I infer that the issue of sustainability requires 
decision-making, participation and a desirable outcome by/ with the community 
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actors and government institutions. Hence, there should be an absence of individual 
and rent-seeking behaviour. As (Cannon, 2000, p. 367) noted when discussing 
community development: “Because community development specialises in mobilising 
people in the interest of social justice and in developing social relationships based on 
cooperation rather than individualism it should have a central role in the processes of 
confronting the environmental crisis, and in designing more sustainable futures which 
place people centre-stage without divorcing them from their (ecological) 
environment.” Taking the argument from there, understanding how these actors 
interact with their environment and resources will move this discussion to the next 
section, which examines the pros and cons of resource availability and abundance. 
 
The Resource Abundance and Resource Curse 
In this section of the literature, I will be looking at the various arguments given for the 
burden resources have brought to some countries in general and resource-based 
communities in particular. In the discussion, I will attempt to connect the relation 
between political ecology and sustainable development. Accordingly, the different 
roles of the various actors have significant impact in the resource-based communities. 
They show evidence of rent-seeking and social disparity and have no central 
community development agenda. The question remains if the cause of this rent-
seeking and underdevelopment is as a result of the resources. 
 
Many commentators have argued that the whole problem of resource conflict is linked 
to an abundant natural endowment. In my understanding, that is not the case. The 
problem has to do with bad governance exercised through legal limitation and 
exclusion of resource communities on policy making and implementation. I suppose 
that a mutual power relation is required to promote the supply of resources from the 
communities, and demand or commensurate recipient gains from the natural 
resources. It is when this fails that the impact arising from discontent ends in 
community violence. Collier and Hoeffler (2005) argue that the issue of ‘lootable’ 
resources, poor governance and underdevelopment in sub-Saharan Africa centre on 
greed and grievance. It is a fact that the absence of mutual consent between the state 
actors and the communities is an indicator of governance flawed. But what I will 
disagree with is the direct link between community grievance and the armed conflict 
in Sierra Leone. The key factor to the armed conflict was political before it became 
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associated with the socio-economic factors to sustain it. However, the community 
violence out of grievances did not cause the armed conflict; rather, it was a dormant 
breading ground. This implies that the political motives arising from patron-client 
took advantage of the socio-economic grievances in resources communities.  
 
I need to emphasise here that proponents that link diamonds to armed conflict have 
over exaggerated the relationship at national and global scale without making 
distinction on community violence. What has occurred over the years is discontent 
and violence fermented by political and economic greed by the elites, social 
exclusion, and economic deprivation. The reaction, in the form of grievances has been 
maintained at community scale. It has never been directed to armed conflict. Rather 
when the war broke out for political and economic reactions, these community 
grievances were magnetised by warlords. Partly, it was a reason why some of the 
youths were easily conscripted into a fighting force. The grievances arising among the 
communities, especially the youths, though it has an indication of flawed governance, 
arise from socio-economic exclusions and deprivation. From my assumption on 
‘state-corporate’ curse hypothesis, the community grievances reach expression of 
growing discontent and become conflict, especially from the youths when the state 
uses its institutions to suppressed social, economic and environmental descent. This 
affirms Zack-Williams’ (2001) argument that youths were helpless and marginalised 
before the war.  
 
Inferring from the above discussion, Ross’s (2001a) hypothesis explained the paradox 
within resource rich economies. These economies, Ross explained, are poor and 
violent in spite of abundant natural resources (Ross, 2001a). Despite the abundance of 
resources, only the elite and their agents or associates have benefited through a 
dogmatic doctrine of patrimonialism and clientelism (Le Billon, 2001). Whilst the 
elites gain, the resource-based communities do not benefit but carry the burden of the 
environmental impact. Consequently, the uneven distribution of wealth from natural 
resources has turned resource rich nations into nations of conflict (Collier, 2000; 
Ross, 1999). However, what happens when these economies result in violence is 
another matter. In such circumstances, political ecologists may want to know the role 
the resource plays in such conflicts. According to Ross (2001b) and Le Billon (2001), 
the availability of resources shortens or prolongs resource violence. They further 
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explain that the dependency on natural resources may exacerbate civil conflicts and 
that civil conflicts could conversely exacerbate resource dependence (Ross, 2001b). In 
this case, there is what I will call the ‘paradox of abundance’. Meaning that, the 
abundance resources could lead to conflict because of inappropriate governance, and 
this in turn increases the over reliance on natural resources. In any case, Ross failed to 
understand that the resources are not the problem but the people who manage them. 
As I have explained in the previous sentences on the ‘paradox of abundance’ above, 
the relationship between resource dependence and conflict has to be taken in the 
context of a time and place. Also, I see resource dependence as a problem during a 
conflict and not before it. It could only be a problem prior to conflict when the 
governance structure is ineffective. For instance, diamonds in Sierra Leone became an 
instrument of war only during the war and not before it. Circumstantially, the state 
institutions before the outbreak of the war in 1991 become ineffective because of 
corrupt officials. Inferring from this, I argue that resource dependence is a 
consequence of war and not a driver of conflict. The most potent issue of resource 
abundance before the war could be governance flaws, especially those operating 
between the resource-based community and the state.  
 
2.6 Sustainable Community Development 
Here, I will discuss the concept of community and the concept of sustainable 
community development. Before discussing sustainable community development, it is 
good that I will discuss what a community is before understanding how it can work 
towards being sustainable. Under sustainable community development, I will attempt 
to expatiate on the line of difference between community development and 
sustainable community development.  
 
Concept of Community 
The meaning of what a community is varies in both the national and global contexts. 
Consideration of the geographical aspects of what a community is could vary from 
one part of the world to another or from one sector of an economy to another. 
Nevertheless, a community should be able to have a common vision. Hence, this can 
provide a definition that incorporates who is, who is not, where they belong, and how 
they belong, which is necessary. 
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Some contributors define community as a geographical location, whilst others could 
mean it to be non-geographical, comprising of shared beliefs or characteristics like 
ethnicity, sexuality or social class (Minkler and Wallerstein 1997). Others, such as 
Joseph (2002), differentiated a community from what she calls the capital society. 
What Minkler and Wallerstein (1997) identify as a community may include: a) a 
pattern of social cohesion, b) functional spatial units fulfilling sustenance needs, c) a 
sense of collective identity and d) groupings motivated as one to act in a political 
manner and participate in changing circumstances affecting them. Joseph sees 
community as boundaries between them and us that are established through reference 
to race, identity, place and culture. However, Joseph (2002) sees a variation between a 
community and society that shows internal coherent (continuous) and autonomous 
(discontinuous) structures separately from each other. Society is argued to mean 
denature that crosses borders and sees everything and everyone equivalent. Minkler 
and Wallerstein (1997) identified two theories that characterised a community that is 
inclusive of all regardless of the variations of the community. Though Joseph 
differentiated community from society on the basis of how community operates 
within social boundaries whilst society works across boundaries, Minkler and 
Wallerstein’s account of community is synonymous with what Joseph calls a society. 
This shows that the use of the concept of community depends on the context of one’s 
proposition.  
Minkler and Wallerstein (1997) posit that a community has to be perceived as both an 
ecological system and a social one. The ecological system is comprised of the size of 
the population, heterogeneity, density, the physical environment, technical factors and 
social structures. The social systems includes economic, political and ‘subsystems’ 
existing within a particular community and how they co-exist with each other outside 
the community systems (Minkler and Wallerstein, 1997). This definition might not be 
wholly adopted in all cases. However, in this thesis, it suits the characteristics of the 
communities the research considered. Another definition of community states that it is 
‘a group of people with diverse characteristics who are linked by social ties, share 
common perspectives, and engage in joint action in geographical locations or settings’ 
(MacQueen et al., 2001 p. 1929). Whether the community is perceived as an 
ecological system or a social one, other commentators examined the porosity of what 
a community looks like. Somerville (2011) argues that a community can be conveyed 
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as being homogeneous or heterogeneous, integrated or segregated, strong or weak, 
cohesive or fragmented, open or close, united or divided, and inclusive or exclusive. 
Homogeneous communities are generally strong, empowered to pursue and express 
similar attitudes on many issues affecting them. On the contrary, Somerville (2009a) 
characterised weak communities with acquaintanceship and permeable sociability, 
comprising of people from different cultures and backgrounds. Despite most 
communities being multicultural, especially in developing countries like Sierra Leone, 
I posit that the weakness of the communities is not as a result of a variation of cultures 
from diverse background. Rather, the permeable and impermeable, strengths and 
weaknesses of the communities arise from patronage and self-seeking interest by 
actors who do not serve the interest of the community in which they live. In essence, I 
can deduce that an individual or group can live in a locality but do not belong to that 
community because of actions that are inimical to the common existence of the 
community. This narrative gives us the understanding that belongingness in a 
community varies and is bound by fussy, rigid, flexible, stable and unstable states. 
Despite a community being perceived as people living in a place with a common 
interest, common characteristics, values and culture, they are determined by their 
weak and strong connections. In that case, Clarke et al. (2007) posit that the 
relationships that hold a community together are characterised by the way in which 
members share enjoyment.  
The different attributes of a community discussed above could be available and 
workable for a time, but cannot necessarily be sustained indefinitely. This is true of 
developing countries where the structures of the social society are unstable due to 
cultural and governance issues. The prevalence of such unstable societal conditions 
leads to underdevelopment and unsustainable communities. That is why some 
countries consider the term sustainable community instead of just community. For 
instance, the United Kingdom’s 2005 report on sustainable communities defined a 
sustainable community as a place where people would want to live and be employed, 
at the present and for the perceived future (Defra, 2009). The communities have to be 
safe and wide-ranging to meet the different needs of present and future members. The 
communities have to be well planned and offer parity of opportunities for all (Maliene 
and Malys, 2009). This definition has an element of sustainability according to the 
Brundtland report (1987). Hence, in this thesis, I discern a community as a component 
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of development that is meaningful to both short-term and long-term members. This 
shows that a community should involve political deliberations, environmental 
concerns, social issues and economic activities over time. These are issues that affect 
communities from one point in time to another. Therefore, a community underpins the 
attainment of improved productivity, or economic growth (Haynes, 2005; Dobb, 
1963), social and economic equality (Calvert, 1989), improved institutions, attitudes 
and development policy (Haynes, 2005). Such choices and works could mitigate 
underdevelopment and maintain sustained development. Taking these discourses into 
consideration, I have focused on sustainable community development instead of 
community development in mining communities, where the stakeholders co-work 
with the communities in the production and delivery of goods and services, and in 
policymaking and implementation.  
 
Community Development and Sustainable Community Development 
I will differentiate the thin line separating community development from sustainable 
community development. I will explain the difference between community 
development and sustainable community development using two arguments: one is by 
using the Brundtland report and the other by using an analysis of the condition of 
what I call the ‘capacity of self-reliance’.  
 
Considering the Brundtland report, I look at a step towards the sustainability of a 
community by examining the interrelationship between a community and 
development for present goals and future needs. According to Frank and Smith 
(1999), community development is defined as the planned fruition of the economic, 
social, cultural, and environmental factors of community well-being. The community 
members work collectively to act on problems affecting them and to find solutions for 
them. Economic, social, cultural and environmental factors are components of the 
Brundtland report which, when adopted, attempts to move the community from being 
just a community to an instrument of development. However, for the community to 
develop sustainably, it requires a process of social capacity or community capacity 
among the community actors to develop in order to be able to determine their vision.  
 
In that sense, sustainable development emphasises the importance of bridging the gap 
between ecological views and development aspirations, taking into consideration the 
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social relationships that exist in the community. It incorporates the promotion of local 
community activities over development decisions (Baker, 2006). By this, the 
community working under the ideas of sustainability needs a workable social capital, 
institutions and actors who are proficient in engaging with the process of community 
development and sustainability and know when, where and how this is appropriate. 
This process advances the social capacity of the community in what I consider the 
‘self-reliance capacity’, whereby the communities can determine policies and 
community services. The discussion has however shown that the process 
differentiates community development from sustainable community development. 
 
Going further in order to discuss the concept of sustainable community development, 
drawing on the above discourse, I infer that an understanding of the social relationship 
discussed above, that for a community to be a sustainable one, it involves the people, 
their entitlements, environment, and the welfare concerns of future generations. 
According to Gore (1993) entitlement is peoples’ unhindered access to their legal 
rights and other public benefits. This cannot go on without the promotion of social 
rights, including legal rights. The promotion of social change aims at accomplishing 
human and non-material needs, enhancing organisational efficacy, progressing social 
equity and developing human and technical capacity focussed towards sustainability 
(Roseland, 2000). As such, we see the community thriving not based on geographical 
factors and composition but through a process of social change. The entitlement and 
right to legal and public service enjoyed by the community will strengthen the social 
capacity of the community. However, it is not the end but a means to the end when 
the actions and impact of the present communities are considered in the light of how 
such actions affect future communities. Otherwise, the whole of social change in the 
community becomes short lived. According to Baker (2006) “the objectives of 
sustainability require the protection of the natural resource based upon which future 
development depend” (Baker, 2006, p. 5). This supports my argument regarding 
sustainable communities, linking it with the enshrined principles incorporated in the 
Brundtland commission report: ‘development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of the future generations to meet their own needs’ 
(WCED, 1987), and the capacity building approach, which works towards achieving 
sustainable development under Agenda 21 (Khan, 1995).  
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According to Gwin (2005), capacity is the ability that people, societies and 
organisations have to administer their affairs successfully. A community’s ability for 
capacity building includes good leadership, supportive institutions, inspiration and a 
willingness to act on issues affecting them (Frank and Smith, 1999). However, 
sustainability does not only limit itself to capacity building but rather a continuous 
long-term capacity building process in which every stakeholder participates (UN, 
2006). To support this assertion, Domeisen and Sousa (2006) state that capacity 
building without an emphasis on long-term holistic dispensation is unrealistic. For 
that reason, I see participation and not representation as an essential aspect of 
sustainable community development. There should be a collective response and 
participation of all community members in determining their destiny (Narayan, 2000; 
Bunwaree et al., 2005). In fact, collective response has to be on-going in order to 
sustain the goals of the community. Short-term capacity building may not give the 
required results for sustainability unless the process is continual and able to give a 
desirable outcome. However, long-term political interregnums and instabilities have 
affected the living standards of people in most resource-rich communities in the 
developing world. The paradox is that the more resources extraction occurs, the more 
the well-being of the communities is affected. Apparently, as I have indicated above 
with examples of the 2007 incident in Koidu, a recent one on December 19th 2012 that 
left two protesters dead, and the Marikana massacre in August 2012, some forms of 
investment in the resource-rich economies are hindrances to attaining sustainable 
community development. The resources are mismanaged and the local communities 
are not informed nor do they consent to the awarding of mining contracts to 
companies or corporations. Politically, governments have taken unilateral command 
and control decisions without consideration of local community interests. Evidence of 
such political interference and complacency has affected sustainable community 
development. This has often led to armed conflicts (Le Billon, 2001; Collier, 2000; 
Ross, 1999) characterised by a decline in social, economic, environmental conditions 
and unequal power relations (Doppelt, 2003). Such measures inhibit the aspiration for 
sustainable community development when the actions of the actors fail to reconcile 
social progress, economic activity and environmental protection (Baker, 2006). The 
development process in communities in the developing world should not operate in a 
form of a game theory where communities and sectors grow at the expense of others 
in the form of a zero-sum game. In a process like this, activities in the economic 
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sector like mineral extraction are offset by a loss in other sectors (resource pull effect) 
(Humphreys et al., 2007) and consequently the payoff is zero. 
 
2.7 Strong Versus Weak Sustainability 
This section is of vital importance in understanding the effects of approaches adopted 
by various actors in resource-based communities. Earlier, primarily from a political 
point of view, I have discussed the use of power on people and resources. Here, by 
focusing on the resources, the effect of the actors’ actions shows which aspect of 
sustainability is achieved. Subsequently, the effect could be limited or extended to 
affect all resources and future communities. Hence, we need an enabling ecological 
community that harmonises with nature according to the Brundtland report. However, 
there are various ways the actors may use to achieve this. Baker (2006, p. 5) suggests 
works towards preserving nature, and noted that establishing an ecological society 
implies “reconciling economic activity, social progress, and environmental 
protection”. This view is not accepted by others who consider economic activities 
central to environmental protection. Considering Meier’s (1989) call for holistic 
approach to development, Peet’s (1992) opinion on infinite growth on a finite planet, 
and Humphreys et al.’s (2007) conception of a ‘spill-over effect’ on other sectors, 
these arguments highlight whether the role of various actors can constitute sustainable 
development.  
 
The proponents of strong sustainability advocate that it can be achieved by 
recognising the finite nature of the earth, greater resource protection and the 
improvement of natural assets. They emphasise that the problem is not about the 
pursuit of economic growth but its pattern, which causes environmental problems 
(Hamstead and Quinn, 2005; Baker, 2006). They argue that strong sustainability 
should focus on the qualitative improvement of all forms of assets instead of limiting 
on the focus on the quantitative expansion of any one form of capital. The essence of 
is to foster a better life without depleting the natural resources at the expense of the 
future community. As such, it will become clearer why I have focused on sustainable 
communities with literature on political ecology and sustainable development. 
Development and provision of welfare services should be done without rapid 
depletion and extinction of the natural capital. The process of welfare and service 
provision should be rational. Supporting this commentary, Roseland (2005) explains 
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that well-being can be improved through different types of community assets (natural, 
economic, environmental, social, human and cultural). Rather, what has been evident 
in most resource-rich countries, especially in the developing world, is the utilisation 
of natural resources for self-seeking gains using power relations between powerful 
actors and their associates. 
 
On the other hand, weak sustainability advocates argue that there should be no limit to 
the fundamental system of economic growth. Their proposition calls for infinite 
growth from the utilisation of natural capital to create economic capital. They ignore 
the impact infinite growth has on the environment. Here, the environment includes the 
natural capital itself, as well as the community. In real terms, they even ignore the 
impact on human capital. They advocate for a human-centred approach to the human-
environment relationship, and argue that environmental problems could be resolved 
through technology innovations, efficient use of resources, substituting manufactured 
goods or capital for the available natural capital or asset, and a focus on 
individualism, private property, a limited role of the state, and dependence on market 
and technological innovations to remedy environmental and social problems (Baker, 
2006; Friedmann, 1987). This assumption seems unsustainable because the actions do 
not take into consideration the effect on natural resources and communities of the 
future. It is obvious from the analysis that the political ecology is associated to 
sustainable development. The role of the actors on resources is directly or indirectly 
linked to the needs and resources of future generations. In that respect, I posit a 
connection between weak sustainability and the resource curse hypothesis or resource 
exploitation on two assertions. Firstly, it has to do with ecology and, secondly, it has 
to do with the distribution of the vast wealth that is often characterised by rent-
seeking and client-patron establishment. Often, as in the case of Sierra Leone, the vast 
resources have been extracted but the argument made for weak sustainability 
proponents for economic growth is yet to be achieved. As such, from the ecological 
perspective of strong sustainability, there is deep-rooted environmental degradation 
and loss of assets ranging from natural, physical and social assets. The outcome of the 
research supports this argument, as the diamond industry shows neither a strong nor a 
weak sustainability approach. 
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Community Assets in Perspective 
This section begins with the identification of assets or capitals outlined by Roseland 
(2005) in table 2.2. These are necessary in working towards sustainable community 
development as they uphold the pillars of sustainable development given by Ekin 
(2000) and Khan (1995). Green and Haines (2002) gave four forms of community 
capital, which are human, physical, financial, and environmental. It might appear that 
the amount of required community capital varies depending on the nature of 
sustainability in the community. Achieving sustainable development, according to 
Baker (2006, p. 8) is: “an on-going process, whose desirable characteristics change 
over time, across space and location and within different social, political, cultural, and 
historical contexts”.  
 
Unlike Ekin (2000) and Khan (1995), who commented on a limited number of assets, 
Baker (2006) went further to include other aspects. However, among their various 
contributions, Roseland (2005), and Daly and Howell (2006) have mentioned all of 
the assets I mention in the communities investigated. The consideration of these assets 
is significant because I see the sustainability of the communities as a function of 
them. Therefore, talking about sustainable community development co-exists with the 
quantitative and qualitative improvement of the available assets in these communities. 
In chapter 5 the reader will learn of the evidence of exploitation, which shows a lack 
of infrastructural development. Roseland (2005) and Daly and Howell (2006) 
identified six types of assets that we can examine: (i) Human capital (ii) Natural 
capital (iii) Economic capital (iv) Social capital (v) Physical capital and (vi) Cultural 
capital. To understand the context within which these communities can work towards 
a sustainable community development, it will be expedient to give an overview of the 
compositions and state of the various assets. I have identified these assets, and I will 
discuss them one after the other, according to table 2.2 on the following page.  
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Table 2.2 Types of Community Assets 
 
Identified Assets           Composition of Assets 
Natural Capital 
(Ecological or 
Environmental) 
 
Comprises of biophysical resources, living systems and life-
support services of our planet 
Human Capital 
 
 
Covers knowledge, health, skills, competence, motivations, 
emotional and spiritual capacity of the individual that 
enhances the establishment of personal, social and economic 
well-being 
Physical Capital 
(Manufactured or 
Produced) 
 
Includes the stock of material resources such as buildings, 
equipment, infrastructure and machinery 
Economic Capital 
(Financial) 
 
 
It is a derived form of capital from others’ assets. Involves 
ways of resource allocation, investment, cash, and the 
monetary system 
Cultural Capital 
 
 
An outcome of shared traditions, values, customs, identity, 
heritage, and history.  
Social Capital 
 
 
Operates formal structure (government) and informal 
organisation (social networks). Consists of relationships, 
structures and networks, institutions that enhances shared 
knowledge, understandings and blueprint of interactions 
among a group of people, families, communities, political 
systems etc.  
Source: Roseland (2005, pp. 4-14) 
Natural Capital 
According to Roseland (2005), natural capital encompasses biophysical resources, life 
support services, and living systems. Precisely, natural capital is the natural 
endowment base that includes ecological elements such as land, flora and fauna. Ekin 
(2000) described the ecological element as to involving the functioning of both the 
social and economic factors and their effect on the environment and resources. In 
economic terms, land is a factor of production and includes natural resources. 
However, it has been viewed not only as a factor of production but also as a unique 
social amenity. Ghimire (2001) explains that land is a secure form of holding wealth 
and gaining social and political advantages and establishing family food security. The 
outcome of the research discussed in chapter 6 shows that the capacity of the 
community members to conceptualise what land means to them determines how they 
interact with it. 
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Human Capital 
According to (Rose 2005), human capital includes knowledge, health, skills, 
competence, motivations, and the emotional and spiritual capacity of the individual all 
of which enhance the establishment of personal, social and economic well-being. 
Every community needs access to these enshrined elements to increase their 
community capacity and economic well-being. Investment in human capital through 
education, training and health services works towards economic growth, development 
and sustainability. However, these are lacking in most resource-based communities. 
This inadequacy cannot maintain a steady transformation towards a sustainable 
community. According to Meir (1989), development involves a holistic 
transformation. However, I argue that the transformation is dependent on the 
availability and utilisation of the assets.  
Economic Capital 
It is undisputable that, as part of a holistic sustainability approach, economic capital is 
vital to developing a sustainable community. Roseland (2005) identified economic 
capital as a derived form of capital emerging from the other assets. It involves the 
methods of resource allocation, investment, cash, and the monetary system. Ekin 
(2000) explains that economic capital concerns the allocation and distribution of 
relatively scarce resources. Ekin is completely correct in limiting his work to the 
scarcity of resources. Often, we have seen resource problems arising not because they 
are scarce but because the process of allocation and distribution is in the hands of the 
few who determine how and what should happen. For instance, Ross (2001b) argues 
that the resource curse is attributable to resource abundance. Indeed, the petroleum 
problem in Nigeria and the conflict over diamonds and resources in Sierra Leone, 
Angola, and D.R. Congo have nothing to do with resource scarcity. However, Ekin is 
right to include the issues of allocation and distribution of resources.  
 
Physical Capital 
Roseland (2005) defined this form of capital as the capacity of a group of individuals 
to affect standards, regulations, and put into effect the regulations that determine the 
distribution of resources and the approaches that are used. According to Roseland, 
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physical capital includes the stock of material resources such as buildings, equipment, 
infrastructure and machinery. 
Social Capital 
Roseland (2005) identified social capital to include formal structures (government) 
and informal organisations (social networks), political systems, relationships, 
structures and networks, institutions that enhances shared knowledge, understandings 
and a framework of interactions among a group of people, families, and communities. 
Social capacity enhances the establishment of social networks, structures, institutions 
and organisations, which leads to calls for collective action and shared knowledge, 
understanding, and interactions that can bring desirable outcomes (Roseland, 2005). 
Phillips and Pittman (2009) note that social capital or social capacity affects the extent 
to which a community can collaborate together effectively to plan, set goals, get 
things done, make group decisions and develop and sustain strong relationships. In 
addition, Craiz (2005) and Daly and Howell (2006) argue that social capital is 
necessary for capacity building within social relationships and to increase 
opportunities. In essence, Daly and Howell (2006) argued in support of engagement 
and the norms that foster community development. This asset is of significance when 
I consider the nature of community governance and political ecology with respect to 
the role of the important actors. 
 
Cultural Capital 
This is not only an important aspect of these community assets but also a sensitive 
one in communities that hold strong cultural beliefs. It is a form of capital that 
determines the way the communities understand the environment around them, the 
norms, values and the steps towards change (Daly and Howell 2006). Roseland (2006) 
explains it as the outcome of shared experience through customs, traditions, heritage, 
history and identity. These customs and traditional beliefs are often highly respected 
in many communities. The details of the outcome of the research on them will be seen 
in chapter 8. 
 
Sustainable Community Challenges 
I have discussed above that the various assets and the direction of the approaches 
towards sustainable development can be conceptualised as being of either strong or 
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weak sustainability. Achieving a sustainable community is not without challenges. 
Over time various actors have exerted increasing amounts of pressure on natural 
resources, degraded the land and their actions have affected the communities and 
subsequent communities. Some commentators argue that these challenges are owing 
to the prevalence of endemic poverty, corruption, disease and violence (Dobie, 2002) 
while others attribute it to the inherent systems of governance (Graham et al., 2003). 
Despite the availability of some of the assets I discussed above, there is a complex 
interaction between humans and their environment. The Brundtland report says that 
the human and ecology relationship has become a significant problem emanating from 
the lack of institutional and infrastructural capacities to effectively manage these 
intricate situations (Brundtland, 1987). The effect of the human and ecological 
‘collision’ in most resource rich nations in the developing world has shifted 
subsistence from poor agricultural activities to mining activities. As such, most of the 
fertile agricultural land has been utilised for mining activities by individuals and 
companies (Humphreys et al., 2007). In addition, there are also problems associated 
with lack of accessible public information, government transparency, public consent 
in decisions affecting well-being, and the non-existence of enforceable environmental 
laws (Hecht, 1999).  
 
Minkler and Wallerstein (1997) discuss that a community is not only characterised as 
being ecological and social, but is also classified into three distinct models of practice: 
a community’s locality development, its social planning and the social action 
(Rothman and Tropman, 1987). These are challenging issues especially when 
considering policy and decision-making, and production and service production. 
Rothman and Tropman (1997) deliberated on the issues with respect to the model of 
practice. They made their argument on the basis that locality development portrays 
community identity as a sense of belongingness, that social planning focuses on how 
problems affecting the community are resolved, and that social action is comprised of 
both aspects of locality development and social planning as well as community 
engagement and community participation (Cohen et al., 2008). In order to be 
effective, participation has to include preventative measures, mitigation, and 
compensation (Goodland, 2004). It works side by side with engagement and 
empowerment.  
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According to Cohen et al. (2008), community engagement is a process of soliciting 
people’s contribution on significant policy issues, and their integration into decision-
making and social action. They reiterate that better planning, real commitment and 
inclusiveness are the fundamental principles of community engagement. At the initial 
stage of planning, objectives are required but can only become workable with 
participatory commitment by the various stakeholders. However, this is not often the 
case, as I will discuss in chapter 8. What normally happens is that the national and 
local authorities exercise a command and control policy. Command and control, 
according to Carter (2001), is any efforts by an authority (e.g. national government, 
local government, administration) to influence the decisions of businesses and people 
through explicit standards and employed state employees, and a concurrent legal 
system that implements the policies (Cater, 2001). This imposition from one 
stakeholder in order to compel others to adhere to an environmental policy or action 
cannot be sustainable. It can only lead to social disorder and has been common 
practice leading to elitism and patrimony, as evident in chapters 6 and 7.  
 
The other challenge associated with engagement and participation is empowerment. 
These issues are obviously interrelated. The actors have to be empowered to exercise 
their rights without fear or limitations. Morse and Fraser (2005) argue that it is 
attainable through bottom-up community participation, working toward the goals of 
the community. This is because, according to Holmes (2003b), the participation of 
local communities can provide an explanation of the relationship between 
communities and their environment. The Tamarack Institute (2008) states that it 
allows an evaluation of the principle of community engagement through an interactive 
process. According to the Tamarack Institute (2008), recognising the community’s 
commitment enables them to identify their own action plans. However, often, the 
choice of participants affects the ultimate achievement of sustainability. When and 
which people in the community are actively involved matters in what the World Bank 
Group (WBG) called meaningful participation (Goodland, 2004).  
 
2.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the contributions of academics and researchers in 
developing a conceptual framework for political ecology that meets the challenges of 
community and resource sustainability. Drawing from this body of literature, I have 
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attempted to identity and critique sections of the literature that will enhance the 
outcome of the research, which could aid further investigation. I critique the changed 
context in which the commentators have laid down their arguments and the practical 
issues affecting communities in resource-based areas. In doing so, I reviewed 
elements of political ecology that deliberate on that. I also considered the different 
approaches in the field that have been challenged in the field of ecology and 
communities. Most of the decisions or policies undertaken by the state pose serious 
social risks and operational difficulties. A theoretical state-policy framework that 
cooperates in partnership with the communities intensifies a power disorder that 
reinforces the power base of the elites. The new context therefore calls for a co-
governed and co-managed/production framework that will promote ecology, 
sustainable use and sustainable communities. Looking at the prevailing predicaments 
of resource curse in the developing world, power should be linear in order to conform 
to state institutions and community institutions both in legal terms and in practice in 
order to engage with practical questions that will induce practical solutions. Unlike 
those who concentrate on external actors, I have also argued in the chapter that the 
role of internal actors should be considered seriously. The internal actors are as 
equally destructive as their external counterparts. I also examined the theory of 
resource curse, which is attributed to resource abundance and conflict. In addition, 
with inefficiency and misrepresentation in state institutions through 
institutionalisation and the denotation and connotation of governance, I briefly 
explained the definitions on governance from a national and community point of 
view. I also deliberated on community governance and sustainability. I argue that 
community governance can no longer be looked at in isolation without considering 
sustainability if we think there is a need for sustainable community development. 
Alongside this, the chapter explains that because there is variation in the development 
process between developed and developing nations, people’s environment and culture 
influence their way of life. As such, consideration should be taken of the variance in 
governance structures across nations and communities, which influence the 
achievement of ecological solutions. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF SIERRA LEONE’S DIAMOND MINING 
INDUSTRY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter is of great importance in this thesis as it serves as a theoretical precept 
for chapter 5. The first objective of this thesis is to identify the relationship between 
resource exploitation and community governance in mining communities, through an 
analysis of key actors and their roles at a range of scales. Mining has been going on 
since 1931, but years of diamond mining have had limited development on 
infrastructure in resource communities. From a strong sustainability perspective, the 
natural assets have been extracted at an unprecedented state; in a weak sustainability 
approach, the extracted resources have not brought the desired economic development 
in resource communities in particular. When the war broke out in 1991, the diamond 
communities became places of interest for state and non-state actors, including 
external actors. Even though the thesis focuses mainly on community actors, the 
purpose of this chapter is to identify some key actors whose roles on resource 
exploitation from time to time transcend from community or national level to global 
level. From a political ecology viewpoint, the power role of various actors varies over 
time at the detriment of the environment and the communities. This is exemplified in 
the patron-client relationship in the midst of personalised national institutions and 
natural resources.  
 
Some academics like Le Billon (2001) links the problem to resource abundance and 
Collier (2000) argue that the problem has to do with greed. Collier and Hoeffler 
(2005) argue that the link between what they call ‘lootable’ resources, poor 
governance and underdevelopment in sub-Saharan Africa is centred on greed and 
grievance. In an attempt to make the diamond resources benefit the communities, 
Maconachie argues for the establishment of institutions as a governance strategy for 
the long-term diamond resource problems in Sierra Leone. Maconachie (2008) 
discussed the governance initiatives in the diamond industry in post-conflict 
development in Sierra Leone by assessing the Kimberley Process Certification 
Scheme (KPCS) and the Diamond Area Community Development Fund (DACDF) as 
two main governance initiatives in the country’s diamond sector to salvage the 
problems in the communities. Ocheje (2006) calls for a high standard of transparency 
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that both the government and the extractive corporations investing in these resource-
rich developing countries must conform to. Firstly, it should be known that abundance 
has nothing to do with the malfunctioning of the diamond industry; rather it is about 
the political and economic construct of state and non-state actors for rent-seeking 
purpose. Secondly, Ocheje’s argument limits the need for transparency in the industry 
to two main actors: the government and corporations. In addition, the formation and 
implementation of the two governance initiatives ignores grassroots community 
involvement. Excluding other actors who play a role or who are affected is flawed and 
cannot achieve a sustainable diamond industry. In an attempt to identify various 
actors in the Sierra Leone diamond industry, I argue that achieving sustainable 
diamond mining should include the root causes of various actors’ involvement in the 
diamond industry in Sierra Leone.  
 
In that case, this chapter will start by discussing the political history of Sierra Leone 
and shifts from optimism to pessimism. This shift is discussed in the next section that 
examines the political economy of Sierra Leone in the pre and post-independence era. 
This will be followed by the history of its diamond industry. The next section will 
identify both state and non-state actors. This section is followed by the governance 
initiatives that have not adequately involved most of the actors. The last section will 
be the conclusion that summarises the chapter. 
 
3.2 Political History of Sierra Leone 
Sierra Leone’s political history could be dated from the arrival of Pedro Da Cintra 
along the coast of Sierra Leone in Freetown in 1462, to the first group of captured 
slaves by Sir John Hawkins in 1562, to the abolition of the slave trade in England by 
Lord Chief Justice Mansfield, to the arrival of the first group of freed slaves in 1787 
by Granville Sharpe, Thomas Clarkson and William Wilberforce, and to colonialism 
and independence in April, 1961(Alie, 1990). These men, abolitionist presupposed 
that these ‘freed slaves’ would engaged in commerce and agriculture by creating the 
right conditions and prospect to evolve in a free and self-governing community 
according to western civilisation (Wyse, 1989, cited in Francis, 2001). It can be 
argued that the first mistake of governance in community of freed slaves may have 
commenced from the imposition of an alien culture that did not take into 
consideration the already existing governance structure among the natives. This 
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‘cross-roads’ governance structure of western style and the indigenous way became 
even apparent in the two systems of rule by the colonial government which was 
imposed after Sierra Leone became a British crown colony in 1808 and had a 
protectorate in 1896.  
 
Sierra Leone was thought by some to be a success story of a nation that would see 
rapid development after independence in April 1961, when the vast mineral deposit 
was projected to be a blessing to the small West Africa state. In contrast, that 
optimism eroded over the years as it was marred with interface between patron-client 
relation and the politics of decline in what Reno called the ‘Shadow state’. The 
governance structure became the interest of those connected to the political 
association. Subsequently, discontent arose and conflict ensued, and most actors 
became interested in the war because of the role that diamonds play. The focus that 
was laid on the abundant natural resources above the governance structure was, to me, 
the first mistake of the resource exploitation. Little or nothing was done to remedy the 
colonial legacy of divide and rule or the act of prioritising resources above the 
resource communities, which was demonstrated through the development of feeder 
roads and rails for the transportation of natural resources to seaport. The former US 
Ambassador to Sierra Leone, John Hirsch described the situation: “Sierra Leone’s 
history reflects a fundamental paradox before: independence it was, at one level, a 
remarkable example of peaceful coexistence among people of diverse religious beliefs 
and backgrounds. Fourteen different ethnic groups lived according to Islamic, 
Christian and animist traditions. Intermarriage was common and there was little ethnic 
tension. Yet geographically base ethnic tensions between Mendes in the south and the 
Temne and Limba in the North, manipulated by politicians were to be at the root of 
the state’s progressive collapse in the nearly four decades since independence” 
(Hirsch, 2001, p. 24).  
 
The ten year old war that broke out on March 23rd 1991 when the RUF invaded the 
eastern town of Bomaru near the Liberian border was notorious for its extreme nature 
and levels of violence perpetrated by both internal state and no-state actors, who were 
aided clandestinely by eternal actors. The conflict was not for diamond resources nor 
were the diamond resources used during the war because of abundance, as instead 
they were drivers of the conflicts. The impact of the conflict affected every sector and 
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assets of the resource-based communities and the national economy. With civilians 
being at the crossroads of bad governance and resource exploitation emanating from 
colonial rule, after years of politicising economic and political interest, and neglect 
resulting in the rise of clientelism and patrimonialism, 50,000 civilians were killed 
and 100,000 were mutilated (UNIFEM, 2007; Kabia, 2006). This contradicts 
commentaries by conflict analysts that African conflicts are marred by ethnicity 
(Kabia, 2006). This limited analogy, without considering the underlying economic, 
social, political, colonial and international factors, overshadows the historical context 
of bad governance and resource exploitation that has its roots in the colonial era and 
has extended to present day Sierra Leone. The network of these factors has given rise 
to weak and failing state in Sierra Leone in what Francis called the ‘politics of 
decline’ (Francis, 2001).  
 
The ‘politics of decline’ has manifested in Sierra Leone and is characterised by 
clientelism and neo-patrimonialism, which has culminated in insurgency (David, 
2001), a formal and informal trade in arms and mineral resources, and the destruction 
of community assets. Evidently, this characterisation was exemplified during the civil 
conflict in Sierra Leone. Not surprisingly, this has contributed to the emergence of 
various actors who could be either victims or perpetrators. As such, Kaplan in Kabia 
(2006) categorised the violence that gripped Sierra Leone as ‘new barbarism’ and 
linked the causes of this ‘barbarian war’ to the social breakdown caused by population 
pressure and environmental collapse (Kaplan, 1994). However, his position was 
challenged by Richard (1996) and Francis (2001) who stated that these factors had not 
fomented the war in Sierra Leone. Intuitively, I disagree with Kaplan’s propositions. 
Evidence from the research work undertaken shows no evidence of population 
pressure even in the midst of environmental degradation caused by years of formal 
and informal structured licit and illicit forms of mining.  
 
Sierra Leone’s economy became marred by resource exploitation and violence. Some 
conflict commentators and the World Bank point at economic factors as the pivotal 
cause of civil conflicts (Kabia, 2006). Hence, in the quest for causes and resolutions, 
Collier’s greed and grievance debate in Berdal and Malone’s edited book, titled 
‘Greed and Grievances: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars’, showed that states saw 
economic opportunities are far more likely to cause conflict than grievance (Collier, 
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2000). This economic factor was supported by Smillie et al. (2000) in ‘The Heart of 
the Matter’, which stated that diamonds (resources) are the root cause of the Sierra 
Leonean conflict. Political commentators also argued that the conflict in Sierra Leone 
was overtly or covertly for diamond resources. The argument linking diamonds to the 
conflict in Sierra Leone between 1991 and 2001 was also supported by state actors. 
For instance Sierra Leone’s permanent representative to the United Nations at the 
time, Ibrahim Kamara, argued that the root cause of the conflict remains diamonds, 
diamonds and diamonds (quoted in David, 2005; Kabia, 2006). If the argument was 
generally accepted it would support the argument by Ross (1999) that the abundance 
of natural resources is the cause of conflict in resource-rich nations, especially in 
developing world. I have disregarded this claim on the basis that diamonds 
(resources) are economic drivers that sustained the war to achieve political and 
economic aims through arms conflict and not drivers that started the conflict. In 
addition, the conflict that has to do with socio-economic deprivation and political 
exclusion has been primarily centred within the communities. Armed conflict led by 
political factors and subsequent economic interest only takes advantage of the internal 
strife within the communities in order to recruit aggrieved youths. This became 
evident when the RUF occupied the rich diamond district of Kono in Eastern Sierra 
Leone in 1992, 1995 and 1999 and took their ultimate march to Freetown on the 6th 
January 1999. However, that success was short lived when the Nigerian ECOMOG 
forces thwarted their advance towards the west of the city and flushed them back to 
the provinces. The emergence of the conflict and the role of various actors interpreted 
what type of state Sierra Leone has been. 
 
3.3 Political Economy of Sierra Leone  
This section is intended to cover the political and economic aspect of Sierra Leone 
by establishing a basis for analysis on the link between natural resources and the 
nature of domestic politics based on the neo-patrimonialism and the politics of 
decline. Neo-patrimonialism explains that there is no peculiarity between public and 
private relationship of political life (Francis, 2001). The political economy of Sierra 
Leone presents the basis for natural resource use and the politics of 
underdevelopment. Neo-patrimonialism is a form of post-independence political 
relationship typified by underdevelopment, where public authority has been 
appointed by formal office holders, politicians, military officers, family and personal 
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associates in a surreptitious usage of the res publica (Jean Francois Medard quoted in 
Francis, 2001). Hence, this will give an explicit understanding of how domestic 
politics, through the patron-client relationship utilises diamond resources for rent-
seeking purpose, and the subsequent collapse of state institutions. The political 
economy of Sierra Leone presents the basis for natural resource use and the politics 
of underdevelopment. 
 
Sierra Leone attained independence from Britain on 27th April 1961 as a 
parliamentary democracy with Sir Milton Margai as the first Prime Minister. 
Politically, this independence was sought during a controversial and authoritarian 
period when Siaka P. Stevens was behind bars for opposing the terms and conditions 
of independence. Sir Milton Margai was seen as a close ally of Britain during the 
Cold War between the Communist east and the capitalist west, who were strongly 
opposed to Communist penetration in Sierra Leone. Like many other African 
countries that gained the right to self-rule from unwelcome colonial presence, Sierra 
Leone adopted what Bayart (1982) called the statist conceptions of development and 
economic nationalisation to enhanced state-owned enterprises from foreign 
dominance. This idea was however, undermined by political patronage and rent-
seeking clients in different political administrations in Sierra Leone characterised by 
both democracies and military government. Apparently, both forms of 
administrations have played diverse exploitative roles on the abundant natural 
resources. In addition, both have attempted to find a remedy but are yet to provide a 
sustainable resource control and development in resource rich communities.   
 
During the dawn of independence in Sierra Leone, the economy was structured to 
depend on its vast natural resources. Manufacturing and services were ignored and 
this continues to this day. Sir Milton established the economy on a solid agricultural 
sector, revenue from diamond deposits and the mounting importance of prospective 
industries such as marine and petroleum (Melady, cited in Pham, 2004). Perhaps 
also, his approach to an agro-based economy conforms to the era of a structural 
system based on a relationship between the core or developed economies and the 
periphery, which was structured to supply the most needed natural resources. Sir 
Milton never knew that the mining sector would become a curse in Sierra Leone. 
The extraction of mineral resources such as diamonds has brought an economic, 
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social, political and environmental burden to the communities involved. Likewise, 
with political interregnums and reckless governance in Sierra Leone, the succeeding 
governments after independence have also become cursed. The mineral policies are 
yet to substantially transform these communities who live where the vast natural 
wealth is exploited. Despite these vast natural resources, the national government has 
failed to provide the basic requisites of economic development and environmental 
protection. Instead, they collaborate with corporations to exploit the resources and 
shift the ecological damage onto the resource-based communities. Hence, the 
euphoria for socio-economic development and good governance that was once 
predicted in the early days of independence has become unsustainable. 
 
Like patrimonialism, clientelism in Sierra Leone has become a seriously consistent 
practice of distributing state resources. One government after another maintained 
very entrenched patron-client relationships that allowed only supporters and 
sympathisers of the regime to benefit from the natural resources. According to 
Clapham (1982, p. 4), clientelism is ‘a relation of exchange between unequals’ (cited 
in Kabia, 2006). Since the early post-independence era in 1961, the resource-based 
communities have not been equal to the state actors and their institutions. Hence, the 
utilisation of the natural resources in Sierra Leone has become a tool of political 
appeasement with no sustainable mining and development policies. As such, this has 
led to ineptitude and considerable corruption in the running of the state institutions 
and resource communities. State institutions and resource communities in Sierra 
Leone are weakened, and some even have collapsed gradually and simultaneously. 
The available resources for developing national and community institutions were 
used to satisfy the patron-client class. Because of the prevailing circumstances, Reno 
(1991) noted that: “political leaders ‘convert wealth into political resources, buying 
the loyalty of some and buying weapons to coerce others and thus gather more 
resources and so on” (Reno, 1991, p. 1).   With weakening state institutions, natural 
resources such as diamonds have become instruments of private interest for political 
patrons and their clients. As such, the state of Sierra Leone has become replica 
‘market’ or what I may call a ‘proxy market’ where individuals in public institutions 
accumulate unscrupulous wealth (Lamarchand, 1988 cited in Francis, 2001). This 
patrimonial nature,(Kandeh (1999) posited as “conversion of state offices and public 
resources into personalised wealth. Government contracts were deceptive and 
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manipulated and salaries allocated to non-existence workers or ‘ghost workers’ 
became salaries for corrupt officials managing the Parastatals. Sham investigations 
to correct such corrupt practices were known as ‘contractgate’, ‘vouchergate’, ‘die-
man racket and ‘squandergate’ were conducted. 
 
This became a factor in the resource-cursed economy and the basis of the cursed-
state burden that squarely falls on the resource communities. Corruption became 
endemic as political clients used their influence for rent-seeking by accepting 
kickbacks on contracts alongside their ‘official’ duties. This inter-marriage between 
corruption and state politics is what Reno termed as the ‘shadow state’ (Reno, 1999). 
Within a deteriorating political atmosphere, the state was incapacitated and unable to 
deliver even some of its most basic needs (Reno, 1999). Therefore, this supports my 
assertion that the state is a curse to the communities because of its unwillingness to 
build economic transformation, and a situation of declining social services, 
depreciated infrastructure, weak economy, and widespread poverty prevails. In such 
a case where the state cannot deliver, community owned initiatives and socio-
economic development will not be expected. As such, the communities become 
weak, permeable, fussy, segregated, and led by a status quo ideal. In essence, the 
existence of connections in the communities fuelled the scramble for natural 
resources such as forests and diamonds; thus leaving behind an unprecedented 
environmental destruction (Bangura, 2008).  
 
Between the 1960s and 1970s, the Sierra Leone economy was dominated by revenue 
from diamond production, accounting for about 70% of the country’s foreign 
exchange earnings (Clapham, 2001). In 1960, annual diamond production was 
estimated at 2 million carats. This volume dropped in subsequent years.   
Subsequently, after years of resource mismanagement and poor governance, the 
economy began to experience a swift decline in the late 1970s. In 1988, the official 
diamonds exports were estimated as US$22,000 (Francis, 2001). The Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) fell from US$1.1 Billion in 1980 to US$857 million in 1990 and in 
1995 Sierra Leone had a debt burden of US$1.2 billion (Kandeh, 1999). This led to 
pervasive economic shocks for both patrons and clients. However, as the situation is 
today, it was the communities that suffered the most. The growing ‘informal 
structures’ and the weakening of state institutions affected the diamond industry 
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immensely in Sierra Leone. There has been social, political and economic discontent 
among resource community members, and the scramble for these rich minerals 
became a weapon of war during the ten-year conflict. Within the period of the war, 
human, social, political, and natural capital were affected beyond all proportion. The 
diamond industry became an institution of unprecedented unethical economic gains 
and widespread environmental degradation (Bangura, 2008). This form of 
exploitation has been in existence since the early days of independence under the 
dictates of patrimonialism-clientelism relationship. Such relationship was established 
under the SLPP government of Sir Milton Margai (1961-1964) and continued by Sir 
Albert Margai (1964-1967), and was later entrenched during the reign of Siaka P 
Stevens and his hand picked successor, Joseph Saidu Momoh,during his one party 
rule (1968-1985) and (1985-1991) respectively. In all of this, politics of decline has 
entrenched itself in almost every sector of the economy for personal gains by 
politicians and associate clients. This unprecedented way Siaka P Stevens and Joseph 
Saidu Momoh operated the state as personal property was illustrated by Coleman and 
Rosberg as ‘Fuherism’, and ‘Sultanism’ by Weber (Coleman and Rosberg, 1996, 
quoted in Francis 2001).  
 
When Siaka P. Stevens defeated Albert Margai in 1968, he turned politics as a tool to 
appease close associates of the ruling circle (Kabia, 2006) with political positions and 
access to diamond resources. The inner circle controlled and used their position to 
promote personal wealth. This became apparent after Milton Margai in 1964. Albert 
Margai who succeeded his brother, implemented the 1965 Public Order Act to silence 
opponents and even ordered the paramount chiefs not to encourage the APC in their 
chiefdoms (Kabia, 2006). Apparently, after defeating Sir Albert Margai in 1967, 
Siaka Steven became a pivotal actor within the illegal diamond trade with personal 
wealth gained from this subversive business amounting to over $500 million between 
1967 and 1985. For this reason, his seventeen years of rule was code-named the 
‘seventeen year plague of locusts’ (Meredith, 2005). In the history of Sierra Leone’s 
governance system, Siaka Steven was a vivid example of patrimonialism and the 
father of the subsequent ‘shadow state’ (Reno, 1999) and his ‘politics of decline’ was 
characterised by patrimonialism, clientelism, corrupt practices and state failure 
(Francis, 2001). This ‘shadow state’ and ‘politics of decline’ have not been reformed 
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but rather have been transferred and sustained by succeeding governments in Sierra 
Leone.  
 
Siaka Stevens was the Mines Minister in 1951 - appointed by Britain’s government. 
He was aware of the illegal diamond trade and how to gain illegal wealth from 
diamonds and personally controlled state resources (Gberie, 2002). In 1971, President 
Stevens nationalised DeBeers SLST and formed the National Diamond Mining 
Company with 51% of its shares owned by the government and 49% by SLST. 12% 
of the government’s share was personalised by Stevens. Due to widespread corrupt 
practices with state institutions and resource exploitation, Stevens’ regime was 
described as ‘Kleptocratic’ - meaning that there is little distinction between personal 
finances and those of the state.  
 
Siaka Stevens compensated his political clients with security, public office and 
resources (Thompson, 2004). Kabia (2006) commented further that this patron-client 
relationship resulted in a flawed approach that affected the distribution of state-scarce 
resources. I agree with Kabia that this affected the distribution of resources, but I 
would disagree that the state’s resources were scarce. During the rule of Siaka P. 
Stevens, before the hosting of the Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU), now the 
African Union summit (AU), in 1980, Sierra Leone had a very strong economy and a 
comparatively better standard of living than today. In addition, the patron-client 
relation did not only affect distribution of state resources but also limited the access to 
resources to clientelistic networks that benefited from state resources and institutions. 
In that regard, bad governance led to endemic corruption and individualistic and one-
sided political gains used rent-seeking. Such political status quo has been adopted by 
succeeding regimes in Sierra Leone amid institutional decline in public services and 
corporations caused by widespread corruption and neglect. This type of connection 
between corruption and politics in Sierra Leone has come to be referred to as the 
‘Shadow State’ (Reno, 1999).  
 
Siaka P. Stevens effectively manipulated national politics for the benefit of his 
supporter and close associates of the ruling All Peoples Congress (APC) political 
party, including a patrimonial network of unscrupulous Lebanese businessmen at the 
inner core. Among them were Henneh Shamel and the Afro-Lebanese Jamil Sahid 
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Mohamed who, as examples of private self-interest actors, became the closest 
business associate of Siaka Stevens and enjoyed a remarkable influence on state 
policy (Kabia, 2006; Gberie, 2002). Jamil’s political leverage was not designed to 
foster a political position in the administration; instead, he used his political influence 
for resource access and economic gains. In an attempt to entrench the system of 
patrimonialism within such bad governance, Siaka P. Stevens declared a one party 
system of rule in 1978. This re-enforced the absolute transfer of power to the hand of 
Siaka P. Stevens and his closet associates. In addition, these political patrons used 
power covertly and overtly to break the fabrics of the political, economic, social, 
cultural and ecological institutions in the day-to-day running of the state and in 
relation to diamond resources. Politically, in an attempt to entrench his political rule, 
he established the Special Security Division (SSD) to suppress any opposition to their 
political strength, economic gains, social breakthroughs and access to control and use 
of natural resources (diamonds) at will. A similar tool was used by his predecessor, 
Sir Albert Margai, after he succeeded Sir Milton Margai by enacting his controversial 
1965 Public Order Act that criminalised ‘libel’ as a political tool to silence political 
critics (Kabia, 2006). 
 
Even in the midst of contemporary democracy, it is alleged that “the then exiled SLPP 
government (1997-98) of Dr Ahmad Tejan Kabba was mining to sustain their 
hegemony when staying exile in Guinea”. Such similar allegations were linked to the 
present APC led government as a campaign tool to secure votes in Kono by promising 
the youths access to diamond gravel if they voted in during the 2007 parliamentary 
and presidential elections. This shows that the view of the resource curse regarding 
the diamond resources in particular is subject to political and economical reasons, and 
is exercised through patron-client on one hand, and electioneer-client on the other. 
This shows how politicians of both democratic and non-democratic regimes use 
diamond resources to exploit the people, the resources and degrade the land. This is a 
serious political, economic, social, and an unfriendly environmental, tactic used by 
state machinery to exploit citizens using diamonds as a political tool.  
 
This exposes how the ‘politics of decline’ in Sierra Leone was marred by 
mismanagement of the natural resources, especially the diamond economy. 
Subsequent decades saw a U-turn on the economy with a considerable decline on 
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diamond exports, despite the government’s initiatives to curb smuggling. Gradually, 
the economic decline arising from bad governance in the form of patron-client 
relations ignited grievances that were exploited in the notorious civil war that Sierra 
Leoneans could ever have imagined. The diamond resources became the drivers of the 
war as both state and non-state actors scrambled for the control and exploitation of the 
diamond-rich districts, especially Kono in Eastern Sierra Leone.  
 
It is no surprise, therefore, that the diamond industry in Sierra Leone became a tool 
for political exploitation under the hand of Fred Kamil, Henneh Shamel, Jamil Sahid 
Mohamed and few ‘political clients’ who, for selfish reasons, labelled Sierra Leone as 
a resource-cursed country. Without learning lessons from the past, the present regime 
might follow the same anomalies inflicted on the people and the environment by not 
adequately addressing the present bone of contention between the Koidu community 
and Koidu Holdings (now the OCTEA group) to re-start Kimberlite operations 
without reviewing obsolete mining policies and the concerns of the aggrieved, 
deprived and vulnerable people of the Kono district. 
 
3.4 Sierra Leone’s Diamond Industry 
Diamond mining in Sierra Leone has gone through different forms and serves various 
objectives from the Colonial Era (Pre-Independence) to the Independence era 
(Economic-Nationalisation). The mining spree has, in many occasions, resulted in 
excruciating consequences on the people and their environment. It is apparent that the 
causal factors that have contributed to widespread uncontrollable mining and inflicted 
environmental degradation have been historically for political and economic reasons 
carried out through patronage structures. This has created a situation where self-
interest has been put ahead of national development. Since 1930, politics has been a 
game of political and economic appeasement in Sierra Leone’s diamond mining 
industry. Diamonds have also been used by various regimes to enrich themselves and 
their sympathisers at the expense of the people and the environment. However, 
political decisions are expected to be influential in ecological policymaking to help 
sustain development in an environmentally-friendly mining activity. Unfortunately, 
many of the decisions have been unpatriotic, ineffective, disastrous, rent-seeking, 
patron-clientelistic, and lack well-defined property rights. Democratic rule and 
military regimes alike have always been interested in seeking political sympathy 
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during general elections and reign of power. This was evident by late president Siaka 
P. Stevens who used diamond resources to get voting appeasement. The RUF, during 
their ‘reign of terror’, used diamond resources to maim, kill and degrade the land 
without prudence. But the pollicisation of natural resources commenced during the 
colonial era. 
 
Despite the abundant and widespread diamond resources in every district in the 
southern, eastern, and parts of the northern provinces, Sierra Leone remains one of 
the poorest countries in the world (NACE, 2011); ranked 174 out of 177 in the UN 
Human Development index (GoSL, 2011), as 82 percent of the country’s 6.4 million 
people live in relative poverty, and 21 percent in extreme poverty (consuming less 
than what is needed to meet basic needs). Unemployment is pervasive among the 
youth (aged 15-34), particularly in rural areas (Fanthorpe, 2001). With limited 
employment opportunities in other sectors, most of the unemployed have taken to the 
diamond mining sector as the only source of employment. This occurrence of a rising 
natural resource boom associated with a decline in other sectors of the economy is a 
peculiarity of resource-rich economies. According to Ebrahim-Zadeh (2003) 
resource-rich countries suffer the “Dutch disease” a phenomena that first emerged in 
the decline of the manufacturing industry in the Netherlands in the 1970s. One way 
the resource curse occurs is through the movement of labour from declining sectors 
into the mining sectors.  
 
Sierra Leone is an agricultural fertile land. Agriculture had been the most substantial 
sector of the economy in employment and viability. The economy was structured as 
extractive economy with immense focus on cash crops. The economy was not only a 
subsistence producer but was also an exporter of food crops until the 1970s and 
1980s, which was when the economic U-turn occurred and led the country from being 
an exporter of food to an importer of food such as rice (Gberie, 2005). Conversely, 
diamond exports were gradually increasing, unlike agricultural crops. It is obvious 
that as the export of diamonds became lucrative, and the role of the diamond 
resources in the economy became complicated. Subservient state actors took 
advantage of their political leverage to control mining resources through rent-seeking 
practices. In the process of this ‘rent-seeking’ attitude through corruption and 
institutional collapse, diamonds become the central economic asset in the political 
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system in Sierra Leone. On one hand, the natural asset was initially a legitimate tool. 
Economic good, on the other hand, became a political tool. In simple terms, 
controlling the diamond resources enhanced the control of the economy. Diamond 
resources have been used for different purposes depending on the objective of the 
state and non-state actors. The state actors use the diamond resources (a natural asset) 
for patron-client satisfaction through corruption practices and state failure in what 
Francis (2001) calls the ‘politics of decline’. 
 
Diamond mining has become one of the most remunerative economic activities 
outside of agriculture in Sierra Leone. It is not holistically controlled and can be 
easily penetrated by potential miners without any rigid requisites. Most mining 
activities are small-scale, with low-tech mineral excavation and processing. The large-
scale mining undertaken by major companies such as Koidu Holdings Ltd, which 
include rigorous economic and legal barriers to entry, have also caused grave damage 
to the resource-based communities. However, years of mining have not been 
sustainable in these resource-based communities. Accordingly, Ross (2001) argued 
that resources are a curse in developing countries because they bring more destruction 
than development. Though the scope of the thesis does not go as far as looking into 
the role of corporations, evidence of corporate irresponsibility by Koidu Holdings 
provoked violence in Kono in December 2007 (NACE, 2009) and on December 19th 
2012. The approach of Lonmin in Marikana on August 17th 2012 resulted in a similar 
outcome. The manner in which both governments and their security apparatuses 
unleashed terror and death are convincing examples of a shift from the concept of 
resource-curse to the concept of what I will call ‘state-corporate curse’. Despite 
corporate responsibility and socially responsible investing policies, most of the 
mining companies in Sierra Leone have ignored the ethical aspects of investment. In 
addition, they have the ignored long-term hazards emanating from mining activities. 
They have ignored the impact of their mining activities on existing communities and 
future generations or communities. This has affected the various components of 
sustainable development. According to Spicker (1995), environmental problems affect 
the basic welfare needs of affected mining areas (communities), their health, their 
work and leisure, their quality of their neighbourhood, and even their ability to 
participate fully on issues affecting their communities. This implies that 
environmental problems affect not only community capacity but also the sustainable 
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development of the communities. Internally, in the resource communities, these issues 
are seen and felt; externally, they have been concealed with what I have called the 
‘website’ strategy, which is used as a smokescreen to portray the companies as 
exemplars of corporate responsibility, while the government and NGOs are 
presupposed as being ‘resource ambassadors’ of the communities.  
 
Over the years, the communities have been subjected to structured participation on 
both social and political issues. They are merely ‘resource captives’ who occupy a 
land without legal control over the natural resources. Hence, their participation 
becomes meaningless because of the inequality within social structures, which leads 
to ‘recycling poverty’ or the ‘paradox of poverty’, and the inefficacy of the 
institutions. According to Spicker (1995), such structured inequalities widen and 
strengthen the social relations gap, stemming from the way that society is organised 
(social division), rather than intrinsic human characteristics. This has been a common 
occurrence affecting resource-based communities in Sierra Leone since the colonial 
period. In contrast, Collier (2000) argues that economic opportunism and deep-rooted 
grievances rather than structural inequalities are the cause of social unrest. Collier 
failed to recognise that it is the propensity for greed that paves the way for structural 
inequality in society. For instance, the greed evident in the distribution of the wealth 
from diamond revenues was a deliberately structured framework implemented 
through clientelism and neo-patrimonialism. This inevitably led to grievances and 
conflict between the deprived poor and the structured system. According to Dobson 
(1991) and Martell, (1994), the worst examples of resource exploitation led to 
environmental degradation.  
 
With corruption prevalent in the mining industry in Sierra Leone, and inadequate and 
ineffective coordinating institutions, the revenue from the royalties and taxes levied 
on diamonds is yet to benefit the mining communities. Politicians have always 
collaborated with small and large mining companies through the bribing of 
government officials and the practice of purchasing diamonds below market value. 
Humphreys et al. (2007) noted that the short-term availability of huge financial assets 
augments the prospect of the larceny of such assets by politicians. Such diabolic 
action was exemplified by the eccentric Jamil Sahid Muhammad, who with the help 
of the then APC regime of Siaka P. Stevens and his successor Joseph Saidu Momoh, 
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clandestinely cheated the state revenue by purchasing diamonds below market value 
whilst paying kickbacks to corrupt officials (Smillie et al., 2000). According to 
Humphreys et al. (2007), corruption in natural resource-rich economies has different 
dimensions.  
 
The corruption in the diamond mining industry is not limited to just individuals but 
also within multinational companies with government collusion. Multinational 
companies in countries rich in natural resources maximise their cost by acquiring 
resources below market value through kickbacks to government officials or by 
making them shareholders. One of these companies, Executive Outcome, was hired in 
1992 as a mercenary group and later given a stake in the diamond industry as a pay-
off for liberating and securing diamond rich districts in the eastern and southern part 
of Sierra Leone from the notorious RUF rebels (Smillie et al., 2000; Musah, 2000). 
Resource corruption in Sierra Leone cannot be proven openly, but it is implied from 
the failure of state institutions to hold the corporations accountable in the event of 
their corporate failures. State-corporate corruption inhibits people’s access to 
resources, income, social security, and ownership to land. These resentments have 
fuelled social upheavals and unrest in mining communities. Like the Marikana riot, 
the unrests are often cowed by the wrath of the security institutions of the 
government, who act as a security force against the discontented and dissatisfied 
communities. However, one thing the policymakers fail to understand is that the 
failure to address the social and economic injustice in this social disorder will always 
culminate in reoccurrence of civil violence. For instance, the violent youth-led 
protests of 2007 against the Koidu Holdings diamond mining company in the Kono 
district is an example of discontent (NACE, 2009) after decades of suppressed silence.                
 
Most of the diamond mining activities in Sierra Leone draw on the alluvial deposits, 
which are easily accessible with less sophisticated and crude mining tools. Only a 
very percentage of Kimberlite pipe mining has been undertaken in Sierra Leone. This 
form of mining needs sophisticated deep horizontal or vertical mining techniques and 
is done mainly by multinational corporations such as Koidu Holdings (now the 
OCTEA Group). Many academic commentators attribute the success of the economic 
story of the diamond resources in Botswana to the Kimberlite deposits rather than that 
of multinational companies. Access to this form of mining requires huge capital and 
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technical expertise. Even though this analogy is true to some extent, the inaccessible 
Kimberlite mining in the Kono district, Eastern Sierra Leone has proven contrary. It is 
as comparatively destructive in its mining activities in the resource-rich communities 
through the blasting of rocks at the heart of the district headquarter town of Koidu, 
and its controversial relocation and building project fuelled indignation, violence and 
deaths in December 2007 and also in 2012. 
 
On the alluvial side, the lack of technical skills to commence mining invited many 
youths and businessmen from within the country and outside of Sierra Leone to 
mining districts. This move threatens other variables such as agriculture in rural 
communities. The youths shifted their interest from agriculture to diamond wealth 
through an economic drive, socio-cultural factors among peer groups and community 
perceptions. Though many commentators like Clapham (2001) attribute the problem 
of the mines to being easy access using unskilled techniques, the facts rest on failure 
by the state to manage the resources for the national benefit since independence. The 
diamond wealth was for the benefit of politicians and their supporters, clients, and 
tribesmen through corrupt practices with internal and external economic actors. Also, 
the government’s attempts to control both mining and marketing of diamonds was not 
in the national interest. It was meant to put control of the government diamond office 
into the hands of clients and political associates like Henneh Shamel and Jamil Sahid 
Mohamed. Apparently, instead of the scramble for resources by structural colonial 
imperialism, there was an internal scramble for diamond wealth through corrupt 
practices by politicians and paramount chiefs (Clapham, 2001). These states’ clients 
had leverage to exercise their power by using the state as a facade to pursue essential 
private forms of political management and wealth accumulation at the expense of 
resource communities and national interest in what Reno called a ‘shadow state’ 
(1999). It is not surprising, therefore, that after years of such bad governance, violent 
conflict was set to unleash a war that destroyed all forms of capital (natural, social, 
cultural, economic and political) in March 1991 and did not officially end until 2001. 
 
During the war and the scramble for diamond rich districts, youths benefitted very 
little from the gains garnered from these natural resources. Instead, they were used as 
forced labour to the increase the gains of their superiors and the warlords. These 
diamonds used to fuel the conflict became known as ‘blood diamonds’ (Keen, 2005) 
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and the illicit and inhuman trade was carried out by individuals (domestic and 
international), governments (democratic and military regimes), intervention forces 
(ECOMOG; UN Peace Keepers), mercenary groups (Executive Outcome; Sandline, 
UK), and warring factions (Sierra Leone Armed Forces [SLAF]; Revolutionary 
United Front [RUF] (Smillie et al., 2000). Much of the wealth went to warlords and to 
those I call war ‘enhancers’ or actors. These stakeholders in such a devastating trade I 
have connotatively referred to as ‘Blood Diamond Merchants’ because they deal with 
‘Blood Diamonds’. This term refers to the types of business that either used diamonds 
in exchange for weapons or in any way that exacerbated the ten year long brutal war. 
These are merchants who sought to trade in ‘Blood Diamonds’ and even sometimes 
evaded taxes on the trade in illicit diamonds that provoked, inflicted and sustained the 
conflicts and destruction in lives, infrastructure, and the environment in Sierra Leone. 
 
As a result, the domestic scramble for diamonds catalysed the high volume of school 
withdrawals. Most of the diamonds became ‘war tools’ during the decade-long war in 
Sierra Leone. Not surprisingly, alluvial diamond mining is expanding on agricultural 
land. According to an NACE report, the number of artisanal miners in the country 
varies from 100,000 to 400,000 (NACE, 2009). In 2005, the World Bank 
approximated the figure as between 200,000 and 400,000 people dependant on 
artisanal mining for their livelihood. The rapid increase in artisanal miners is 
attributed by some to poor education. Fanthorpe (2003) states that a dysfunctional 
education system helps to create a large legion of unemployed and partially literate 
youth that are easily hired by both political and criminal factions. This stance is 
similar to that of Zack-Williams (2001), who argues that the lack of education and 
employment opportunities were the key grievances for many youths before the 
outbreak of the war. However, from the research, lack of literacy is not the limited 
factor that influences youths’ involvement in diamond mining. There are other 
associated social discontents responsible, as discussed in chapters 6 and 7. 
 
Another phenomenon associated with endemic mining is the customary nomenclature 
operating mainly in rural districts. Contemporary substantiation explains that 
customary law and the traditional chieftaincy system also contributes to the alienation 
of youths and middle-aged adults, thus driving them into political participation and a 
socio-economic corral. The sham governance in the form of decentralisation from 
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central to local community level is without social cohesion and economic gains. Also, 
there is disjointed power to rule and control resources among community actors and 
the state. In 2004, the World Bank reiterated that the tenets of customary law-
including land allocation (property rights) and distribution needed to be revised in 
order to uphold a crystal-clear rural opportunity structure (World Bank, 2004). This is 
yet to bring the desired result because one imminent obstacle to sustainable social 
security is the lack of community capacity, which will be discussed in chapter 6. 
Paintin (2008) supports this argument on the basis that, despite the provision of local 
and district councils to identify and resolve the concerns of the youth, they lack 
capacity, they are under-funded, and barely have clear programmes for action. On the 
other hand, the communities are limited by the government’s legal apparatus, which 
states that anything underneath 6ft belongs to the state. In practical terms, people will 
lose their right to the surface when resources are discovered under their land. In 
essence, they receive instructions rather than consultations. Above all, there appears 
to be no attempts made to deal with the serious land tenure problems caused by 
chiefs’ right to appropriate the land of community members. 
 
Despite the above discussion, the government’s policy initiative on diamond mining is 
export-oriented. It is largely controlled by a small number of dealers and exporters 
who are mostly of Lebanese and West Africans descent, most of whom reinvest very 
little in the mining communities they exploit (Gberie, 2002). The diamond-rich 
districts remain among the least developed districts in a country without social 
infrastructure and amenities. Richards (2003) called the diamond fields the ‘rural 
slums’ of Sierra Leone. According to PRSP (2005), the people in the diamond-rich 
Kono district suffer a higher level of poverty than inhabitants of other parts of the 
country (GoSL, 2005). This is no surprise because the number of poverty-affected 
people is swollen by migrants from other parts of the country. In the rural Kono 
district, the poverty level, which is 79.6 percent, is higher than rural Pujehun with 
59.6 percent while Urban Kono has 56.3 percent. Among these miners, 75% of them 
are between the ages of 21 and 30 (PAC, 2006). With the numbers increasing rapidly, 
the government has not been exercised by concerns about the exhaustion of diamond 
deposits, the destruction of the ecosystem, and the changing landscape (Peters, 2007). 
Sierra Leone, as a country emerging from civil war, is keen on economic recovery 
with little or no emphasis on environmental impacts and sustainable community 
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development. With no time for resilience in the ecosystem to revive, previously mined 
places are neglected over the years (NACE, 2009) and the communities have a long 
way to go to become sustainable. Following this narrative, I will discuss below the 
actors involved in the diamond trade. It will show us who they are and how involved 
they have become in the trade.    
 
After the discovery of diamonds in Sierra Leone in 1930 in the eastern forested 
country side in the Kono district, legal mining operations were commenced in 1931 
by the Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST), which became a DeBeers subsidiary after 
it had gained mining concessions from the colonial government in 1934. In that 
respect, SLST paid 27% income tax on its diamonds to the government (Gberie 
2000). However, this legal mining was short-lived and the present day illegal mining 
can be traced from that period.  
 
Illegal mining and smuggling became prevalent through organised banditry and 
thuggery. With the diamond boom becoming like a whirlwind, many actors became 
interested. An estimated number of between 400 and 500 men started incursions on 
areas controlled by the SLST Corporation in the government’s diamond producing 
areas. Without any doubt, the illegal trade in diamonds became a lucrative business. 
With Siaka Stevens’ clandestine economic nationalisation drive to nationalise the 
diamond mining, SLST withdrew in 1984 when legal mining and exporting declined 
(Le Billion, 2005). This move was preceded by a considerable decline in legitimate 
diamond exports from 2 million carats in 1970 to 595,00 carats in 1980, to an even 
smaller amount of 48,000 carats in 1988 (Gberie, 2005). This decline falls within the 
reign of Siaka P. Stevens, who used stated resources for patron-client relations and 
during the Momoh reign of power. The clandestine policies were on-going with 
smuggling and lower government revenue from diamond trade.  
 
3.5 Analysis of Actors in the Diamond Industry 
This section is crucial to chapter 5 and will review some of the analyses of the 
domestic and external actors in the Sierra Leone conflict’s diamond trade. Unlike the 
wider thesis, which focuses on community actors, this section gives the broad base 
composition of the actors. It was then marred by economic collapse, social crisis, 
society, resource exploitation and environmental degradation. The Sierra Leone 
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diamond industry is eclectic and encompasses a variety of factors and stakeholders. I 
distinguish their distinct role in the diamond industry. These are the socio-economic, 
political, and ecological roles which each of the actors could play (Bangura, 2006). 
These actors include state and non-state participants. I have dealt with state actors at 
various points in this chapter. The non-state actors comprise both internal and external 
state players. Each one of them is closely linked with the uncertainty surrounding the 
ethics of responsible investment that raises a number of important questions for 
research as well as how they can influence domestic policies. The scope of ethnical 
investment is broad and has not been dealt with in this chapter. Here, I consider the 
idea of ethical investment in simple moral terms. Ethical investment and corporate 
responsibility is flawed and ineffective. This ineffectiveness creates serious socio-
economic challenges in the exploitation of diamond resources and the linked threats to 
ecology. This threat comes from acts of patronage relation and the existence of 
invisible (unaccounted for) actors. As these actors are unaccounted for, so are the 
diamonds which go through from one actor to another within Sierra Leone and across 
its’ borders. 
 
Patrimonialism and clientelism are pertinent to understanding the role of different 
internal actors in the governance process and on the use of resource for either national 
benefit or private-self-interest or public-self-interest. I connote private self-interest for 
non-state actors who gained from their association with the political system at a point 
in time, and the public-self-interest to mean actors who use their public or political 
position for self-gains. The act of patrimonialism and clientelism has been a 
contending governance problem that has affected resource-based communities. 
Patrimonialism, according to Thompson (2004, p. 115) is a form of political order 
where power is concentrated in the personal authority of one ruler. The state is their 
private property, and the act of ruling is consequently arbitrary: Thompson’s 
definition on patrimonialism re-enforces my attempt to differentiate public self-
interest from private self-interest. It is very likely that actors with political hegemony 
could exercise power vested in him by personalising power, abusing power by ruling 
arbitrarily. On the contrary, the private self-interest actor enjoys a patron-client 
affiliation by the powers vested in the public or political figure by virtue of political, 
economic and social affiliation.  
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Non-state Actors in Sierra Leone’s Diamond Resources 
The war in Sierra Leone was not only fought directly by state actors but also with 
non-state actors at home and abroad. This chain of actors became notorious for 
dealing with illegal diamonds, which later came to be referred to as ‘Blood 
Diamonds’ (Kabia, 2006), and I have referred to these actors as ‘Blood Diamond 
Merchants’ (BDM). The activities of such actors affected the resource-based 
communities, exploited the diamond resources and destroyed other forms of capital. 
The chain of these non-state actors flows from Sierra Leone, West Africa and Europe 
and to trading hubs such as Antwerp and Tel Aviv (Clapham, 2001). There was 
essentially evidence of greed, and years of discontent encouraged illicit mining, 
illegal trade whereby these grievances were translated into active participation during 
the outbreak of the war in 1991. Apparently, the outbreak attracted a wide range of 
actors both at home and abroad. As the diamonds became drivers of the war in Sierra 
Leone, their easy access and revenue motivated the warlords to continue the arms 
conflict at the expense of all forms of capitals and development. The diamond trade 
created internal and external beneficiaries to the war through arms and diamond 
resource smuggling (Le Billon, 2005).  
 
Internal Non-state Actors in the Diamond Mining Industry   
There were both national and international actors involved during the ten year 
conflict; they include the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Sierra Leone Arm 
Forces (SLAF), civil defence forces, mercenary groups (Executive Outcome, 
Sandline, UK) and regional (ECOMOG) and international peacekeepers (UN Peace 
Keeping Forces). These forces are in one way or another involved in some form of 
diamond mining activities in Sierra Leone. Their activities shifted to either illicit 
mining or illicit trade activities or coercion. Though it is acceptable for military forces 
to keep the peace in conflict, they have no legal mandate to be involved in mining 
activities. I will now discuss the actors one after the other below. 
 
The RUF as Diamond Agents 
Among the agents of the blood diamond activities was the Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF), the rebel group that commenced the war in 1991 and seized the diamond rich 
district of Kono in 1994, primarily for fund raising activity to solicit arms deal with 
merchants of war and alleged sympathisers, such as Charles Taylor, the former 
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president of Liberia. The RUF was notorious and desperate to find internal sources of 
funding to continue the war. As a result, they were determined to seize more diamond 
fields in the East and South of the country. They succeeded because the state security 
forces were incapable of protecting the land, lives and properties. The RUF was 
successful in infiltrating every diamond district with ease. The scale of the mining 
was not only extensive but was also destructive in ecological terms (Bangura, 2006). 
The RUF made more diamond sales than the entire government of Sierra Leone. The 
estimated yearly account of diamond sale by the RUF during the conflict fluctuates 
from around $25 million to about $125 million (UN, 2001), while the government of 
Sierra Leone recorded an official export of 8,500 carats in 1998. According to 
diamond reports from DeBeers, it was estimated that around $20 million worth of 
diamonds were exported by the RUF in 1999. Whatever the imprecise estimates, the 
scale of export from an armed group signifies a major source of revenue to finance 
their war activities, which in turn was detrimental to the people and the environment. 
Referring to the agents of this unethical diamond trade, the RUF is by no means the 
only agent of blood diamonds in Sierra Leone. The RUF with the help of Charles 
Taylor used revenue from diamond sales to acquire drugs, arms and ammunition 
(Smillie et al., 2000). 
 
Sierra Leone Armed Forces as Agents 
As the war continued, the armed forces of Sierra Leone became unable to provide 
security. At the same time, the soldiers who were meant to protect life and property 
involved themselves in both protecting their personal mining ‘holes’ and in forced 
labour. The situation worsened when, in the mid-1990s, some elements of the Sierra 
Leone’s Armed Forces collaborated with the RUF, overthrew the democratically 
elected government in 1997 and then extended their diamond mining spree. The 
collaboration started in secret until it became apparent in May 1997, when some 
military officers of the SLAF and RUF united to overthrow the government of the 
then president Alhaji Tejan Kabbah (Kabia, 2009). This was the time the war became 
a free for all. Consequently, rampant diamond exploitation was the order of the day by 
men in uniform who then used forced labour to extract the diamonds. The army lost 
its legitimacy and any trust in it to protect the state. Instead, the military institution 
became a thorn in the flesh of the country that adopted a mining approach that is 
neither demonstrative of strong or weak sustainability. 
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Civil Militia Agents 
Since the integrity of the Armed Forces was questionable and incapable of delivering 
security, the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) government employed civil militias, 
mainly from the South and East of Sierra Leone, to provide state security and fight the 
rebels. However, there was a regional factor in this decision. Ethnic groups from the 
north have always dominated the army so the sense of distrust in the army displayed 
by the ruling SLPP, which is mainly supported by elements of Southern and eastern 
ethnic groups. It could not rely on the loyalty of the army because of the 29 Sierra 
Leoneans killed including the army officer Yaya Kanu and the Inspector-General of 
police, Bambay Kamara, both from the north, by the NPRC in 1992 in revenge for an 
alleged attempted counter-coup to reinstate the northern influenced ousted Momoh 
APC government. The civil militia were dominated by groups called the Kamajors, 
Kapras, Gbathes, Donsos, and the Tamaboros. These names are based on their strong 
ethnic element. Unlike the other militia groups whose role was limited, the Kamajors 
were the pivotal civil militia in the government of the Sierra Leone Peoples Party 
(SLPP) between 1996 and 2002 and utilised as a utility force. As their influence grew, 
the pro-government Kamajors militia involved themselves in serious mining activities 
in their controlled areas. During the overthrow of the SLPP and the struggle to 
reinstate it, the Kamajors took control of the mining towns, including Tongo and 
Bama Konta in the Kenema district. Even though they were initially welcomed as a 
preferred substitute for the disgraced Sierra Leone Armed Forces, they led an 
unprecedented ethnic killing spree focussed on non-indigenes accused of supporting 
the AFRC-RUF junta in their areas of control. It was clear that as more actors became 
involved in the political sphere, and as a result of the exploitation of natural resources, 
the phenomenon of clientelism and neo-patrimonialism became prevalent and caused 
an unimaginable negative impact on the people and the environment.    
 
The Lebanese 
The Lebanese are internal state and non-state actors depending on their role. Their 
involvement in the political economy in Sierra Leone can be traced from colonial era. 
This section will examine the pros and cons side of the Lebanese involvement in the 
state of affairs in Sierra Leone since they arrived in Sierra Leone in 1893, and another 
41 of the Maronite Christians who settled in Freetown in 1901 (Gberie, 2002). They 
made their way to West Africa in general and Sierra Leone in particular as refugees 
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fleeing the silkworm crisis in the 19th century that came as a result of the once great 
Ottoman Empire. This migration occurred during the colonial era. Their composition 
was a mixed one with some Maronites being Christians and others being 
predominantly Shiite Muslims who arrived from Southern Lebanon in 1903. This 
category of Lebanese was impoverished and educated (Leighton, 1992). In this 
section, it is argued that the role the Lebanese have played in the political economy of 
Sierra Leone diamonds is historic and was made possible due to a political and 
economic colonial administrative hegemony that arose out of an attempt to subdue 
economic rivalry in the protectorate. Being refugees from the Middle East, their 
interest was enhanced by the British colonial administration to overshadow the rising 
economic interest of the Krio business people in the protectorates (provinces). 
Economically, they are involved in trade (licit and illicit); socially, they have married 
indigenes but not equitably verse versa; politically, they have been political clients. 
Their patron-client relation since 1901 is historic and coordinated by the colonial 
administration in Freetown (Colony).  
 
Prior to their visit and involvement in trade, there was a ‘silence dispute’ between the 
colonial administration and the Krio, who are descendants of returned slaves residing 
in the land in Freetown solicited from King Tom and ratified by King Naimbana or 
Nemgbana of Koya Chiefdom. The Krio had penetrated the protectorate as 
professional elites and successful business people. This economic purpose threatened 
the economic interest of the colonial economy. One thing that made it possible was 
that, unlike the Krio, who penetrated the interior part of the protectorate of trade, the 
colonial officials did not do so because of hazardous conditions. Hence, they wanted a 
way to counter the influence of the Krio they presumed as being disloyal (Gberie, 
2002). In that case, the timely arrival of the Lebanese was an opportune moment to 
hinder the economic influence of the Krio business people.  
 
The colonial government used financial assistance to help the impoverished and 
desperate Lebanese, who were encouraged to move into the hinterland (protectorate). 
The colonial government established a patron-client relation with the Lebanese as a 
notion of economic interest to maintain their hegemony on the natural resources in the 
protectorate. This is still evident in present day Sierra Leone, with Lebanese 
merchants in resource-based communities undertaking clandestine diamond trades 
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under the guise of retail business. The colonial patron-client relation with the 
Lebanese was enhanced by infrastructural development on the construction of feeder 
roads and the use of vehicles to transport agricultural produce from the resource 
communities (supply) to the seaports or urban communities (demand). The Lebanese 
became proprietors in the colonial established businesses and dominated the produce 
trade, and their influence also extended to retail trades in Freetown. Though the post-
colonial patrons gave political appointments to their client, the colonial patrons did 
not and instead used unfair and corrupt means to suppress fairness. Siaka P. Stevens 
during his reign as Prime Minister and President of Sierra Leone in 1967 had clients 
of Lebanese economic elites to absorb, through corrupt means, within the diamond 
industry (Gberie, 2002). But the relationship between the colonial administration and 
the Lebanese economic elites was short lived when they were accused by the local 
population of hoarding and smuggling basic food commodities to cause an artificial 
scarcity that drastically increased prices. Consequently, in 1919, two Lebanese 
nationals were deported by the British colonial administration following widespread 
riots targeted at Lebanese merchants (Van der Laan, 1975).  
 
The type of patron-client relation between the Lebanese and their colonial patrons was 
what I call economic-clientelism. It was not meant to attain political influence for 
them but instead eliminate the economic power of the Krio. Later, the Lebanese used 
that economic-clientelism to indulge in rent-seeking gains. This was the beginning of 
resource exploitation by non-state actors and set the platform for the resource-curse 
hypothesis on the diamond industry in Sierra Leone. Taking advantage of this 
relationship, the Lebanese settled in the diamond rich district of Kono as early as 
1930, when diamonds were discovered under the guise of trade even before the 
establishment of a diamond office in 1932, and ahead of the Sierra Leone Selection 
Trust (SLST), which was granted exclusive prospecting and diamond mining rights 
for every part of Sierra Leone in 1935. Though mining was made illegal until 1956, 
the few Lebanese residing in the resource district became involved in illegal mining 
and illegal trade in diamonds by funding Africans to mine. This unauthorised 
diamond business by the Lebanese encouraged diamond smuggling. As a result, the 
colonial authority between the 1940s and the 1950s deported most of those 
unscrupulous Lebanese (Van der Laan, 1975). Not surprisingly, in the 1950s, 20 
percent of diamond leaving the shores of Sierra Leone to the international market was 
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smuggled by Lebanese and Madingo agents (Gberie, 2002). The diamond smuggling 
activity from Sierra Leone through Liberia attracted other Lebanese people in other 
West African countries who had been socially connected to such Lebanese people as 
Kassim Basma and his family since the 1950s (Fithen, 1999). This demonstrates that 
resource exploitation is influenced both internally and externally.  
 
The colonial authority was interested to curb illicit mining and the trade in diamonds. 
They decided to nullify the 1935 mining rights law that prohibited non-SLST 
individuals to mine by enacting the Alluvial Diamond Mining Scheme of 1956, which 
paved the way for mining licences to be granted to private individuals including the 
Lebanese actors. It was estimated that 32 Lebanese had mining licences by 1956. 
Ironically, the legitimacy for legitimate mining did not curb the smuggling of 
diamonds. The trade seemed to be more lucrative than the legitimate diamond mining 
trade. As such, the authorities amended the Alluvial Diamond Mining Act to warranty 
non-Sierra Leonean diamond dealers to deposit £3000, which could be forfeited if the 
licence owner was caught in illicit diamond trade. Yet again, this step made no 
significant gains as the illicit trade proved lucrative.  
 
The attempt to control the diamond industry saw a further setback in the 1950s and 
1960s when the capacity influence of the Lebanese actors became more obvious. 
Three Lebanese nationals, Fred Kamil, Henneh Shamel and Jamil Sahid Mohamed, 
engaged themselves in various capacities from arms confiscation of diamonds, from 
dealers travelling along the porous Sierra Leone-Liberia border, to patron-client 
relation. Fred Kamil operated in Liberia along the Liberia-Sierra Leone border with 
his gang of Liberian descent to attack and confiscate diamond possessions of 
smugglers in alleged retaliation for being cheated by a diamond smuggler (Kamil, 
1979). During that period, DeBeers had the service of a former Director-General of 
MI5, Sir Percy Sillitoe, to curb the smuggling of diamonds. Sillitoe contacted Kamil 
and guaranteed him protection and one-third returns on any intelligence that led to 
information on weapons and diamond smuggling. Henneh Shamel of the Shiite 
descent from South Lebanon was a close client of Siaka P. Stevens. He had about 
1,100 men working for him in the gold mines in Sierra Leone in 1936 but quickly 
involved himself in the smuggling of diamonds in 1950. His patron-client relationship 
with Stevens was short-lived when in 1969 diamonds worth $3 million were stolen 
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from him at Hastings Airport in Freetown. He was charged with theft and acquitted 
but was deported (Gberie, 2002).  
 
Many alleged the theft was a conspiracy by the Afro-Lebanese national Jamil Sahid 
Mohamed. He had been sentenced to six months for unlawful possession of diamonds 
in 1959. But that did not stop Siaka Stevens from using him as an economic client. In 
1971, after nationalising SLST to the National Diamond Mining Company (NDMC), 
with 51% of shares owned by the government of Sierra Leone and 49% by SLST, and 
the company being managed by 6 government appointed nominees and 5 from SLST, 
he appointed Jamil to take over 12% of the government’s shares (Gberie, 2002). On 
one hand, the nationalisation drive could have been viewed as part of the African 
governments’ drive towards economic nationalisation under the statist conceptions of 
development in an attempt to reduce foreign dominance on national economic and 
political decisions (Bayart, 1982). On the other hand, it was a political patronage 
attempt to establish and maintain a patron-client relation through corruption. Siaka 
Stevens and other successors used the latter for their clients through a structured form 
of corruption. 
 
Evidently, SLST diamond shipment declined considerably whilst Jamil and his 
associates misappropriated the diamond revenues through stealing and smuggling. 
The patron-client objective was realised when SLST decided to sell their shares in 
1984 to a company (Precious Metal Mining Company) owned by Jamil (Gberie, 
2002). Subsequently, the Precious Metal Mining Company (PMMC) in 1986, after 
claiming to be no longer viable, terminated its management with NDMC. But the true 
intention manifested itself when there was considerable decline on diamond exports 
from 2 million carats in 1970 to 595,000 in 1980, and to 48,000 in 1988 (Gberie, 
2002). The role of the Lebanese in the political economy in Sierra Leone even 
transcended the shores of Sierra Leone to include Lebanon, Palestine and Iran’s 
interest in Sierra Leone through a Sierra Leone born-Lebanese, Nabih Berri. 
 
External State Actors 
As stated earlier in the thesis, other agents of the Sierra Leone diamond trade were 
external. Most of the external actors are state-led. Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Ukraine 
supplied arms whilst Libya under the late Muhammad Gadhafi played a controversial 
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role in the conflict through his ‘green book’ and military training. Before the war 
started in Sierra Leone the small diamond industry in Cote d’Ivoire had not been 
operating since the 1980s. Ironically, the Ivoirian government exported an average of 
1.5 million carats to Belgium between 1995 and 1997 (Kabia, 2011). In another 
development, whilst Liberian diamond exports averaged between 100,000 and 
150,000 carats, their official export to Belgium between 1994 and 1998 was estimated 
at around an average of six million carats a year or thirty-one million carats during 
that period. This identifies what I have seen as the difference between production 
capacity and export capacity. Sierra Leone had the production capacity but exported 
less diamonds than Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire, the two countries had lesser production 
capacity but exported more diamonds than Sierra Leone. This was an indication of the 
dark side of Sierra Leone’s diamond industry with her neighbours.  
 
Liberia was a very close associate of the RUF through the then-president, Charles 
Taylor, who is now serving decades behind bars for his role in the conflict in Sierra 
Leone. Charles Taylor’s ‘godfather’ influence in Sierra Leone came to international 
prominence through his giving uncut diamonds to the British supermodel Naomi 
Campbell in South Africa in 1999 (The Telegraph, 2012). Like Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire 
became a transit point for illicit diamonds from Sierra Leone and for arms shipments 
to Sierra Leone. Unfortunately, Charles Taylor is the only external player accused and 
jailed for the conflict in Sierra Leone.  
 
In addition to external state actors such as Liberia, Burkina Faso engaged in serious 
and notorious gun running for the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) from 
Ouagadougou (the capital city of Burkina Faso) into rebel axis in Sierra Leone. On 
behalf of the government of Burkina Faso, the chartered Engineering and Technical 
Company Limited, through the assistance of a Ukrainian state-owned company 
(Ukrspetsexport), exported 68 tons of weapons and ammunition consisting of 715 
boxes of weapons and cartridge powder, surface to air missiles, rocket-propelled 
grenade launchers and anti-tank weapons to Ouagadougou for the RUF in March 1999 
(UN Security Council, 2000). This demonstrates the extent of involvement by outside 
players in the Sierra Leone diamond industry by ‘Blood Diamond Merchants’. 
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Mercenary Agents 
The agents of the diamond trade did not only limit their influence to domestic levels 
or state conspiracy with the rebels. Both military regimes and democracy utilised the 
proceeds from diamonds to employ the services of mercenaries and even gave them 
mining rights to secure mining areas and restore democracy. This is where I question 
who is a legitimate and who is an illegitimate mercenary. It is an answer that requires 
more research and cannot be answered in this section because it is an enormous 
subject. In April 1995, the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), which 
overthrown the then ‘One Party’ rule APC government of Joseph Saidu Momoh, hired 
the services of the South African Mercenary firm, Executive Outcomes (EO), to 
provide security and secure diamond areas (Kabia, 2010). Without any doubt, they did 
secure mining areas from the RUF until when they were asked to leave as part of the 
conditions the RUF asked for before a ‘peace deal’. As part of the deal between the 
NPRC and the mercenary group, the NPRC contracted Branch Energy (a subsidiary of 
EO) mining and prospecting rights (Musah, 2000).  
 
The role of mining corporations in the Sierra Leone conflict was a mixed blessing. On 
one hand, they involved themselves with mercenary groups like Executive Outcome 
and Sandline. Diamond Works was a Canadian company in London at the time of the 
Sierra Leone conflict. They acquired Branch Energy Limited in 1995. As their interest 
in diamond resources in the Sierra Leone became inevitable, the company introduced 
Executive Outcome and Sandline to President Strasser who, with other military 
officers, overthrew Joseph Saidu Momoh’s APC regime. The success made by EO to 
prevent the rebels from taking over the capital city of Freetown and the subsequent 
successes in driving the rebels in the mining district of Kono gave resources access in 
the diamond industry. Branch Energy had a 25-year lease and concession on the 
diamonds in Sierra Leone. In addition, other companies such as Rex Diamond, which 
assisted the Strasser coup’s administration in acquiring spare parts, engines, and 
ammunitions worth $3.8 million, had mining concessions in the Zimmi and Tongo 
fields (Gberie, Smillie and Hazleton, 2000 with Partnership Africa Canada).  
 
The SLPP-led government also colluded with mercenaries in the ‘blood diamond’ 
tale. It was reported that whilst in exile in Guinea, after the 1998 coup that revealed 
the inter-marriage between the Armed Forces and the RUF, President Kabbah had 
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discussions with individuals connected to Sandline International, a London-based 
private military company. This was facilitated by the then UK High Commissioner 
Peter Penfold and Rakesh Saxena, a Vancouver-based business tycoon who was 
financing the US$10 million deal in exchange for mining rights, and was 
accompanied by the presence of Nigerian-led ECOMOG military representatives 
(Kabia, 2009). It was employed to bring about the swift restoration of democracy in 
Sierra Leone after the 1998 coup. It is seen here that the resource curse on Sierra 
Leone is not only limited to the unequal distribution of wealth and the subsequent 
poverty that prevails, but also the in use of the natural resources for political and 
economic reasons. In a bid to execute the deal, Sandline imported into Sierra Leone 
about 35 tons of Bulgarian weapons for the use of the pro-SLPP Kabbah Kamajor 
militia, and gave intelligence and logistic support to the Nigerian led ECOMOG 
(Africa Confidential, 1998).  
 
ECOMOG 
When the internal security apparatus became weakened and the diamonds became a 
tool to fund warring factions, the ECOWAS military wing, ECOMOG, was assigned 
to keep the peace after a successful intervention in May 1998. Unfortunately, the 
Nigerian-led ECOMOG became involved in wide-scale diamond mining at all levels 
of exploitation including artisanal mining. The provision of security was no longer 
paramount. Their role shifted from state security to diamond security. According to 
Gen. Jetley, the Nigerian army became interested in staying longer in Sierra Leone 
due to their gains from illicit diamond activities (Jetley, 2000). The evidence to 
support this claim came from many eyewitnesses of the RUF attack on the diamond 
rich district of Kono in December 1998, when the Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces 
were caught off guard whilst deeply concentrating on securing their mines. A memoir 
released by the former Nigerian Commander of the 24th Brigade in charge of the 
Kono district, made this statement: “Most of the personnel of units deployed at Kono 
district except those located at Njaima Nimikoro were deeply involved in illegal 
mining of diamond. Our boys forgot our main mission in Sierra Leone and opted for 
material gains due to the influence of the SLA soldiers. The allure of having a few 
gemstones in their pockets was too tempting to resist especially as the only 
gratification to take back to Nigeria was a paltry $150 as opposed to $900 they often 
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collect while on UN operations. This unprofessional attitude reduced their will to 
fight tremendously” (Adeshina, 2002, p. 143; cited in Kabia, 2006).  
 
3.6 Governance Initiatives 
After years of misappropriation of diamond resources in conflict economies such as 
Sierra Leone, there was the need for both internal and external actions to avert or 
mitigate the illegal flow of diamonds from potentially volatile or struggling, or 
deprived economies. Internally, the government introduced the Diamond Area 
Community Development Fund (DACDF); externally, at global level, the Kimberley 
Process Certification scheme through internal governance and control of diamond 
resources.  
 
Kimberley Processing Certification Scheme (KPCS) 
In May 2000, an attempt to curb illicit flow of ‘blood diamonds’ or corrupt diamonds 
from conflict areas and now in resource rich developing nations was initiated by the 
government of South Africa when some governments, industry and civil NGOs had a 
joint initiative to curb the flow of these rough diamonds by ‘rebel’ movements to 
finance wars against legitimate governments through the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme (KPCS). It was later adopted at a ministerial meeting in 
Interlaken in Switzerland in November 2002 (Maconachie, 2008; Gberie, 2002). 
There was grave concern that diamonds from conflict countries such as the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola and Sierra Leone, driven by resource 
exploitation, might affect the legitimate diamond trade. In addition, one could argue 
that the present KPCS wants to prevent potential use of diamond resources for illegal 
actions.    
 
In Sierra Leone, prior to the KPCS, the Security Council passed Resolution 1176 in 
1998 to prevent diamonds from RUF conflict zones from reaching the international 
market. That made little signs of curbing the dangers of diamond exploitation by the 
RUF to carry out their bloodthirsty campaign. Therefore, the Security Council passed 
another resolution (1306) in 2000 that called for a complete ban on Sierra Leonean 
diamond exports until a proper mechanism was put in place to eradicate or mitigate 
smuggling of diamonds from Sierra Leone. In the same year, after Resolution 1306, 
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the UN Security Council, in September, introduced the diamond certification scheme 
with the assistance of the Belgium Diamond High Council (BDHC).  
Understanding the political economy involving the diamond industry in Sierra Leone 
since the colonial period, a sustainable solution on the certification scheme must not 
be seen as a targeted policy on conflict diamonds alone but rather on any diamond 
that may not go through the legitimate government regulatory systems. This is 
because even though there is an absence of war or conflict diamonds, there is 
evidence of smuggled diamonds passing through unofficial channels. According to 
Gberie (2002), 60 percent of diamonds from Sierra Leone are smuggled to Guinea 
Conakry and the Gambia. Gambia, which does not produce diamonds, exports a 
considerable amount of diamonds smuggled in diplomatic bags. In addition to this, 
some merchants could prefer to smuggle diamonds as a means of laundering drug 
money, black money, or hidden money. 
 
Between 2000 and 2009, the aims of the certification scheme became obvious. Sierra 
Leone had been experiencing a high export level of diamonds through legitimate 
channels (see Table 3.1) and has denied, at least for now, potential warlords and 
corrupt individuals the use of diamonds for conflicts. The flow of conflict diamonds 
reduced considerably by 15 percent compared to the outflow in 1990 (MMMR, 2009). 
With this progress, the UN Security Council lifted the Resolution on Sierra Leone 
diamonds in 2003 and the KP has continued to be effective. However, despite this 
governance initiative approach to address the illicit diamond trade, it has made 
insignificant progress on redressing poverty, inequality, and the bizarre working 
conditions of small-scale miners (Olsson, 2006; Silberfein, 2004). In my contribution 
from the evidence gained from mining communities, it has also failed to address the 
issue of child labour.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 104 
Table 3.1: Sierra Leone Kimberley Certification Export Scheme 
Year Carats Value (USD) in millions 
2000 77,372.39 10 
2001 222,519.83 26 
2002 341,859.23 41 
2003 506,723.37 76 
2004 499,242.43 (A) 
58,030.54 (K) 
126 
2005 552,044 (A) 
116,665 (K) 
141 
2006 209,762 (A) 
30,631 (K) 
126 
2007 603,623 142 
2008 371,260 99 
2009 N/A 80 
Source: Strasser-King (2004:9); GGDO Diamond Export Figures, 2001-2006; 
Kimberley Process 
(A)  Alluvial 
(K) Kimberlite 
 
Diamond Area Community Development Fund (DACDF) 
To compliment the governance initiative of the KPCS, other alternatives in the 
artisanal sector were initiated. For instance, the now disbanded Peace Diamond 
Alliance (PDA) or the Integrated Diamond Management Programme (IDMP) was 
modelled to redress the shortcomings of the KPSC (Levin, 2005). One of the 
governance initiatives brought forward by the PDA is the Diamond Area Community 
Development Fund. 
 
The government of Sierra Leone through the Ministry of Mines and Mineral 
Resources approved the DACDF in December 2001. It scheme was intended to be a 
community-based, decentralised and participatory approach to natural resource 
management across sub-Saharan African (Maconachie, 2008). I have used the word 
‘intended’ to substantiate the difference between theory and purpose of the DACDF 
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and practice or what has actually occurred with the funds. The scheme calls for 3 
percent (0.75 percent export duty) of the government’s diamond export for 
community small-scale projects on social and infrastructural development in the 
resource communities at pro rata (Temple, 2005). It means that chiefdoms benefit 
from this fund subject to the number of mining licences issued. According to the 
Global Witness/Africa Canada report (2004), $195,165 was returned to the diamond 
producing communities in 2001; $312,988 in 2002; $569,000 in 2003; $900,000 in 
2005 (GAO, 2006). Though the 2004 amount is not available, Partnership Africa 
Canada, and Network Movement for Justice and Development (2006) claimed that the 
combined total licences issued in 54 chiefdoms amounted to 2,313. As of 2010, about 
70 chiefdoms were receiving DACDF funds. 
 
The outcome of the DACDF is a mixed story. On one hand, Temple (2005) reported 
that some chiefdom councils for financing education, infrastructure, health and 
vocational skills centre have used the fund wisely. For instance, the Chiefdom 
administrators in Kayima (Sandor chiefdom) used the fund to rehabilitate the Native 
Administration police quarters; Panguma in the Lower Bambara chiefdom used theirs 
to rehabilitate the community centre. On the other hand, in a series of ad hoc reports 
in 2002, it was revealed that a number of chiefdoms are not using the funds 
effectively. There was a lack of transparency, community participation in decision-
making and community awareness. Jackson (2007) highlights that the evidence of 
misuse of DACDF due to lack of an accountability mechanism. In addition, a report in 
the Integrated Diamond Management Programme (IDMP) for the government of 
Sierra Leone’s High Level Diamond Steering Committee reveals that the 
accountability performance of the Sandor chiefdom was very poor. This led to the 
temporal suspension of the disbursement in 2004. This was evident on the basis of 
disparity between rural elites and the general community such as women and youths 
(Temple, 2005). Richard (2005) attributes this disparity or inequality between the 
rural elites and the community to the war, and existing dissatisfaction among the 
youths with traditional hierarchical political structures in rural Sierra Leone. I may 
agree with Richard but would include that the problem has been historic or endemic 
with little or no attempt to avoid the deprivation mechanism of the ‘ruled’ by the 
ruling elites. In conclusion, from the evidence discussed above, the network of all 
stakeholders should enhance monitoring and accountability mechanisms in order to 
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ensure that the DACDF operates for the genuine benefit of the mining communities. 
This is why this thesis calls for community-state governance at all levels of policy 
formulation and implementation. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have been able to link past colonial activities with post-colonial 
Sierra Leone. I identified the role played by various actors, the issue of bad 
governance in the form of patron-client relation that originated during colonialism 
when the colonial administration encouraged a top-down approach by giving more 
unquestionable powers to the chiefs, and used the Lebanese as economic clients 
against the Krio. The issue of patron-client is historic and the negative side of it bred 
the smuggling of diamonds by colonial clients. The colonial-Lebanese clientelism 
became a root for the Lebanese to become involved in illegal mining and smuggling 
in the Kono district. The mining industry has also attracted both internal and external 
non-state actors. Their economic interests superseded the ecological interests. The 
resolutions adopted to make diamonds resources benefit the communities have 
received mixed blessings. The corruption in the diamond mining industry is not 
limited to just individuals but also within multinational companies with government 
collusion. Multinational companies in countries that are rich in natural resources 
maximise their relationship with state actors at any levels and to any extent. One of 
these companies, Executive Outcome, was hired in 1992 as a mercenary group and 
later given a stake in the diamond industry as a pay-off for liberating and securing 
diamond-rich districts in the eastern and southern parts of Sierra Leone from the 
notorious RUF. Resource corruption in Sierra Leone cannot be proven openly, but it 
is implied from the failure of state institutions to hold the corporations accountable 
in the event of their corporate failures. Hence, finding a sustainable mining industry 
should be devoid of preferential status quo of any actor or groups of actors. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter identifies and explains the methodology, the method of data collection 
that entails the use of multi-purpose case studies or triangulation, and the design and 
information on the study area that was used in arriving at the aim and objectives of the 
research. The adoption of such a methodology is consistent with the theoretical 
aspects of the research, the body of literature and with the issue of sustainable 
community development under consideration.  
 
I have outlined the research design of the thesis in this chapter by describing the logic 
of the research approach and explaining how I have applied it. I will begin by 
explaining the research methodology and discuss the approaches to the research, 
which are qualitative, inductive, and include a case study. I then continue to explain 
the use of the methods in detail by discussing the manner of data collection and 
analysis. I have made a summary of this framework in the form of tables and will 
discuss them one after the other. 
 
Table 4.1 Summary of Research Methodology  
Key Methodological Elements Description 
Methodology Critical realism 
Strategy Realistic evaluation 
Approach Qualitative 
Inductive 
Case study 
Methods of data collection 
 
Secondary data: Documentation 
Primary data: (i) Semi-structured 
interviews (ii) Focus groups 
Analysis methods 
 
Coding 
Categorising of codes 
Theory building 
Descriptive analysis 
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After the table above (Table 4.1), I will now commence discussion on the critical 
issues of the research methodology. This is an attempt to show its applicability to the 
research.  
 
4.2 Methodology 
The effectiveness of a research project is determined by the appropriateness of the 
methodology. Taking this into consideration the research work must be important and 
the aims achievable. In the field of research, there are two distinct research 
methodologies used by social scientists and physical scientists in finding answers to 
questions. The methodology is either quantitative or qualitative or a mixture of both. 
With these two, there is an on-going argument as to which one of them is most 
appropriate for particular research questions. As such, different contributors have 
made different contributions to them. Denzin and Lincoln (1994) defined qualitative 
methodology as a process and a way of understanding phenomena that cannot be 
either quantified or measured. Denzin and Lincoln argued that quantitative research is 
less capable of exploring certain social issues. However, Levine (1993) argues that 
despite the strong opposition from qualitative proponents to quantitative social 
science, it still prevails. These arguments, as in other fields of study, will always 
remain. The fact is that both research methodologies may share basic principles of 
some social science phenomena, differing in varying ways, but can both achieve an 
outcome depending on how the researcher uses them. Their appropriateness depends 
on the outcome of the study undertaken. Each method has its advantages and 
constraints with regard to how they influence social research.  
 
The research was entirely qualitative, using a case study and employing triangulation 
techniques for data collection. For the purpose of clarity, Yin, (2003, 2009) and Nee 
and Taylor (2000) explain that triangulation is a method of exploring different areas 
to derive an answer to a question. Triangulation works in combination with semi-
structured interviews, documents, and focus group discussions. In the thesis, 
triangulation provided the opportunity for cross-validating the data from different 
sources before coding, categorising and inducing a new theory. Its adoption was 
relevant as its exposes the same problems in the communities using the same 
techniques. 
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Qualitative methodology is important because it can create knowledge that is more 
socially useful and can contribute to more effective development policy (Yin, 2009). 
It can provide a better understanding of human interpretations and interactions. This is 
significant in this research, which is focussed on community. According to Bryman 
(2008), qualitative research centres on events in a social world through the eyes of the 
studied group. It conforms to a post-positivist approach that deals with the 
understanding of subjective social phenomena (Finch, 1986). In essence, qualitative 
methods build knowledge that is socially constructed (Yin, 2007). As such, qualitative 
methodology is appropriate in most social science research like the area in question. 
Unlike a quantitative methodology that is often measured in quantity and frequency 
(Denzin and Lincoln 1994), some researchers tend to be interested in insight, 
discovery, interpretation of data rather than testing hypotheses (Merriam, 1988). Thus, 
qualitative research has proven to be a significant research method in most social 
science research in developing countries in order to rigorously examine the 
characteristics of social phenomenon (Narayan et al., 2000). Mackenwash (2009) 
argued that qualitative data can give more descriptive outcomes that help to 
understand human interactions and interpretations. Unlike quantitative methodologies 
that gather facts and their frequencies and transform them into theoretical and 
methodological assumptions (Neuman, 1994), qualitative research looks at the various 
constructs and importance that people develop out of their experiences (Easterby-
Smith, 1991). The compassionate position of seeking to understand issues through the 
eyes of the respondents conforms to interpretivism and expresses the epistemological 
relations with phenomenology (Bryman, 2008). This illustrates that the researcher 
must embrace the meaning of actions portrayed by the respondents. It also justifies 
why semi-structured interviews in a qualitative research are valuable sources of data 
collection under such circumstances. These arguments further support its adoption in 
this research, which is interested in the actors, their role, and the limitations of 
resource and community sustainability.  
 
Qualitative methodology is flexible and collects relevant data, facilitates researchers’ 
accounts and allows explanations of processes and meanings in a particular social 
context (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Bryman (2008) describes qualitative research as 
fostering commitment to events in the social context, in case they are investigated. 
The epistemology underlying qualitative research is that it guarantees the utmost 
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efficiency of the researcher’s constructivist approach in a social phenomenon by 
exploring the concealed or ignored issues through reflection (Neuman, 2006). Lofland 
and Lofland (1995, p. 16) state that their approach: “underlies significant points in 
social research that the researcher could induce the mind of the respondents by 
assuming his or her role to acquire social knowledge”. It is as a result of this 
theoretical assumption that most qualitative researchers build claims into their 
research (Bryman, 2008). 
 
Limitations 
However, qualitative methodology is not without limitations. Lofland and Lofland 
(1995) argued that there is the risk of the researcher deviating away from the purpose 
of the study, not understanding how far the research should go, and the possibilities of 
participating in unethical activities. This concern was also raised by Bryman (2008), 
who argued that qualitative methods appear to be preoccupied with apparently trivial 
facets, and that qualitative research tends to be too long, with too much to read. 
However, in contrast to Lofland and Lofland (1995) and Bryman (2008), Yin (2009) 
argues that these points are mostly necessary for the researcher because of what the 
researcher wants to know and the account it gives of the respondents’ behaviour. It is 
under these circumstances that Geertz (1973, quoted in Bryman, 2008) advocated the 
proviso of social settings, events, and individuals. He argued that the researcher 
should adopt qualitative techniques in order to collate the accounts of respondents.  
 
However, in an attempt to allay the fears raised by critics of qualitative research, the 
researcher works on the propositions of the study by trying to be more focussed on the 
issues alongside the network of evidence. Patton (2001) explains that propositions 
assist the researcher to be steadily focused on key data that will help to define 
alternative explanations. As qualitative methodology helps to explore and describe the 
information in real social life situation, the case study approach (4.3.1) below is 
adopted in order to give an explanation of the complexities of real-life situations 
which many previous researchers and writers may have ignored by utilising 
quantitative or physical science research. 
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4.3 Research Strategy and Approach 
In this section, I explain the strategy and approach undertaken in the research. Though 
there could be other similar approaches, I have identified and made use of the 
approaches that are very relevant to the overall direction of the study. My first attempt 
is to explain that the research takes a qualitative and case study approach, which I 
have explained in section below. The second discussion is centred on the adoption of 
an inductive approach to theory building from evidence collected in the data (4.4). 
 
Case Study Approach 
The research has undertaken a qualitative and case study approach based on key case 
studies in the resource-based communities. Here, I have avoided commenting on the 
qualitative aspect of the literature as much of it has been explained in the 
methodology section (4.1) above. Unlike other researches or commentaries on 
diamond mining in Sierra Leone, this research undertakes a relatively new direction to 
exploring the problems associated with the mining industry in Sierra Leone. The 
study is not focused on land degradation and conflict diamonds. Instead, the research 
is focused on sustainable community development. In that respect, four chiefdom 
headquarter towns or communities that are actively involved in mining were explored 
in detail. In an attempt to understand the approach, I will first surmise some of the key 
issues arising from the body of literature on case study research, and comment on why 
I have used this approach. I will then identify and discuss the case studies, taking into 
consideration the general characteristics in the districts and the influence of the 
political, social, economic and ecological factors. Finally, I will explain the sources of 
data within each of the cases chosen and show the timetable of the research on each of 
the cases. 
 
The case study approach helps the researcher to be more focussed because of the 
potential proximity to real life situations (Yin, 2007). This contradicts the criticism 
that qualitative methodology diverts the researcher away from the purpose of the 
study and contains the possibilities of participating in unethical activities (Lofland and 
Lofland, 1995). A case study is often misunderstood by many to mean either a 
participant-observation data collection technique (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1992) or 
an ethnographic method (Yin, 2009). However, a meaningful definition of case study 
could be the scope of study or a technical perspective on a real-life situation, the 
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forms of data collection, analysis and strategies (Yin, 2009). According to Anderson 
(1993), case studies are concerned with how and why things happen, allowing the 
investigation of contextual realities and including the difference between what was 
planned and what actually happens. Another definition describes case study as: “an 
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within 
its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2009 p. 18).    
 
The other definition points out that case study research: “…copes with the technically 
distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data 
points, and as one result relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to 
converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result benefits from the prior 
development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis” (Yin, 
2009, p. 18).  
 
All of these contributions are essential in a social setting. However, it should be clear 
to the reader that case study work is not limited to qualitative research (Creswell, 
2007). Case studies at times are applicable to both qualitative and quantitative 
evidence (Yin, 2009). In this respect, other researchers gave offer a similar focus on 
defining it as a unit of study, an entity around which there are boundaries that define 
what the study is all about (Robson, 2003). Whilst Stake (1994, 1995) defines it as an 
integrated system, Smith (1978) defines it as a bounded system. On the other hand, 
Miles and Huberman (1994) describe a case as a phenomenon of some form of 
phenomena in a bounded context. Case studies are descriptive, explanatory, or 
exploratory (Yin, 1993). For instance, Anderson (1993) classifies a case study as a 
method to show how and why things happen, and to investigate the contextual 
realities and the differences between what was planned and what actually occurred. 
This adheres to the researcher’s earlier comment distinguishing between what the 
documents say and what actually happens in the field. That is why Patton (1987) says 
that a case study is particularly useful where the researcher needs to understand an 
area of study of a particular situation in great-depth.  
 
Multiple sources of information in a research project are needed to provide an all-
inclusive perspective of the issues under examination. Such sources of evidence come 
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from the combination of observations, semi-structured interviewing, and document 
analysis. In a case study, this will assist the researcher to use different data 
information to validate and cross-check findings (Patton, 1990). Collecting data could 
be from a single source or multiple sources. Therefore, it is pertinent to explore the 
different types of case studies as outlined below in section (4.4). 
 
Types of Case Study 
Yin (2003, 2009), classified the case study approach into two categories. The first one 
is the single case study, and the other is the multiple-case study. A single case study 
simply means the use of one unit of analysis or case to investigate an issue. On the 
other hand, a multiple case study implies the use of at least two cases within the same 
study to allow for generalisations based on various sources of evidence (Yin, 1993, 
2009). In this research, I adopted the multiple case study approach. Yin (1993) argues 
that studies on multiple cases should follow a replication, and not a sampling, logic.   
The replication is derived out of the use of multiple-case study and enhances 
confidence in results (Yin, 1993). Some fields of study in political science and public 
administration have used the term ‘comparative case method’ as a distinctive form of 
multiple case studies in order to distinguish between the two types of case studies. 
This explains why case study research is not only limited to qualitative research as 
stated earlier (Yin, 2009; Creswell, 2007). It may have a mixture of qualitative and 
quantitative sources of information, and single or multiple case studies. This implies 
that the researcher, irrespective of whether the choice is for single case or multiple-
cases, needs to take a decision before any data collection starts. The adoption of a 
multiple-case study approach allows for generalisation (Hartley, 1994), and is argued 
to be more robust (Yin, 2009). This, according to Yin, explains why the analytic 
outcome arising from at least two different cases will be more reliable than of a single 
case (Yin, 2009). 
 
Case studies in a social science setting are holistic (Gummesson, 1991). This enables 
the researcher to have an insight into certain phenomenon with the help of various 
sources of evidence. This, despite some criticisms, allows for generalisation because it 
uses multiple sources that can arrive at some form of replication (Yin, 2009). Another 
advantage of a case study is its capacity to assist the researcher to capture emergent 
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and imminent properties of a situation in the unit being investigated (Hartley, 1994). 
However, the advantages also come with some limitations, as discussed below. 
 
Weaknesses and Strengths of Using a Case Study Approach 
Despite its relevance, the case study method or approach is not without limitations. A 
case study is regularly considered to be unsystematic and full of extraneous data and it 
is argued that it does not address the issues of generalisation (Noor, 2008; Johnson, 
1994). Others have criticised it for lacking scientific rigidity and reliability (Johnson, 
1994). However, the question often asked in a single case study is ‘how can a 
researcher generalise from a single case’? This is why Yin (1989) was quick to 
contest the criticism by bringing into the argument a constructed explanation of the 
difference between analytic and statistical generalisation. Yin (1998) argues that 
analytical generalisation builds up theory use to compare the outcome of the case 
study. For example, ‘Blood Diamonds in Sierra Leone’, written by Campbell (2004), 
has been argued to explain a situation, provide the basis for providing solutions to a 
problem, explore a phenomenon, build upon a theory to produce a new theory, and to 
contest a theory. Despite these reservations over the case study research, its usefulness 
is immeasurable as it leads us to another important aspect, which is discussed in 
(5.3.3) below.  
 
Induction 
The researcher used a case study method with an inductive approach in the thesis 
because the research is instructive and attempts to establish new theories in order to 
explain resource use and community sustainability, instead of testing an existing 
theory in a deductive manner (Blaxter et al., 2001). This is justified in the analysis 
chapters (5, 6 and 7) where new theories are induced from the information gathered 
from the field. Inductive approaches test and create new theories from data collected 
and analysed from case studies. This is what Charmaz (2005) describes as an 
‘iterative process in qualitative methodology’ that attempts to establish new theories 
in new areas of study. Other researchers such as Blaikie (2000) theorised the inductive 
approach as ‘abduction’ and ‘retroduction’. He refers to abduction as a research 
strategy that aims to describe and understand social life phenomena in terms of social 
factors, motives and the relevant accounts of participants. On the other hand, he refers 
to ‘retroduction’ as a research strategy which tries to “discover underlying 
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mechanisms to explain observed regularities” (Blaikie, 2000, p. 101) that tests data in 
an interactive way. Suitably, I have constructed theories using induction, abduction 
and retroduction. I looked for regularities common to social (community) and political 
actors, their roles, and their involvement in sustainable community development. 
These theories are outlined in the body of literature critiqued in chapter 2. With this 
body of literature and the formation of new theories in chapters 5, 6 and 7, it is 
therefore of importance to have an overview of the research design outlined (4.4) 
below. 
 
4.4 Research Design: Strategy and Approach 
According to Yin, (2009) an all-encompassing research design for case study research 
is yet to be developed. Yin has tried to improve case study research with one overall 
research design. However, before I identify it, it is worth knowing what a research 
design is. According to Yin, (2009, p. 26) a research design is: “…a logical plan for 
getting from here to there. The ‘where’ may be defined as the initial set of questions 
to be answered, and there is some set of conclusions (answers) about these question”. 
Yin explains that between the research questions and the answers lay necessary steps, 
including data collection and data analysing. Another definition describes research 
design as: “...a plan that guides the investigator in the process of collecting, analysing, 
and interpreting observations. It is a logical model of proof that allows the researcher 
to draw inferences concerning causal relations among the variables under 
investigation” (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1992, pp. 77-78)  
 
A research design is a “blueprint” for a study addressing significant problems: what 
question to study, what data is appropriate, what data to collect, and how the results 
are analysed (Robson, 2003)? The plan has helped the researcher to avoid moving 
away from the focus of the study. In summary, Yin (2009) identified five significant 
components of a research design, which the research took into consideration in the 
research process. These are: research questions; its proposition where necessary; unit 
of analysis; logical framework linking the data to the propositions; and the principles 
for interpreting the findings. The importance of these components is illustrated in the 
framework of the research, with the research aim and objectives as outlined below.  
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Aim and Objectives 
Aim: This research aims to explore the dynamics between resource use and achieving 
Sustainable Community Development in the Kono district, Sierra Leone. 
 
Objectives:  
1. To identify the relationship between resource exploitation and community 
governance in mining communities through an analysis of key actors and their 
roles at a range of scales 
2. To examine if and in what ways mining communities utilise their assets and 
undertake practices that contribute towards sustainable community development 
3. To identify both the structural and community-based barriers to promoting 
sustainable community development in mining communities and then make policy 
recommendations for community development in such communities 
Case Studied in the Research 
I engaged in four case studies in four mining chiefdoms that are instrumental in 
drawing generalisations on sustainable community development. The adoption of 
these cases is designed to investigate the problem of political ecology in the mining 
communities. I have drawn a table (Table 4.2) in section 4.4.2 below to show the 
cases investigated. Prior to that, I want the reader to engage with a summarised 
background of Kono and its relationship to the research. 
 
The research study was undertaken in the Kono district, in the eastern part of Sierra 
Leone. The first diamond discovered in this district in 1930 was found by a British 
geologist, J. D. Pollet, in the Gbobora River, near the village of Fintigaia in the Kono 
district (NACE, 2009; Zack-Williams, 1995). The district has a population of 
335,401, which is 6.74 percent of the national population and a low population 
density of 61.4 persons per sq. km (Statistics Sierra Leone, 2006). Despite the influx 
of people into the district in search of diamonds, the concentration is centred mainly 
in urban or suburban towns.  
 
Since the initial discovery, diamond activities have been taking place on small and 
large scales, legal and illegal (Smillie et al., 2000; Bangura, 2006, 2008), by domestic 
and external actors, in the form of alluvial and Kimberlite (NACE, 2009; Zack-
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Williams, 1995), by private and ‘private government functionaries’, and mined during 
the day and at night. As different actors with different mine at all levels, the impacts 
of mining in diamond mining communities vary. These mining communities have 
been ‘polluted’ environmentally, socially, politically, and economically. 
Consequently, this has affected the way the communities have sustained themselves 
since mining activities commenced and there seems to be no sign of this abating. This 
is a motivation for the researcher to explore the aims of the research and find answers 
to the objectives as outlined in chapter 1 and in section 4.4 above.  
 
Table 4.2 Community Selection: Case studies in the research 
Case name Chiefdom Description 
Koidu Town (Sefadu) Gbense Cosmopolitan district 
headquarter town 
with both corporate 
and small-scale 
mining actives 
Koidu Town (Sefadu) Tankoro Cosmopolitan district 
headquarter town 
with both corporate 
(Koidu Holdings Ltd) 
and small-scale 
mining actives 
Yengema Nimikoro Home of the defunct 
SLST and former 
NDMC headquarters. 
Mining is still on-
going 
Sewafe Nimiyama Along the Sewafe 
River. Mining is on-
going 
 
Geographically, diamond mining activities are dominant in the Eastern and Southern 
provinces of Sierra Leone. The diamond mining in the Northern Province is not at a 
level comparable to the other two provinces. In the Eastern province, there are three 
districts involve in diamond activities, and in the South, there are three districts. 
However, regarding units of analysis, the research limits its case studies to four 
chiefdoms (Nimiyama, Gbense, Nimikoro and Tankoro) in the Kono district with 
common problems and research questions. The choice of Kono district is justified by 
the fact that the district is nationally and internationally known for the most excessive 
mining activity since the first diamond was discovered there in 1930 (NACE, 2009). 
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Young men or youths are a large component of the mining activities and serve as a 
unit of analysis, being an important part of the mining community.  
 
The identification of these selection units as multiple case studies, in order to get 
answers to the aims of the study, re-enforces the argument for triangulation (Yin, 
2003, 2009). This assisted me in confirming the validity of the research process and 
serves as a useful technique for linking the data to the researcher’s propositions. 
According to Patton (2001), validity and reliability are two factors that any qualitative 
researcher should take into consideration while designing a case study, collecting 
data, analysing results and answering research questions.  
 
4.5 Conducting the Research: Preparation for the fieldwork/Data collection 
procedures 
This section is of immense importance to this study because it puts into practice the 
theoretical ideas discussed above. The research adopts significant purposeful sources 
of data as a sampling strategy to justify the multi-case study approach and 
triangulation.  
 
The fieldwork was undertaken in four chiefdoms (Gbense, Tankoro, Nimikoro and 
Nimiyama) in the Kono district, Eastern Sierra Leone, which were engaged as case 
studies. Kono’s main town is Koidu. Before going further, I would like the reader to 
know that Koidu town is embedded in Gbense and Tankoro chiefdoms. That is why I 
labelled it in table 4.2 above as being a cosmopolitan community. The researcher’s 
first visit was to the Ministry of Mines in order to have a discussion with some 
officials. The Director of Mines office, at the Ministry of Mines Head Office in 
Freetown, gave an insight into the operations on Sierra Leone’s artisanal diamond 
mining and the efforts made by the government to achieve community development in 
mining communities. The exposition of community development in the mining policy 
paper is very limited, and much of the discussion was centred on the government’s 
achievements in reviving the mining sector and the reviewing of mining policies. 
Referring to The Ministry of Mines website was suggested for all that one may wish 
to know about the mining activities in the area under the research. Therefore, 
government documents and other secondary data became a pivotal aspect of the 
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research, in order to ascertain what is in government documents and what actually 
happens in the communities.  
 
This motivated the researcher to make the second visit to the ‘Network Movement for 
Justice and Development’. Though NGOs that claim only to be advocates of just 
mining are actually actors in their own capacity, the research did not necessarily focus 
on their role in the community. The researcher was interested in finding a bridge 
between the ideas of both community and government documents. The researcher had 
a discussion with one of the managers’ in-charge of Mining and Extractives for the 
Network Movement for Justice and Development [NMJD]. Like within most parallel 
actors, the views of the NGO differ. The manager contributed to the comparison of 
the mining policies and the practices on the ground. The manager also identified 
resource persons in mining communities. The resource staff supported me with 
documents, which were instrumental in my data collection and analysis. This 
approach was significant for the researcher, who wanted to know the story of those 
who have knowledge and links with the mining activities and construct the story in a 
different way from the government officials or websites. Jack’s (1987) commentary 
supports my approach, when he states that the most direct method of selecting key 
informants is by consulting experts who are experienced and analytical in the study 
area.  
 
The third contact was with local authority/councillors, who are supposedly 
representatives of the communities. They are aware of how land is transferred from 
the legitimate communal ownership to a license holder or a mining company. They 
are mainly indigenes of the mining communities but with ambiguous roles. Three 
local authority officials were interviewed in four chiefdoms: Gbense, Tankoro, 
Nimikoro and Nimiyama. A total of 35 community members in these communities 
were interviewed in an average time of 25 minutes each. Some respondents 
interviewed were part of the focus groups. Hence, I consider the individual 
respondents interviewed than the focus group. Also, the two respondents in Freetown 
did not take formal interviews, instead, they gave me directives to sources of 
information.  
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The fourth visit was at Koidu Holdings Ltd (now OCTEA). One official was 
interviewed from Koidu Holdings. It is the most powerful corporate mining company 
in the area and has had conflicts with the communities in Koidu town (Gbense and 
Tankoro Chiefdoms). I had an interview with one of the administrative officers, 
whom I had contacted by email and telephone beforehand. Though he answered my 
questions, he tolerated no extra questions because he claimed to have a meeting to go 
to. However, the discussion showed the discontent between the communities and the 
corporations, despite the social activities undertaken as part of their corporate 
responsibilities. He gave me a clear indication of the relationship between the 
company and the community, which, even though it has improved, is yet to be 
amicable. 
 
The fifth contact was with random selection of common artisanal mining ‘companies’. 
These are companies according to the government’s definition, but fall short of 
professional or formal management. They equally contribute to the destruction of the 
environment but government policy on Environmental Impact Assessment [EIA] and 
community development is targeted only on highly capital-intensive mining 
companies like Koidu Holdings Ltd. This contact was very significant as all those 
who were interviewed demonstrated no evidence of community projects in the areas 
they mine.    
 
This motivated the researcher to talk with community members individually and in 
small focus groups. Eight focus groups with a composition of between four and seven 
community members were engaged. Like with the individual participants, the two 
focus groups in each of the chiefdoms were undertaken with consent. The participants 
were enthusiastic to participate and in high spirits. This demonstrated how prevalent 
the endemic issues affecting them are and illustrates the level of discontent. This 
interaction was crucial. Kitzinger (1994) explains that interaction is the crucial feature 
of focus groups because the interaction between participants draws out their views of 
the world, the language they use on an issue, and their beliefs and values about a 
situation.  
 
After getting the necessary information from the above key informants through semi-
structured interviews, the next step was an attempt to review the necessary significant 
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documents such as journals, articles, and newspapers from the libraries of Njala 
University and Fourah Bay College, in addition to those collected from the Ministry 
of Mines and Mineral Resources, and the Network Movement for Justice [NMJD]. 
Some of these articles were written by myself as an attempt to expose the 
predicaments mining communities face. The researcher did not depend on the 
university libraries because they are not well-equipped for this subject. However, the 
different varieties of documents provided detailed demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics of the case study chiefdoms and provided information on government 
policies on mining and community. They were helpful in arriving at some summary 
findings on what government pronounces and what actual happens in the 
communities. Chapters from Local Agenda 21 (chapter 28, chapter 8, chapter 25, 
chapter 36 etc.) were also used and served as a precursor for identifying policy flaws 
and finding answers about sustainable communities during the research. The next part 
of this chapter looks at the data sources of the research. I have constructed a table 
(4.3) and included key research questions, the respondents who were asked, and the 
information sought from them. This table is not discussed in detail and the issues 
identified in them have been simplified. It only gives a foresight of what will be 
discussed in section 4.6 below.  
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Table 4.3: Specification questions and sources of data 
Research 
Questions 
Source of data Respondents Data Collected 
What are the roles 
of the actors and 
do their actions 
influence resource 
exploitation and 
community 
governance? 
(i) Documentation 
 
 
(ii) Interviews 
 
 
 
(iii) Focus groups 
 
Ministry of Mines; 
NMJD 
 
Miners; Financial 
supporters; Local 
counsellor; NMJD 
 
Randomly selected 
(voluntary) 
The information on 
the actors and their 
activities 
How do their roles 
affect sustainable 
community 
development? 
(i) Interviews 
 
 
 
(ii) Focus groups 
Miners; Financial 
supporters; Local 
counsellor 
 
Randomly selected 
(voluntary) 
The information on 
the actors and their 
activities 
What are their 
activities that 
contrast with 
community 
governance and 
sustainability? 
(i) Documentation 
 
 
 
(ii) Interviews 
 
 
 
(iii) Focus groups 
Mining policy 
(MMR website); 
NMJD 
 
Miners; Financial 
supporters; Local 
counsellor 
 
Randomly selected 
(voluntary) 
The information on 
the actors and their 
activities 
 
Information on 
community social 
structure 
What assets are 
available and are 
they used? 
(i) Interviews 
 
 
 
(ii) Focus groups 
Miners; Financial 
supporters; Local 
counsellor; Others 
 
Randomly selected 
(voluntary) 
Background 
information on 
community assets 
 
The activities on 
these assets 
What are the 
limitations to 
sustainable 
community 
development? 
(i) Documentation 
 
 
(ii) Interviews 
 
 
 
(iii) Focus groups 
Mining Policy 
(MMR website) 
 
Miners; Financial 
supporters; Local 
counsellor; Others 
 
Randomly selected 
(voluntary) 
Community 
perceptions on 
sustainable 
community 
development 
 
 
What they think are 
the limitations  
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4.6 Case Study Timetable and Data Collection Procedures 
The research on the four cases was undertaken between February and July 2011. The 
schedule for collecting documents, conducting interviews and meetings for focus 
groups was not consistent. Regarding the issue of documents, the challenge was 
relatively easier because most of the documents were online at government websites 
(MMR), and those of Koidu Holdings Ltd and the Network Movement for 
Development and Justice (NMJD). These categories of respondents hardly responded 
to questions for personal reasons. All brief comments were directed to the websites. 
The other participants showed a willingness to cooperate, but had to leave to 
undertake their mining activities. I had to chase them after work or meet them on their 
way from work. I also had a random selection of them for the focus group 
discussions. This also made the numbers for each focus group uneven. However, the 
information collected from the respondents was credible as it shows consistency as a 
case report was produced and analysed for each case. This conforms to Charmaz 
(2005) principles on data collection and analyses where both are presumed to be 
linked and work simultaneously. The collaboration between data collection and 
analysis was appropriate for me because of the homogeneity of the problem and the 
actors and activities in all the cases. As a result, the collaboration enhances my 
attempt to link the research problem with a theoretical explanation. After each case, a 
case report was complied and the result analysed and a gradual theoretical 
development was induced using an inductive analytical technique. In light of this 
narrative, I have constructed a table below that shows the different cases and the 
location. 
 
Table 4.4: Timetable for Data Collection 
Period of data 
collection 
Location No. of respondents 
Interviewed 
No. in focus 
groups 
02/11-03/11 
 
03/11-04/11 
 
04/11-05/11 
 
06/11-07/11 
Freetown 
 
Koidu 
 
Yengema 
 
Sewafe 
2  
 
16 
 
10 
 
9 
n/a 
 
9 (5+4) 
 
7 (4+3) 
 
7 (3+4) 
Total  37 23 
 
 124 
Data Collection Techniques and Processes 
In this section, I will explain the nature of data collection, and the techniques and the 
process used to analyse the data. First, I will discuss the data collection procedure by 
discussing the techniques in detail. The techniques I used are documentation, semi-
structured interviews, and focus group discussion. Second, I will draw a table where 
necessary for each of the techniques, explain the demographic description of the 
respondents that I interviewed, and code the focus groups. I used at most two focus 
groups for each case. Referring to my earlier explanation, the number of respondents 
is not even in all the cases. One of the reasons is the respondents are very busy. The 
other is that Koidu is located within two chiefdoms which cannot be always be 
differentiated. 
 
Documentary Analysis 
Documents are significant in collecting data (Yin, 2009). Documents used in this 
thesis include those from the Ministry of Mines and Mineral Resources, the Network 
Movement for Justice (NMJD) and other articles including those by Partnership 
Africa Canada (PAC). Silverman (2001) justifies using documents by arguing they are 
a permanent and reliable investigating record. They are required for multiple analysis 
and help to fill in gaps that enhances the credibility of this study. Documents allow a 
re-examination of issues and provide the basis for comparing past and present events 
(Yin, 2003, 2008). Documents became very instrumental in cross-validating field data 
and answering research objectives (1), (2) and (3).  
 
However, documents sometimes suffer from the problems of validity and reliability. 
Access to documents from government officials and non-governmental organisations 
was problematic with more references made to websites because of the bureaucracy 
involved in accessing documents, especially from government departments. This was 
accepted and the documents derived from the websites were used in arriving at the 
outcome of the thesis. With varying documents collected, effort was made to avoid or 
mitigate inconsistency problems by adopting the four quality control methods of 
“authenticity, credibility, meaning of a document and representativeness” as outlined 
by Scott (1990). Bryman (2008) says that documents need to be cross-checked for 
approval in an engaged rather than detached manner. Though not necessarily always 
accurate, the sources of the documents were legitimate and reliable. Some critics are 
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critical of the over-reliance on documents in case study research (Patton, 2001; Yin, 
2009) because they do not always reveal the truth. However, Yin (2009) emphasises 
that documents must be carefully used and should not be accepted as literal recordings 
of events that have taken place. However, other sources of data collection or 
triangulation help to minimise the deficiencies.  
 
Key Informant Interviews 
Table 4.5 Participants Interviewed 
Case study Dates No. of people 
interviewed 
Duration of 
the interview 
Koidu 
 
March, 2012 16 00:25 
Yengema 
 
April, 2012 10 00:25 
Sewafe 
 
May, 2012 9 00:35 
Freetown 
 
February, 2012 2 00:30 
Total  37  
 
I used interviews to get primary data from those really affected. Interviews are used 
as a medium of conversation with a specific purpose. Robson (1993, p. 228) defines 
interviews as ‘a conversation with a purpose’. The rationale is to obtain data relevant 
to the purpose of the research. In between structured and unstructured interviews lies 
the semi-structured interview. The researcher adopted a semi-structured interview 
approach with eight focus groups in the four chiefdoms (4.4) and 20 individual 
community members. Succeeding questions here depend on the previous answer 
given by the respondent. Hence, semi-structured interviews gave the researcher the 
opportunity to modify the order and wording of questions and probe further into 
certain responses from respondents. This enabled the researcher to clarify ambiguous 
issues on resource ownership and the role of members of the community. Unlike 
documentary analysis, interviews gave the interviewer an opportunity to observe the 
non-verbal cues of interviewees. Many of them expressed the desire to vent their 
discontent. A semi-structured interview with the respondents in a face-to-face manner 
enabled the researcher to ask questions, observe the respondent’s body language, and 
make generalisations about different perspectives on key issues (Jack, 1987). This 
enabled me to understand the underlying intentions and perceptions of interviewees. 
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Interviews gave me the opportunity to understand the issues, induce new knowledge 
and answer research objectives (1), (2), and (3). Denzin (1988) explains that data 
collection provides an insight into the experiences, trust levels sand relationship of 
people based on a mutual understanding. This is something that I considered 
cautiously in the research in order to get the desired result for the study. With consent 
from the respondents, some of the interviews were recorded with a tape-recorder. The 
interview was precise and focused on the key issues to avoid overburdening the 
participants. There was no consistency with the duration of each interview because of 
the pattern of work schedules and availability of respondents. The average time of the 
interview was 25 minutes at the convenience of the respondents. 
 
However, there were sometimes problems of interviewee bias especially with the rate 
of discontent among the community members and the public role some respondents 
hold. Some interviewees gave ambiguous and sometimes defensive information, 
especially when the issue at hand affected their job security and interests. This was 
peculiar to government officials and local authority employees who are susceptible to 
political change. That was why I did not focus on them. However, this problem was 
overcome by the triangulation method that I adopted by utilising various other sources 
such as documents and focus groups in order to validate the responses. Using semi-
structured interviews was time-consuming and also difficult when considering the 
research topic, the high illiteracy rate, the intricacy and protraction of the problem, 
and the characteristics of respondents. Efforts were made to make the interviews 
precise and interesting by listening carefully and watching the body language of the 
respondent.  
 
Focus Groups 
Table 4.6 Focus Group Discussion 
Case 
study 
Date Focus 
group A 
Duration Focus 
group B 
Duration 
Koidu  
 
March, 
2012 
5 00:45 4 00:30 
Yengema 
 
April, 
2012 
4 00:50 3 00:40 
Sewafe 
 
May, 
2012 
3 00:50 4 00:35 
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The focus groups were a pivotal part of this study and were carried out in order to 
support the ultimate aims of the study. It also helped to minimise the chances of 
eliciting inconsistencies. According to Powell et al. (1996), a focus group is a group 
of individuals identified and gathered by the researcher to talk about an issue and 
comment on it from their individual understanding of an area of study. Kitzinger 
(1994) describes focus groups as a crucial interface because of the interaction between 
various participants on their views of what goes on around us, their understanding of 
the issues and their beliefs and values about a circumstance. The researcher used the 
focus groups to ignite discussion and provoke answers to the research questions. This 
involved key respondents selected randomly, with their consent, to discuss issues at a 
particular time and location that related to the research. Two focus groups of uneven 
numbers were held in each of the chiefdoms. Some groups amounted to five members 
whilst others went down to three. I was very cautious not to involve too many people 
in a group in order to increase the chances of clear participation. Merton et al. (1990) 
argue that the size of the group should take into consideration the number of people 
involved. A very large group might not enhance adequate participation from most 
members; conversely, a very small group may fail to provide a considerably greater 
outcome of responses compared to a one to one interview. For the purpose of gaining 
a greater outcome from smaller groups, I questioned two focus groups from each of 
the chiefdoms. The research focussed on the communities and the discussion was 
done in an atmosphere of equal participation in order to moderate attitudes, feelings, 
beliefs, experiences and responses in a way that can induce respondents to speak out 
willingly and meaningfully. The participants felt empowered to freely express their 
opinions and ideas. I informed the would-be participants of the focus groups what the 
research was all about and how it would proceed. This mitigated the fears many 
community members have in discussing certain issues affecting them. Since most of 
the participants were relatively illiterate, every question and discussion was done in 
Krio, a local language commonly spoken by all in the area.  
 
4.7 Data Analysis and Interpretation 
This research is solely qualitative, as I have explained in the methodology above in 
section 4.2. After collecting the data, I was faced with the task of analysing the raw 
material to achieve the aim and objectives and answer the research questions. 
According to Gohar (2002), data analysis is the construal of raw data to understand 
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the causes and effects of problem under consideration. Since the study undertaken is 
qualitative, some relevant documents from government departments and related 
institutional documents on the subject of natural resources and mining activities are 
reviewed, coded, categorised and analysed. In addition to the documents, field notes 
and recorded information are prudently transcribed, coded, and analysed thematically 
to explain conformity and disagreements on the research propositions and new 
theories that emerged. 
 
The research undertakes an inductive approach to theory building, coding and 
categorising the themes to arrive at the conceptual ideas. I used the theoretical 
contributions, which guided me to formulate the research questions that were 
designed to facilitate the fulfilment of the objectives. In arriving at the inductive 
approach, I transcribed a few of my interviews from recordings. Most of the 
respondents were not accepting of recordings, and so by virtue of the ethics of the 
research I focused on getting the information through semi-structured interviews and 
documents.  
 
After collecting the information from the various sources and respondents, I coded the 
data, categorised the codes and identified key accounts. After coding, I linked 
categorisation and focused carefully on theory building. This was drawn from Strauss 
and Corbin’s (1998) explanation of qualitative analysis to include description, 
conceptual understanding and theory building. The first step after collecting the data 
was to code the text. Coffey and Atkinson (1996) note that coding is an attempt to 
index a large amount of text, which can be regained in various ways. It helps the 
researcher to become familiar with the data, identify patterns, and build a structure 
from it (Ibid). I have taken these propositions and adopted them to be more 
attributable to the data. I followed recommendations made by Richards (2005) and 
Mason (2002) to have multiple readings of the data and coding content of the various 
interviews. Through this, I took into consideration what the interviewees’ perceptions 
about issues are and how they understand and discuss them. Therefore, my coding 
was more focused on the content and analysis. At first instance, I concentrated on the 
content of the semi-structured interviews, as I explained above, and subsequently after 
being conversant in the technique I shifted my focus to analytical coding. In both 
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steps, I was able to verify each code. This assisted me with finding clues to what I 
was looking out for, as it gave me an open approach to the data.  
 
Categorising the Data 
The next step I used was to categorise the data and link how the concepts relate to 
each other. Qualitative analysis involves a lot of text that could be overly complex. 
The text is simplified into three coded data and then used for theory building, playing 
with and investigating these codes, and building data into significant pattern of 
relationships (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996). At this stage, I was more interested in the 
general issues related to the research aims and objectives rather than developing them 
into meaningful theoretical concepts. This approach is what Weiss (1994) called 
issued-focused categorisation and case-focused analysis that and looked at the 
multiple cases in order to build on the theories. This theoretical literature on 
categorisation codes assisted me. I employed category structures around the thematic 
concepts of the actors, community governance, and sustainable community 
development. These themes go alongside concepts such as roles or activities of actors, 
sustainability practice and assets.  
 
I used these themes or contexts categorising in all the cases, and linked the issues 
across these multiple case studies one at a time, bringing the categorisation together. 
This did not create difficulties because, as I explained earlier, the communities or 
cases have many things in common. The responses are almost the same in each 
context. Thereafter, I used a theoretical comparison between the bodies of reviewed 
literature in the theoretical chapter (2). This adheres to the ideas of case-focused or 
narrative analysis. I worked on the accounts and explanations given to me by the 
respondents case by case through context mechanisms, outcomes, and theory. In 
practice, this is consistent to the case study approach taken in the thesis that is 
concerned with why and how things happen. 
 
Theory and Narrative Building 
This is the final stage moving from the data collection in the field to the narration of 
the story-building. I explained this in the inductive approach above (4.3). I used the 
process to build up the theories and portray the real situation with regard to the 
subject matter. The aim was to describe and understand social life phenomena in 
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terms of factors, motives and relevant accounts (Blaikie, 2000). I started the theory 
building from particular or specific issues, identified the phenomenon, and related it 
by using ideas and theories for all of the cases. This step gave me an explanatory 
structure to build on the story within the thesis and compare and contrast the reviewed 
literature with the new theories. In an attempt to arrive at the narrative from the body 
of theories, I used diagrams and tables where necessary to identify the questions and 
the sources of data. Richards (2005) and Huberman and Miles (2002) supported this 
approach, arguing that diagrams and tables explain who the participant is, how his 
actions affects, and completes or gives the conclusion. I identified the essential 
characteristics in the body of categorisation and attempt to understand them. With 
these characteristics or this categorisation, I was able to emphasise certain differences 
from the empirical data of the participants, the role of the actors and how their 
activities on the available assets limit sustainable community development. From this, 
I made analytical generalisations. According to Yin (2005), these generalisations help 
me to understand the process and the relationships between the various concepts 
emanating from the data. As I did this, I linked the interrelationship between the 
groups of concepts on community governance and sustainability practice in building 
my theories. 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
The use of qualitative methodology and a case study approach for this thesis assisted 
me to solicit information and gain answers to the research questions. The preference 
given to this research method in conducting the study attests to its usefulness in 
allowing me to collect and analyse my data, and thus achieve the purpose of the study. 
However, this method has its own weaknesses and strengths. Like in any other 
methods, such weaknesses cannot be totally avoided. However, prudent efforts were 
made to ensure that these limitations did not affect the study. That is why the case 
study method incorporates a multiple case study approach. All efforts, including 
ethics, were done to credibly achieve a valid and reliable outcome. The rapport 
between the researcher and the respondents who have lost confidence in a system of 
highly literate people was overcome through their own epic discontent and by the 
researcher’s humility, by being free of bias, and being flexible and adaptive. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESOURCE EXPLOITATION: AN OVERTURE OF RESOURCE CURSE 
Analysing the role of actors in resource exploitation and community governance 
in mining communities 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter answers the first research objective (1), which identifies the relationship 
between resource exploitation and community governance in mining communities 
through an analysis of key actors and their roles at a range of scales. It argues that 
resource exploitation is done at all levels and by all actors, and it is an overture to 
resource curse. That is why, in chapter three, I argue that achieving sustainable 
diamond mining should include the root causes of various actors’ involvement in the 
diamond industry in Sierra Leone. As such, in the context of the aim of the thesis that 
explores the dynamics between resource use and achieving Sustainable Community 
Development in the Kono district, Sierra Leone, it is important to unravel what and 
how resource exploitation operates. Also, since humans undertake the activity, it is 
imperative to identify the actors and explain their role in diamond resource activities, 
and the environmental impact caused. In addition, taking into consideration the 
relationship between resource exploitation and community governance in the first 
objective, stated above and discussed in the literature in chapter two, the nature of the 
community’s involvement in community governance is significant enough for 
discussion. The three issues discussed in this chapter will provide the framework for 
the following chapters (6 and 7), which discuss the ways in which mining 
communities utilise their assets and undertake practices that contribute towards 
sustainable community development. It will seek to identify both the structural and 
community-based barriers to promoting sustainable community development in 
mining communities. 
 
In the first part of this chapter, I will document resource exploitation in the four case 
studies sought. In this section, I used interviews and documents to epitomise the 
notion of resource exploitation (RE) by defining and investigating how the activities 
of some actors have led to resource exploitation. In addition, I start by looking at the 
preconditions for resource exploitation and how it is coordinated. I then go further to 
discuss the empirical evidence for resource exploitation, which contrasts with the idea 
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of sustainable community development. Prior to that, I will introduce a brief section 
on the environmental impact of diamond mining in Kono district caused by various 
actors. The main finding here is that resource exploitation is a forerunner of the 
resource curse. 
 
The second part deals with domestic actors’ involvement in the mining sector. I will 
start by explaining who they are and how I categorise them. Often, focus has been 
directed at the foreign players such as multinational corporations and famously the 
role of the warlord and former President Charles Taylor of Liberia and their impact on 
the mining industry in Sierra Leone. In that case, I can see deviation away from the 
internal actors who are as equally potent in ecological destruction as the 
multinationals and other external players. I have concentrated on internal actors. This 
group of actors I have categorised in the narrative as economic, political and social 
elites, whilst others who are subjected to economic and political vulnerability I have 
labelled as the ‘commoners’. I use both primary and secondary sources of data to 
discuss the issues of the various actors by understanding their practices using mining 
policy documents, other secondary data and interviews.  
 
The third part of this chapter addresses resource-exploitation and community 
governance. Here, I discuss the relationship between community capacity and 
government hegemony over the resources. It explains the complex issue of ownership 
and control. Inferring from that, I will look at the community’s rights over resources 
and their sense of identity and belonging, which may help them to work towards a 
sustainable vision of community. This will mean investigating their entitlement to and 
participation in community governance. In my contribution, I see resource-based 
communities as sustainable entities capable of working towards self-reliance. 
However the evidence shows that the requisite resources for community capacity and 
self-reliance are not available. 
 
5.2 Resource Exploitation 
In order to demonstrate the importance of sustainable community development in 
resource-based communities, it is important to start with resource exploitation that I 
have linked to the resource curse. Resource exploitation (RE) is systematic process 
and has now become a systemic problem. Its roots can be traced to the earlier years of 
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diamond discovery in Sierra Leone. Despite recent government reviews on diamond 
mining, it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of their actions. From the 
government perspective expounded by the Ministry of Mineral Resources website 
(MMR, 2012), resource exploitation is an illusion. However, by going to the resource-
based communities, the evidence and interviews demonstrate the existence of 
exploitation. As such, even though I consulted secondary data on this subject, my 
focus was on what really is happening in the communities I interviewed. In an attempt 
to understand the context of resource exploitation (RE) and identify it as a pre-stage to 
the resource curse, this section proceeds by discussing the activities of resource 
exploitation. Secondly, I will illustrate the preconditions and coordination of resource 
exploitation. Finally, I will present an analysis of the evidence of resources 
exploitation.  
 
Resource Exploitation Activities 
In this section, I examined resource exploitation in both a human and resource 
hypothetical context. The debate on the resource curse has been extensively 
researched in recent years. In this section, the discussion will be limited to the 
‘abundance factor’, the ‘ownership and control’ factor, the ‘distribution factor’, and 
policy or implementation inadequacy.  
 
Many commentators have linked resource abundance to the resource curse, problems 
with distribution, and conflict (Rose, 2001b; Collier, 2000). Others like Collier (2000) 
focused on the problem with in reference to the vast availability of resources to greed. 
Collier and Hoeffler (2000) argue that the relationship between resources and human 
activities, especially in developing countries, have led to breakdown of control, 
mismanagement, and ecological destruction. That is why some proponents argue that 
resources have become a curse (Humphrey et al., 2007; Ebrahim-Zadeh, 2003), 
leading to violence and conflicts (Collier, 2000; Ross, 1999), and leaving behind 
unsustainable communities with declining social, economic, environmental conditions 
and unequal use of power (Doppelt, 2003). 
 
In the literature on the resource curse, I have made the distinction between community 
violence arising from socio-economic exclusion and deprivation from the armed 
conflict that commenced in March 1991. The form of conflict discussed here is 
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limited to community level instead of the national level. Besides, the thesis looks at 
how to achieve sustainable communities through a governance initiative that 
incorporates co-governance and co-production in resource-based communities. 
  
To find answers to this on-going debate, interviewees were asked if the problem of 
diamond resources concerns abundance or distribution of wealth. In order to get 
answers to these questions, I differentiated secondary from primary data sources. 
Each of the questions was asked in each case study, except for Koidu, which lies in 
two chiefdoms. Except for some quotes I will directly state, I have summarised some 
of the answers because they address the same issues. I have used codes respectively 
as you can see in the question column. I have not taken a quantitative approach in 
table 5.1 to illustrate the key issues. As I stated earlier in the methodology (chapter 
4), the mining conditions and effects are very similar. In the categorisation of the 
cases, I have ignored the social, economic and political class of the respondents. My 
interest is to identify the problems. In responses where the status of the person is seen 
to influence the response, I decided to ask further questions.  
 
Table 5.1 Typology of Respondents on Resource Exploitation (in Resource-based 
Communities)  
Thematic cause Koidu Town Yengema Sewafe 
 Interviewees 
(seven) 
Interviewees 
(six) 
Interviewees 
(five) 
Abundance (A) or 
distribution (D) 
D,D, D, D, 
D,A, A 
D, D, D, D 
D, A 
D, D, D 
A, A 
Inadequate policy 
(IP) or Ineffective 
implementation 
(IM) 
IP, IP, IP 
IM, IM, IM, IM 
IM, IM, IM, IM, 
IM, IP 
IM, IM, IM, 
IM, IM 
Control (C) or 
ownership (O) 
C, C, C, C, C, C, O, O C, C, O, O, O, O,  C, O, O, O, 
O,  
Author’s construct 
  
With regard to the first question, on whether the problem stems from abundance as 
argued by some commentators, or whether it is about distribution, the responses were 
focussed on the distribution of the wealth rather than on abundance. The same 
responses were garnered from the focus groups. This was not a surprise to me because 
some of the respondents interviewed individually were also part of the focus group 
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discussion. In addition, the agony is almost the same among all the people. 
Notwithstanding this, many of the responses were similar to this: “The problem is not 
because we have plenty of diamonds. The diamonds have no problems. We suffer 
because of the manner those at the top use our diamonds” (Yrm1, Yengema). Except 
for few of the respondents who blame ‘Mother Nature’ for giving them an abundance 
of diamond resources, the majority agreed that the problem lies with the distribution 
of wealth. The few who attributed it to abundance said it out of lost hope and agony. 
According to the interviewee in Koidu town: “If nothing (diamond) was available, 
they wouldn’t have been suffering” (Krm1, Koidu). 
 
The ‘distribution’ factor can be closely linked to the greed factor on the grounds that 
years of mining since 1931 have been marred by patron-client control of diamond 
resources with state actors, corporations, West African and Lebanese dominance in 
the mining and marketing of resources, which is economic driven at the expense of 
resource communities. Considering the existing literature on natural resource, Rose, 
(2001b) and Collier, (2000) have linked resource abundance to resource curse, 
distribution, greed and conflict. On one hand, the outcome conforms to Rose and 
Collier’s posits on distribution and greed, and on the other hand it refutes their 
argument on resource abundance. It is pertinent to know that the availability of 
resources or its abundance cannot be seen as a problem because development requires 
the use of resources. Rather, it is a matter of how the resources are used. Hence, the 
role of the actors becomes an indisputable anchor in the resource rich communities.  
From the community side, the prospect of conflict will be mitigated if the actors scorn 
at rent-seeking agenda and work for the interest of all. In contrast to this, there is the 
tendency of community discontent, conflict, the emergence of spiral groups working 
for their own livelihoods and ecological destruction. Precisely, this is a matter of the 
relationship among various actors and the available resources. Collier and Hoeffler 
(2000) posit that the relationship between resources and human activities, especially 
in developing countries, have led to breakdown of control, mismanagement, and 
ecological destruction. Blaikie’s (1985) and Bunker’s (1985) link local social 
oppression and environmental degradation to wider political and economic concerns, 
but failed to acknowledge the role of the various actors.  
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Rent-seeking is an attribute of what I call economic clientelism. This is a situation 
where powerful elite actors collaborate among themselves to exploit natural resources 
for their own selfish reasons at the detriment of natural resources and the community. 
From secondary sources discussed in chapter three, the diamond resources have been 
used to sustain the political elitism. This shows the mishap on the use of resources. 
From a political ecology point of view, the role of power becomes significant in 
resource distribution. Paulson et al. (2005) explained that power, as a social relation, 
is built on the unbalanced distribution of resources. The unbalanced distribution is an 
evidence of greed and it can be swiftly sustained through power. This can be 
supported from Walker’s argument that “the verbal commitment in political ecology 
is to wield political power to make a difference” (2007). It indicates that power plays 
a key role in distribution and greed. This is an indication illustrating that finding a 
sustainable use of resources can not be prioritised at global level when the internal 
governance upheaval is as equally detrimental as the global upheaval. When the cause 
of the problem is focused on the global, we may deviate from the pertinent issues 
affecting the communities emanating from inadequate and ineffective national 
policies or governance mechanisms. This analysis also shows that the study of 
political ecology should be considered at the level between the state and the resource-
based communities, and among the various actors within the community. In addition, 
the social relations affecting the power roles among the actors are very significant and 
cannot be ignored. 
 
I raised a question on the Diamond Area Community Development Fund (DACDF), 
which is used to support the mining communities. This is one of the governance 
initiatives implemented by the government of Sierra Leone in collaboration with the 
Extractive Industry Transparency International (EITI). This was an attempt to know 
how the community in general is involved. The first thing I learnt was that the 
majority of the respondents are not aware of this fund. One respondent says: “I do not 
even know what that is” (Yrm2, Yengema). 
 
Those who know say that the money is for the Chiefs. I had the same response from 
all the focus groups except those who knew nothing about the fund. Not surprisingly, 
the respondents in the focus group in Koidu commented that the money should be 
 137 
given to them: “The money should be distributed to everybody instead of going to the 
Chiefs” (Kfg2, Koidu) 
 
The DACDF has had mixed blessings from corruption to lack of accountability. On 
one hand, Gberie (2002) supports this argument by stating that the scourge of Sierra 
Leone’s diamond industry is corruption. From the other point of view, the advocacy 
on accountability was limited to state and corporation. Ocheje (2006) calls for a high 
standard of transparency that both the government and the extractive corporations 
investing in these resource-rich developing countries must conform to. The focus on 
state and corporation underscores the role played by community elites (Chiefs) on the 
distribution of resource wealth. It exposes the disparity between rural elites and the 
general community (Temple, 2005). This is why Collier and Hoeffler (2000) posit that 
the relationship between resources and human activities have to be considered to 
avoid breakdown, mismanagement, and ecological destruction. Richard (2005) 
attributes this disparity or inequality between the rural elites and the community to 
existing dissatisfaction among the youths with traditional hierarchical political 
structures in rural Sierra Leone. It is convincing to say that inequality and greed factor 
has caused community conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (2005), and Kabia (2008) have 
linked diamonds to armed conflict, greed and grievance. The greed factor and the 
reaction through grievances as evidence of bad governance are demonstrated through 
unequal distribution of wealth. However, I argue that socio-economic conflicts arising 
from community and national greed have ensued at community scale and have not 
caused armed conflict. It should be known that conflicts have often occurred in two 
forms: one form is evident among the community actors; the other form ensues 
between the community and the corporations. In essence, I have distanced this 
community conflict from the national arms conflict that is historically linked to the 
rebel war that commenced on March, 23rd 1991. Community conflicts, in the case of 
Sierra Leone, only became a source of attraction by warlords to recruit actors of 
various capacities who destroyed almost all forms of capital or assets in order to get 
diamonds.  
 
The second discourse concerns the inadequacy of mining policies or ineffective 
implementation. From the above responses, it shows that though the majority agreed 
that there is a problem with distribution, there is also evidence of it taking place in the 
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form of the DACDF sent to communities. However, there appears to be a limitation 
on the way the distribution is done. This was explored as an issue of policy efficacy or 
an absence of entitlement. Overwhelmingly, the respondents placed a stress on the 
inefficiency of policy implementation. They argued that if the policy is effective, the 
DACDF money will be accounted for: “If the money is distributed and accounted for 
by those who receive it, it will be used for the benefit of all of us” (Kfg2, Koidu).  
Practically, distribution of wealth goes with policies and institutional establishments 
at national and local level. Hence, some commentators attribute resource problems to 
these factors. Nightingale (2002) ‘Pressure and Release’ model explains lack of 
institutions that make certain places and people susceptible to physical events (Wisner 
et al., 2004). On the contrary, evidences revealed that institutionalisation is not a 
sufficient reason for underdevelopment in the communities. The government of Sierra 
Leone has established institutions to administrate people and resources but they have 
been ineffective and misrepresentative, and can be linked to greed. For this reason, the 
‘ill-governance factor’, over resource-wealth distribution has pushed people into 
poverty. The idea of the ‘ill-governance’ factor provoked my next question. 
 
My sub-question is to find out if they know what is the money is for. One quote reads:  
“The Chiefs know because they receive it… we know nothing” (Sfg2, Sewafe). I also 
asked them if they trust the tribal authorities. The answers, like the previous 
responses, were unanimously in agreement with what the following quote states: 
“There is a lack of trust. They are all liars trying just for their own ‘pot to boil’ (trying 
for their own welfare). Those who have the ‘upper hand’ send their families to good 
schools and abroad whilst we suffer. You see, we all need to benefit from these 
diamonds but that is not happening. So what would you expect if we do not have the 
fair share of the cake (diamond revenue)? The DACDF is used for the chiefs’ glory. 
They build ‘barrays’ (royal huts)” (Yrm5, Yengema). There seems to be an element of 
distrust on this matter. Many, especially the youths, are critical of their tribal 
authorities, which they blame for most of the problems. There is a lack of trust 
between the Chiefs and their subjects. Evidently, unlike Collier and Hoeffler, and 
Kabia, the lack of trust is connected to greed and distribution problems. Collier and 
Hoeffler (2005), and Kabia (2008) have linked diamonds to armed conflict, greed and 
grievance. In the communities, distribution of diamond wealth is linked to greed, 
absence of trust, and community conflict. The expectation of the community is to 
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have development projects that can serve the entire community without limitations. 
‘Barrays’ are traditional huts used by the chiefs to adjudicate on matters arising and 
welcoming guests. The money collected from fines arising from adjudication becomes 
the chiefs’ income without accountability. It also emphasises the issue of inequality 
discussed above.  
 
The third discourse is about control or ownership. I wanted to know if the problem of 
abundance and distribution is linked to control and ownership. The common 
understanding is that someone needs to have either control or ownership or both to 
exercise leverage over the resources. Literally, getting an answer from the indigenes 
on this is easy. By customary beliefs, they own the land and anything on it and it can 
only be used by non-indigenes with tribal consent. For all the indigenes asked, the 
response was the same: “The land is ours” (Srm4, Sewafe). They strongly believe that 
the land is owned by them through the Chiefs, but can be temporarily transferred to 
non-indigenes for activities other than farming. The following quote supports this: 
“Land is owned by us but controlled by the chiefs. A stranger will never hold a piece 
of land… It is given to him for temporary use. He cannot use it for other purposes 
without telling the chief. We can use land for farming, but as you can see it is used for 
mining also” (Yrm4, Yengema). 
 
However, the legal right to own and control land may differ from what an indigene 
may mean. This disparity is not only between the indigenes and non-indigenes. It is 
also between the tribal authorities and the national government. As noted, even 
though the general community members blame the Chiefs for their predicament, the 
Chiefs see themselves as being sidelined. This apparent contradiction was supported 
by the secondary data that demonstrated that any mineral that is six feet below the 
earth surface belongs to the state (MMMR, 2012). Another secondary source claims 
that: “The local authority and the people of Kono are like strangers in their own land, 
with mining companies having exclusive control over the land and its resources” 
(NMJD, 2009).  
 
Whilst they believe that they own the land and all that is on it, the government 
actually owns what is in it or below six feet. This is the contradiction the community 
have not understood. In recognising this discrepancy, I theorise that the idea of 
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owning the land is a cultural construction, but the ownership of the resources is based 
on a legal definition. Unlike the strong belief in land ownership demonstrated by the 
indigenes, the non-indigenes see the argument differently. One of their responses 
illustrates their position: “This country belongs to us all. We have the right to enjoy 
the properties (resources) in this land” (Yrm5, Yengema). However, they also 
acknowledged that the land belongs to the indigenes as the following quote states: 
“We believe that land belongs to the Kono people” (Yrm5, Yengema). According to 
Blaikie and Brookfield, (1987) and Schmink and Wood, (1987) Political ecology 
involves the intricacies between local people, national economies, global political 
economies, and the ecosystem. In addition, Walker, (2005) and Bassett, (1988) argued 
that political ecology in the developing world should link local production process 
and decision-making with a global political economy. These political ecologists have 
taken into consideration local people, national and global political economy, and 
decision-making in a macro level but have not delved with the intricacies at a micro-
level (communities). The evidence illustrates that control and ownership differs and 
both are subject to the caprice of the dominant actor. The issue of ownership and 
control has two dimensions. Within the community, the indigenes’ demonstrate their 
leverage over those they consider non-indigenes. On the other hand, the state 
overrides the resource communities.  The irony that the community owns the top soil 
whilst the state owns what is imbedded beneath the earth the top soil is an indication 
of state ownership and control contrary to the co-governance postulation presented in 
this thesis. 
 
Non-indigenes argue that resources are for the benefit of all regardless of where you 
come from. Such views cannot be freely expressed because they conflict with the 
views of the indigenes on ownership and control. To the non-indigenes, land belongs 
to the indigenes but the resources belong to the state, and should be utilised for the 
good of all. The indigenes believe they own the land and should control the resources. 
The ideas vary from one set of people to another depending on their interests. The 
contradictory perceptions among the different sections of the community pave the 
way for what I call ‘the first step to resource exploitation’. In addition, it emerges that 
the problem with resource exploitation is how resources are owned, controlled and 
distributed instead of the relative abundance. In view of that, the next sections will 
explore the prerequisites for exploitation and the evidence of exploitation.  
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Basics of Resource Exploitation: Preconditions and Coordination 
In this section, my intention is to purposefully discuss how the preconditions of 
resource exploitation are coordinated. Above, I concluded that resource exploitation is 
discursive. Here, we are going to look at the practical preconditions that exist in 
resource-based communities. In spite of the contrasting views of the indigenes and the 
non-indigenes, the process itself is mixed. Many indigenes are involved in mining and 
employ both indigenes and non-indigenes as a source of labour. Cautiously, I need to 
explain that the interviewees were never categorised as either indigenes or non-
indigenes. The identities became prevalent as they responded to certain questions. 
This part of the research was directed towards individual respondents instead of using 
the focus group discussions. It is a sensitive area that could steer up tensions and 
discontent. Again, it is not reliable to only get the responses of the relatively better-off 
actors in the community who have leverage over the vulnerable labour force. Like 
government authorities, they shy away from critical questions. I decided to focus on 
the miners who were enthusiastic to comment despite their busy schedule.  
 
Finance as a Tool of Exploitation 
For resource exploitation to be successful, the human factor has to be subjected to 
‘opportunity syndrome’, which simply implies that the miners in particular and their 
immediate ‘supporters’, who also rely on their superiors (masters), have to be reduced 
to a state of seeing the financier as ‘survival-economic Lord’. To generate discussion 
at the start of each interview, in all of the case studies investigated, interviewees were 
asked what concerns them the most during their mining activities. For the miners, 
financial support is the key tool being used to exploit both the resources and them. In 
their response during one to one interviews, the answers were relatively consistent:  
“We can not support ourselves financially. We require help from people who have to 
do that; unfortunately, they take advantage of us” (Yrm3, Ghaya, Yengema).  
 
Here, the notion of resource exploitation is used to identify the behaviour of actors 
with relative economic power. What happens in these mining communities is that, 
after a piece of land is secured for mining through the licence holders, the supporter 
looks for a labour force. This ‘loose labour’ is not difficult to get. Some are indigenes 
whilst others are from other parts of the country, especially from the North. They 
comprise mainly young boys and middle-aged men who are often unskilled, literate or 
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illiterate. When a supporter or financier gets miners, he finances them and goes into 
negotiating when a piece of diamond acquired. My subsequent question is in order to 
know how the non-binding contract operates. The response was consistent again and 
one notable quotation reads thus: “The supporter opts to provide food and 
accommodation or gives money as an alternative to food. Health opportunity is 
supplementary but it is not contractual. The ‘supporter’ provides the working tools 
such as shaker, shovel, and pickaxe to the group of miners (an average of 4) to 
commence work” (Krm6, Koidu).  
 
The miners, who are almost desperate, have a limited choice when accepting or taking 
work in the self-catering section of mines I will discuss later. Other interviewees 
expressed that:  
“Sometimes the supporter can either decide to prepare the breakfast (‘Korjeh’) and 
dinner meal for us, or give us an equivalent of a £1 or £2 (equivalence depends on the 
exchange rate) per day as an alternative to providing them food” (Yrm4, Yengema). 
Subsequently, I asked them why, despite all these odd conditions, they are still 
accepting such exploitation? The answer is far and near. In response to this question, 
the reasons given are all similar, except for non-indigenes whose acute expectations 
are derived from their place of origin. However, according to this quote these 
differences do not alter the general outcome of the question: “There is no other job to 
do” (Krm4, Koidu).  
 
In a country where unemployment is high and systemic corruption ravages every 
sector of the economy, the mining sector becomes the most flexible arena within 
which an individual can make money. For the immigrants from other parts of the 
country the prospect of going back without anything to take home encourages them to 
stay even longer. One of these responses states: “I left my home five years ago. I 
cannot go back like this. My family expects me to go back with money” (Krm5, 
Koidu). Further, I asked them about alternatives to mining. Sierra Leone lies south of 
the Sahara with fertile agricultural land. Therefore, I asked them if they could 
undertake agriculture as an alternative to working in the rough mining conditions. The 
respondents had a strong conviction that it is better to stay mining than to go into 
agriculture. According to this respondent: “Cocoa is seasonal. How long can we wait 
to harvest and sell it when we have family members to feed (take care of). I have 6 
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children and four other children from family members. You can imagine what that 
means” (Krm1, Koidu). 
 
Cocoa is one of the cash crops grown in the Kono district which many have been 
abandoned in order for people to get involved in mining. Often, the land has even 
been converted to a mining field when there is scant evidence of diamond deposits. 
Apparently, the mining sector looks far more lucrative to them because the 
expectation can be realised overnight and the industry is transitory. 
 
Marketing and Pricing as a Tool of Exploitation 
Here, only one businessman and two financial supporters in Ghaya were willing to 
comment on what the miners said regarding the selling and buying of gem stones. 
Their replies confirmed the accusatory responses of the miners I interviewed 
separately. These miners depend on the buyers and financial supporters for their 
diamond activities. Hence, I cautiously tried to protect their privacy. Both formal and 
informal agents carry out the buying and selling, and the process is either legal or 
illegal. With the miners so desperate to mine in spite of the bizarre mining conditions, 
I asked them how the diamond price is negotiated with the financial supporters. 
Regarding the buyers and financial supporters, I gathered two responses from this 
sub-set of respondents. This was done in Koidu and in Ghaya, Yengema, which has 
many of these agents doing this trade and where I had a buyer and a financial 
supporter who were willing to comment. During these discussions with the miners 
over the above question, a number of discourses revealed this growing but 
controversially ignored aspect of the diamond trade. The response was thus: “The 
financial supporter will tell us to sell the diamond to either him or to another buyer. 
But often, the immediate financial supporter coerces the miners to sell the diamond to 
the superior financier. In either case, the money is divided into three parts. One is for 
us, the second is for the feeding and accommodation (rough), and the third is for the 
financial support. Because the chances to resist such action from the supporter are 
limited, we sometimes look out for an opportune time to steal a piece of diamond 
during the washing of the gravel and sell to these illegal buyers and sometimes to 
agent dealers” (Yrm4, Yengema) 
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Are you not risking your financial support, I asked? “We have no choice but to steal 
the diamond; we suffer so much and we gain very little,” the miner (Yrm5) lamented. 
In my next question, I tried to find out from them what the other issues between 
miners and their immediate financiers were. From the quote of the miner in Koidu: 
“We do not trust each other”, Why, I asked: “they fear us and we too fear them. We 
have no hope to gain when we hit the ‘jackpot’ (get a diamond). They know the game. 
So, we watch each other closely” (Krm3, Koidu). 
 
Their responses highlighted that the whole trade is marred with fear, distrust, greed 
and exploitation. There is a ‘paradox of fear’ in the mining areas between the miners 
and their mining superiors. The miners on one hand fear that they will not get the 
payment for their efforts. On the other hand the ‘supporters’ have no trust in the 
miners. These issues were raised by Yrm3 (Yengema) as an important narrative during 
the interview between them and their supporters. The supporters have developed this 
resentment because of two reasons: firstly, some of these financiers were miners 
themselves and know the ‘rule of the mine’; secondly, some of these financiers have 
either bought stolen diamonds or know of a similar casual trade with other financiers. 
Above all, the greed factor exercised by the financiers to exploit these desperate and 
deprived miners encourages the miners to steal diamonds and sell them at prices 
below their real value. Ironically, the under sale price is higher than what they could 
get from their financiers who exploit them. In essence, the greed and grievances 
factors attributed to armed conflict prevail within the communities and between the 
financiers and their economic lords.  
 
Because of the miners’ discontent, they often steal the diamonds and sell to agents 
who are willing to buy. So, I asked them who they sell to and how is the price 
determined. The responses were of equal significance. The miners identified a group 
of informal agents who buy their diamonds. As Yrm3 (Yengema) responds: “We 
sometimes sell to the Banda Banda or ‘Jula’ men whom we can easily penetrate. They 
often work for recognised agents. They also give us ‘windfall assistance when things 
are hard” (Yrm3, Yengema). 
 
This informal diamond route has this class of illegal buyers who fill in the gap 
between the financial supporters and the agents and or dealers. Accordingly, these are 
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a group of non-formal actors working on behalf of some of the most unscrupulous 
dealers in the diamond trade. They have no offices and operate without any licenses. 
Penetrating them was difficult. The only confirmation I got was from the miners and 
two financial supporters who accused them of encouraging the miners to be involved 
in stealing diamonds. One of these responses reads as follows: “These guys float 
around mining sites and communities on motorbikes luring our miners to steal. They 
have no office so that they cannot be traced. They pay low prices for the diamonds. 
But they are not working alone. They work as a team with the corporation of some 
dealers” (Yrs6, Yengema).  
 
What these supporters highlighted was that these agents go around mining sites and 
occupy ‘Atire base’, ‘Ghettos’ or traditional coffee shops, waiting for the ‘fast’ 
diamonds from either ‘Gardo’ miners or stolen diamonds from miners working under 
supporters. These non-formal actors pay unfairly for these ‘highway’ diamonds, as I 
have codenamed them. Comparatively, their price seems to be better than the price 
offered by the financial supporter. Otherwise, the miners would see no reason to steal 
a piece from a financial supporter who cares for them.  
 
I asked the buyer or dealer why they buy stolen diamonds from the miners who have 
no authority to sell diamonds. The dealer of such diamonds argues that: “We cannot 
distinguish between genuine diamonds and stolen ones. The diamond industry is not 
well structured. A piece of diamond can be bought from anyone” (Krd7, Koidu). 
Subsequently, I posed the question to him of why they underpay for the diamonds. 
The response was swift: “We do not underpay for a diamond. We value and pay 
accordingly” (Krd7, Koidu). This argument is fraudulent. It is used as a way of not 
admitting that they buy stolen diamonds. They cannot be forced to admit to this 
practice either. However, what the respondent highlighted was that, despite 
government mining policies, there was an absence of a structural framework to 
address the mining process including the access to the minerals, the labour conditions, 
and the marketing of the diamonds. One obvious aspect of the trade in diamond 
resources (be it formal or informal) is that the prices are determined selectively and 
subjectively. There is no criterion to determine the true value of the diamonds in the 
mining communities, but rather there are obvious criteria to devalue the diamond by 
raising issues about the smoothness, brightness, and by linking its value to the 
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fluctuations of the US dollar. Political Ecologists takes into consideration the different 
stakeholders and how their influence or discourses affect the participation of other 
stakeholders and their interests (Escobar, 1996). That is why stakeholder interests, 
their characteristics and actions are significant in understanding political-ecological 
conflicts (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). The role of different stakeholder shows the 
outcome of their diverse aims and interests (Long and Long, 1992). This is the 
evidence we have seen during the recruitment, mining, negotiations on diamonds 
between miners and their financial-lords, and legal and illegal marketing of diamond 
resources. Every actor works according to their purpose and interest irrespective of 
the flawed of legality. The interest of various stakeholders differs from each other and 
works against each other like a zero-sum game. The issue of stakeholdership has been 
often considered between the state, corporations and communities on diamond 
resource. Little or no attention is given to the diverse aim and interests among the 
actors within the community on diamond resources.  
 
These responses also illustrate that policy papers by government, civil society (NGOs) 
and other stakeholders have not been able to demonstrate sustainable mining policy 
because of the inadequacies in the mining policies, which are yet to evaluate the 
underpinning impact of how this unaccounted for labour force works, and how much 
the miners gain from their activities. Government mining policies have targeted macro 
issues such as reviewing of mining contracts and licensing conditions, and the 
Environmental Impact Assessment. Though this is a formidable step, absence of a 
micro level analysis of the situation of the miners will enhance their physical, social 
and economic exploitation. It will also encourage them to stay longer in the mining 
business, usually as long as it takes to become well off. 
 
5.3 Evidence of Resource Exploitation 
Another aspect of exploitation is the evidence of underdevelopment in the resource- 
based communities. Communities with resources should be capable of working with 
each other and in collaboration with government on the provision of goods and 
services (Osborne and McLaughlin, 2004; Brandsen and Pestoff, 2006). Apparently, 
over the years, the communities and miners alike are yet to partake in sustainable 
activities or at least commensurate activities in the community. Rather, the diamond 
industry has exacerbated social, political, economic and ecological destruction in the 
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mining communities. More analysis of this will be offered in chapter 6 when I discuss 
the issue of assets. Both Kimberlite and Artisanal mining have caused mammoth 
damage to the communities and the environment. Koidu Holdings Limited (KHL), the 
only Kimberlite mining company, blast rocks at will using unreasonable health and 
safety measures and the effective relocation of the residents is only 200 metres from 
the epicentre of the blast. Quality of life is a component of sustainable development. 
Evidence from the photos below shows the contrary. Sustainability incorporates 
health and safety, poverty, migration and the diseases of employees and society 
(Welford, 1997). Therefore, sustainable business requires environmental justice, 
social equity and business ethics. This is not the case with mining activities in the 
Kono district. All the forms of mining taking place there ignore the safety of its 
workers and the communities. As environmental security is closely linked to the 
human security and sustainable community, I will introduce a brief section of 
environmental impacts in Kono district. This aspect focuses on secondary data which 
further explains the evidences. For the primary data, I interviewed miners, supporters, 
an administrator of Koidu Holdings Ltd and a counsellor. The evidence I will be 
discussing below is obvious to an observer in the mining areas. (See photos A, B & C) 
 
Environmental Impact of Diamond Mining in Kono District 
Environmental impact caused by diamond mining can be linked to human security in 
resource-rich communities. It is caused by actors, affect actors, some of whom are 
perpetrators themselves. These actors include miners of varying role as discussed in 
[5.4]. Their activities continue as the demand and supply of diamonds continue 
alongside new discoveries or prospective sites. Diamond mining, like other forms of 
mineral mining activities accelerate the rate and extent of changes on the landscape, 
destruction of flora, dispersal of fauna and inhibits the cycle of the ecosystem with 
short and long term consequences on man and the environment. The environmental 
impacts in the diamond industry vary depending on the method and process of 
extracting the diamonds. According to Lubovich and Suthers (2007) the impact of 
diamond mining is deep rooted from waste disposal, leaching and ground water 
contamination. In Sierra Leone, the two main forms of mining, alluvial and kimberlite 
have had negative impacts on the environment and people. The impact is not limited 
to the uncovered pits dug during mining but includes also the effects of chemical and 
harmful substances on land, air and water. The process of diamond mining leaves 
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small and large man-made craters. These abandoned pits or craters have caused 
enormous health and safety risks, decline on community livelihood, and a threat to 
economic and ecological sustainability. Despite mining by individuals, small-scale 
companies and multinational companies, the land is often not reclaimed due to 
negligence and ineffective environmental policies and implementation. Hence, the 
craters reduce prospective agricultural land and have become breeding places for a 
host of disease agents such as mosquitoes (see photo C). A study carried out in 
Gbakima, south-western Sierra Leone shows evidences of schistosomiasis and other 
parasitic diseases. During mining activities, due to lack of lava and refuse disposal, 
urine and fetal samples are excreted into streams and bushes and later washed away 
into the streams causing widespread infection in the community. 
 
The physical environmental has sustained extensive damage as miners move from one 
pit to newer site where diamonds have been discovered (IRG, 2005). The situation has 
become worse with decline in agricultural productivity from 1.7 percent a year (FAO, 
2004) as against a rapid pollution growth of 3.5 percent annually (World Bank, 2007). 
Diamond mining in Kono district is done in small and large scale, highly mechanised 
or poorly mechanised, and deep, including kimberlite and alluvial. Irrespective of the 
form diamond mining is carried out since 1930; it has caused widespread 
environmental destruction. Despite the use of modern techniques and implements, and 
changes and counter changes of mining policies towards governance initiatives in 
resource-based communities, diamond mining has brought ecological disturbances on 
the physical environment, water, biodiversity and humans in Kono district. Lubovich 
and Suthers (2007) states that in kimberlite mining processes tons of kimberlite is 
given away as waste as huge quantity of waste water and barren rocks are thrown 
away. These destruction and impact has been challenged by community youths, who 
ironically are themselves perpetrators of land degradation. In December 2007, the 
level of discontent reached the climax and was characterised by confrontation and 
deaths (NMJD 2009). Koidu Holding (Octea diamond group) is a foreign direct 
investment company undertaking vast and hazardous technique of rock blasting (noise 
pollution) in relatively populated Koidu town in the Gbense and Tankoro chiefdoms. 
The blasting often causes huge dust clouds (air pollution), polluted nearby streams 
(water pollution),devastating houses and leaves land barren, causing people to 
temporarily and permanently relocate (Lubovich and Suthers, 2007).  
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Environmental impact of mining is not only limited to Kono or other developing 
countries. Russia, a transition economy, had one of the worst man-made craters in the 
world in 2004 with the dept of 1700 feet, an equivalent of 1/3 of a mile 
(http://www.thisissierraleone.com/top-10-worst-diamond-mines-in-the-world/). The 
crater produced 10 million carats each year. From simple analogy, I can posit that the 
period and production capacity of diamond extracted could be proportional. Another 
example of environmental impact is The Jwaneng Diamond Mine owned by Russian 
foreign investment in Botswana. In 2012 it was one of the largest man-made craters in 
the world. In addition to its topographical impact, the waste water it produces 
contaminates the soil (http://www.thisissierraleone.com/top-10-worst-diamond-
mines-in-the-world/). Such pollution is common in almost every mine in Kono district 
as shown in photo A.  
 
The youths are part of the labour force needed in the most unregulated diamond 
mining in the district. Like the kimberlite mining, the alluvial mining has affected 
land resources, flora and fauna and evidence of degraded and exposed ‘mined-
recycled pits (see photo A, B&C). This exposed and barren land is often open to 
erosion and has become unsuitable for agriculture. According to IRG (2005) 
ecological destruction caused from mining activities pollutes air, water and causes 
health hazards. 
 
Alluvial mining, like Kimberlite causes land degradation and ecological damage. The 
sector comprises of accountable and unaccountable actors within the resource-based 
communities and from outside who are driven by socio-economic deprivation and 
governance issues, despite government’s governance initiatives on Diamond Area 
Development Fund (DACDF) and the Kimberley Processing. The influx of various 
actors into the mining communities has affected living conditions too. According to 
MMR & NMJD, (2006) lack of sufficient housing facilities has caused congestion in 
homes with an average of about 10 individuals to a single room or 30 individuals per 
household. According to NMJD (2004) 10,000 miners between the ages of 16 and 18 
are actively involved in diamond mining. With ineffective monitoring and self-
seeking interest, the rampant alluvial mining which is easily accessible with evasive 
regulations has contributed immensely to environmental degradation and water 
pollution (see photo A&C). Evidence of deprivation and desperation, arising from 
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their socio-economic malaise, has provoked unethical actions of some actors to dig 
and sink houses (Lubovich and Suthers, 2007; NMJD, 2009).  
 
Kono district was one time densely forested. Evidences of that can be seen along the 
Nimikoro and Nimiyama chiefdoms. Diamond mining activities has deforested large 
areas with little or no resilience to recover even the secondary forest. The open cast 
mining involves the cutting down of vegetation, excavation of the soil, and in some 
cases where minimal machinery is used, surface water has been polluted. It is 
estimated that between 80,000 and 120, 000 hectres of land have been mined in 
different parts of the country. This shows that though Kono district is the epicentre of 
diamond mining in Sierra Leone, environmental impact is felt in every mining 
community. In addition, the fauna comprising of lions, leopards and elephants have 
become extinct (NMJD, 2009). Much attention has not been given to these health 
related issues as people in the mining field bath, drink and wash with water 
contaminated during mining (see photo C). Ironically, some of these affected persons 
are perpetrators as well. The dependency on diamond mining arising from 
unstructured and ineffective mining policy, inequitable distribution of wealth has 
invited many youths into diamond mining.  
       
  
A. Uncovered mined pit in Yengema   B. A group of deprived miners 
 
Accommodation 
In this section, the discussion on accommodation will focus on the conditions of the 
miners and include the general housing projects in the community operated by Koidu 
Holdings Limited. Indeed, better or improved housing facilities are a fundamental 
element of sustainable community development. This requires the broad-based 
community and the miners to have a respectable place to live. The Ghaya, Yengema 
participants showed me to their places where they sleep. When I asked them, how 
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many people sleep in the small room, the participant responded thus: “We are ten 
inside this room. Living in a room provided for us by our supporter is unbearable. We 
hope that we get a piece of diamond and return home” (Yrm1, Ghaya in Yengema).  
 
In a further question, I asked them if the situation is like that with most miners. “Yes, 
and some who fall out with their supporters often live in worse conditions than this” 
(Yrm2, Ghaya in Yengema) explained. “Some miners could not withstand the 
incongruity under their supporters or financiers. They end up living alone in the open, 
faced with confound challenges of getting accommodation and food” (Srm3, 
Sewafe). One of the miners also commented that: “I have often seen my colleague 
miners who can not afford accommodation sleep in the open with the expectation of 
getting a piece of the diamond” (Yrm1, Yengema). In contrast, the dealers live in 
luxurious houses. This disparity is evident of the gap existing in the mining 
communities.  
 
Like these miners, the general communities that host the resources live in dilapidated 
houses. Years of mining have made very insignificant changes to their housing 
predicament. The few homes built by KHL are for residents whose houses or 
perimeter has been affected by their operations. The housing projects have often been 
detested by the affected residents for being sub-standard. Notwithstanding this, I put 
this concern to the administrator of Koidu Holdings Limited about the type of 
housing, and who benefits from the project. Answering the second part of the 
question, the participant revealed that: “Our priority is to cater for those who have 
direct impact on our mining activities. We cannot provide for everyone” (Krk8, 
Koidu). 
 
For the other part of the question, the participant noted that: “The houses we built are 
of a standard even better than those we relocated them from. Don’t forget, my 
‘brother’, you cannot satisfy people. Whatever you do, they will complain” (Krk8, 
Koidu) 
 
The unfairness here is not only about the type of houses built for the affected 
communities. Satisfying a few and neglecting many who are victims as well is 
unrealistic and unsustainable. Many others indirectly affected by pollution are 
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ignored. The blasting of rocks affects communities beyond those within the blasting 
zone. This situation is peculiar to Koidu, which hosts Koidu Holdings Limited. These 
discourses reveal that the reason the miners choose to live such a chaotic and 
miserable life is centred on their hope of overcoming the daunting social and 
economic challenges. They are always enthusiastic and are waiting for an opportunity 
to get rich. Inevitably, it is this ‘hope’ of getting a piece of diamond that has kept 
these miners in such places, in these deplorable conditions, where they have endured 
being exploited for years in spite of all the constraints involved.  
 
No Electricity in the District 
The district of Kono, especially the rural-urban zone, has no electricity supply. The 
capability to have electricity is dependent on an economic strength that is obvious in 
houses of diamond merchants, and foreign nationals like the Lebanese. These 
economic elites have high-powered generators in their places while the great mass of 
the community lives in darkness with kerosene lanterns. In the next chapter (7), a 
section deals with assets. This will give the reader a better understanding of the 
infrastructure in the communities. 
 
Health and Sanitation 
According to Feachem (1973), “sanitation” refers to all conditions that affect health, 
viz a vis the control of community water supplies, land, air and water pollution 
caused by waste water disposal, vectors of diseases, excreta disposal, refuse disposal 
and atmospheric conditions in semi-urban and rural mining communities. There is 
absolutely no effective environmental health management in the mining locations; 
the miners are only interested in getting the pieces of diamonds they could find at any 
cost, rather than taking the establishment of sustainable conditions into consideration 
during their actions. However they are not the only ones who suffer. The 
communities investigated in the case studies suffer along with the miners. I put this 
question to the councillor who willingly volunteered to give me audience despite all 
the limitations: “Artisanal and Small-Scale mining (ASM) has caused damages to the 
flow of streams, swamps and ponds once use to get water and plant crops. All their 
interest and desperation is to get a diamond” (Yrc7, Koidu). 
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I put forward another question on the way through which this practice can be 
eradicated. The participant commented that: “Resolving this needs strong political 
will from the top. They are a lot of influential players in the mining activities. The 
miners are just employed. The thing you should know is that they are used by people 
who are more than them” (Yrc7, Koidu). Having this political will is possible but 
needs to be far reaching. The government’s mining policies have proven to be 
inadequate and ineffective. The documents did not take into consideration the 
grassroots problems in the industry. There is too much focus is on the activities of big 
companies and the ownership of licenses. Like the wider community, the miners drink 
the dirty water running around the mine zone. However, the situation is also 
unhealthy for the miners during mining activities. The miners drink from running 
water contaminated by mining activities and bathing: “We drink any running water 
even if we detect faeces in it. We would push the faeces aside and drink… because we 
believe God can protect us” (Krm3, Koidu) (see photo 3 on the following page). 
 
It was acknowledged by health officials, individual community members, the 
chairman of the Coalition of Kono Youths and the miners in 2006 that water-borne, 
water-related, water-based and water-washed diseases are prominent (Bangura, 
2006). Five years after this statement, these conditions still prevail. This illustrates 
the feet-dragging by the local, national, and other stakeholders who have yet to 
address this predicament.  
 
 
C. Contaminated mining stream used for bathing  
 
Virtually all the discourse on people depositing human waste in the stream illustrates 
the lack of toilet facilities in the mining zones. It also qualifies the way mining 
activities are addressed in mining communities. They are not well regulated and lack 
sustainable practices.  
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5.4 Actors of Resource Exploitation 
The evidence in this sector is collected from both primary and secondary data. The 
secondary data includes the Ministry of Mines and Mineral Resources, and the 
primary source is semi-structured interviews. Observation was not a technique in 
collecting data but it was very instrumental during the research. This was because 
most of the activities of the actors were apparent. There are various actors, but with 
one common perception of self-interest. As such, there is an internal scramble for 
diamonds in every possible and accessible way. The reader should note that the even 
though I have limited my participants to domestic local actors, I have not considered 
that it is only the actors who do the manual work. The financial supporters employing 
them informally are included. Trying to understand who mines was easy. The only 
conscious part of it was to know the type of mining the miner does. Again, I have not 
included some of the actors in chapter four because they are not active in the 
communities at present. I have drawn a table below (5.2) to identify the actors and 
their role according to the evidence from the respondents.  
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Table 5.2: Domestic Mining Actors 
Mining Type Types of Actors Activities 
 
Artisanal A) Visible 
(i) Hand-picked miners 
They are the obvious 
day to day miners 
working for financial 
supporters 
 
 
B) Invisible 
 
(i) Gardo 
 
(ii) Walker fast 
They are not easily 
identified 
‘Gardo miners’ have 
bad experience and 
work for themselves 
Do quick hired 
service for daily 
survival 
 
 
C) Financial actors 
 
 
(i) Formal supporters 
 
(ii) Informal supporters 
e.g. Barna Barna; Jula 
men 
Provide financial 
assistance to miners 
 
Hire hand-picked 
miners 
 
Give windfall support 
and sometimes buy 
stolen diamonds 
 
 
Author’s construct 
 
The Miners 
A holistic picture of how resources and humans are exploited cannot be 
comprehensive if I ignored understanding the miners [‘swing actors’]. I have called 
them ‘swing actors’ because they move through all the situations of abuse in the 
mining sector. Evidence of abuse is discussed above in section 5.2. I will identify 
some of the quotes that show exploitation through financial aid and marketing: “We 
can not support ourselves financially. We require help from people who have to do 
that; unfortunately, they take advantage of us” (Yrm3, Ghaya, Yengema). 
 
“The supporter opts to provide food and accommodation or gives money as an 
alternative to food. Health opportunity is supplementary but it is not contractual. The 
‘supporter’ provides the working tools such as shaker, shovel, and pickaxe to the 
group of miners (an average of 4) to commence work” (Krm6, Koidu)  
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“The financial supporter will tell us to sell the diamond to either him or to another 
buyer. But often, the immediate financial supporter coerces the miners to sell the 
diamond to the superior financier. In either case, the money is divided into three parts. 
One is for us, the second is for the feeding and accommodation (rough), and the third 
is for the financial support. Because the chances to resist such action from the 
supporter are limited, we sometimes look out for an opportune time to steal a piece of 
diamond during the washing of the gravel and sell to these illegal buyers and some 
times to agent dealers” (Yrm4, Yengema). Escobar, (1996) has illustrated this by 
explaining how political ecologists take into consideration the different stakeholders 
and how their influence or discourses affect the participation of other stakeholders and 
their interests. From the evidence of exploitation, each set of stakeholders operate in 
different angles. Long and Long, (1992) emphasise also that the role of different 
stakeholder shows the outcome of their diverse aims and interests. This is evident in 
resource rich communities where various actors work according to their purpose and 
interest irrespective of the flawed on legality. 
 
The formal mining sector operates with miners, supporters, agent dealers, dealers and 
exporters. The miners form the backbone of the alluvial mining. Apparently, most of 
them are mainly Sierra Leoneans who are unskilled, mainly school dropouts, 
vulnerable and desperate and are adolescent boys and middle-aged men. This was 
supported by Richards (2003), who attempted to explain the link between the causes 
of the civil war in Sierra Leone by factoring in the alienation of youths who dropped 
out from the educational system and are unemployed. Peters (2007) also commented 
that the root causes of the war is linked to the lack of education and jobs, and the 
failure or unwillingness of a ruling elite to empower the vulnerable and needy in 
participating in matters affecting them. The evidence shows that these young men go 
into mining areas to mine because they lack capital to start a business, or are being 
influenced by peer-group aged miners who are fortunate to get rich during mining. 
Some of these actors who involve themselves in the diamond trade are not driven by 
illiteracy and poverty factors. There is evidence that economic deprivation and social 
exclusion from the gains of the resources and the neglect of the youths has provoked 
the emergence of what I call ‘parallel and invisible’ groups or communities within the 
resource-based communities. Though it is a fact that majority of the youths are 
illiterate, that is not a sufficient reason for their involvement in mining. The majority 
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of the miners are motivated by the quest for self-improvement and are driven to get 
rich quickly, due to the uneven distribution of resources. In addition, the findings 
prove a slight shift from poverty to the notion of anticipating ‘more wealth’. Years of 
uneven distribution have provoked discontent, diamond drive, diamond rush and 
sometimes conflict of interests in resource rich communities.  
 
‘Gardo’ 
I first encountered this group of miners in 2006 from my primary data as part of my 
2006 research. In this thesis, I attempted to verify this from the respondents. Only two 
acknowledge doing it sometimes. The ‘gardos’ are mainly illicit miners who prefer to 
work for themselves without financial supporters. The choice to work without 
financial aid emanates from bad experiences of extortion by financiers during 
bargaining for the price of a piece of diamond. Like those I met in 2006, one of the 
respondents explains that those who undertake this path do it as a last resort. Yrm4 
states: “Though it is difficult to commence work without a financier, it is worthy 
when we get the diamonds” (Yrm4, Yengema). With my interest and focus of this 
thesis on sustainable communities, I wanted to know how their mining is done. The 
respondent replied: “We use just buckets, pickaxe, and shakers” (sift) (Yrm3, Koidu). 
 
The responses show that the ‘Gardo’ miners use crude traditional implements to do 
their mining activities without any supervision, no licence or Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA). The ‘Gardo’ miners are individuals who have either separated 
from their former supporters or who have migrated into the mining towns or 
settlements and are waiting to be picked up informally. ‘Gardo’ miners, according to 
their activities, do not have legal right to mining of any sort. In addition, these actors 
do not pay royalties, taxes or purchase small-scale mining licenses. Hence, this 
category of artisanal and small-scale mining forms the bulk of the illicit mining, by 
taking advantage of the weak monitoring. When I asked a local councillor to comment 
on the problem of monitoring, he explained that: “Monitoring the mines is difficult. 
The problem is endemic. The mine wardens are few and complacent” (Yrc7, 
Yengema). 
 
Though government mining policy enshrines the monitoring activity within the 
mining communities, the evidence in this thesis demonstrates how the present mining 
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problems are on-going. The ‘Gardo’ are a threat to the environment and are the 
victims of social conditions. They pay no attention to environmental damage and bear 
the risk and consequences of health and safety implications during their illicit mining 
activities.  
 
‘Warker fast’ (Walk Fast Miners) 
Another group of miners are the ‘warker fast’ (walk fast). They are similar to the 
‘Gardo’ miners but have a distinctive difference. Unlike the ‘Gardo’ miners who are 
illicit and work for themselves, the ‘walker fast’ miners are not self-employed. They 
prefer to do this quick service and expect payment immediately. They do not go after 
diamonds but work for a means of survival. This demonstrates the intricacies of 
working practices happening in the mining sector, which the government’s macro 
mining policies have failed to address. They are employed by small-scale mining 
companies and are paid a daily wage by their ‘service employers’ without any written 
contractual agreement. With risk close at hand for this group of miners, I asked one of 
the two accessible respondents if they have no concern about the dangers. He states: 
“Life is full of risk. We do not fear because they pay us even though the money is 
small” (Krm3, Koidu). 
 
Unlike the miners working for financial supporters, their employers do not feed this 
group of miners. By the nature of their informal employment, the employees work 
hard for an average of six hours a day with no contractual legal agreement. In the 
absence of labour regulations and the conditions under which these miners operate, 
they endure the situation in order to work for an average equivalent of £1 per person a 
day. Krm3, Koidu told me: “We have to survive”… No option (alternative) for now” 
(Krm3, Koidu). This meagre amount is accepted by these labourer miners because of 
their peer group, a desperation to get rich and the ‘need to survive’. With no trust of 
financial supporters due to bitter experiences, the respondent lamented: “We are tired 
of working for supporters. They do not appreciate our efforts, they exploit us, and we 
have no right over our labour” (Yrm4, Yengema). 
 
West African Actors 
West African actors are as active as the Middle East actors in the Sierra Leone 
diamond trade. Like the Lebanese of the Middle East block, they have involved 
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themselves in all sorts of mining ranging from legal to illegal and the smuggling of 
diamond resources. Among these actors is a group called the 5-Nations Committee, 
which was established in 1972. Though they did not admit to partaking in illegal 
diamond trades, their leader, who told me he came to Sierra Leone on the 16th August 
1953, acknowledged helping the community and young miners who meet them for 
help. According to him: “We assist the local community. Our assistance is voluntary. 
We assist youth groups who ask us for assistance” (Krn9, Koidu).  
 
Throughout the discussion, I was not able to get evidence of any tangible 
development projects they have undertaken, except for the financial assistance they 
have been giving to the miners and some license holders. According to their aim, the 
union of these five countries, Nigeria, The Gambia, Niger, Mali, and Senegal was 
formed to assist nationals of those countries on immigration matters and other socio-
economic matters. In an attempt to vet their activities, I asked them if they are 
involved in mining activities. The secretary-general replied that: “Yes, some plot 
(mining land) owners cannot afford to pay for the licenses. So, we come in and pay 
for the license and take over the mining land under the agreed terms. Some times, 
they find miners but cannot provide the finance. They come to us for assistance. 
Later, we buy any diamond they got subject to the assistance we have been given to 
them” (Krn10, Koidu). 
 
They did not acknowledge any involvement in the illegal diamond trade. Probing 
them further might have taken the discussion beyond the ethics of the research. 
However, evidence from the other respondents discussed in chapters 6 and 7 show 
that assistance given to miners paves the way for an informal relationship, which 
allows them to buy stolen or unaccounted-for diamonds. They overcome the mining 
sector regulations by taking advantage of the financial problem associated with 
selfishness, greed and exploitation. In our on-going discussion, I asked them of 
factors that hinder their business. The chairman told me: “The Barna Barna buyers are 
a big problem. They obstruct the trade by buying diamonds anywhere” (Krn9, Koidu). 
These actors are displeased with the non-formal diamonds agents. The secretary-
general lamented that: “These people are hindrance to our business; they operate 
without licenses but buy diamonds from anybody and everywhere” (Krn10, Koidu). 
The activities of the Barna Barna were also commented on by a ‘supporter’ in the text 
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on the tools of exploitation. One of the quotes about them reads: “These guys float 
around mining sites and communities on motor bikes luring our miners to steal. They 
have no office so that they cannot be traced. They pay low prices for the diamonds. 
But they are not working alone. They work as a team with the cooperation of some 
dealers” (Yrs6, Yengema). 
  
Indeed, some of these actors exploit the miners because the system in the mining 
communities is fragile and unstructured. The policies do not address these loopholes 
adequately. Hence, the diamond industry and the resource communities lie at the 
mercy of these unscrupulous traders. 
 
However, though the 5-Nation Committee shift blame onto the Barna Barna, these 
nationals operate with leverage in the mining communities. They fall under the 
category of the ‘Influentials’ discussed above. Unlike the 1955 expulsion of foreign 
nationals from mining areas (Francis 2000), the 5-Nation Committee’s numbers have 
increased owing to inter-marriages and have regionally proscribed rights to reside 
within West Africa states within the confines of the law. They have been able to 
steam through the loopholes in the mining communities and they will continue to 
exploit these communities as long as they have the capacity. Moore (1993) argued 
that the availability of national and local policies on resources, the access to them and 
the roles and conflicts between different stakeholders were initially neglected. In 
contrast, this thesis reveals that national policies are available but are inadequate and 
ineffective. In addition, major focus has been given to the macro aspect of the mining 
whilst neglecting the micro aspect that operates at the community level. This is 
evident of the exploitation as different stakeholders work contrary to sustainable 
resource use and community development. Sierra Leone’s mining policies focus on 
major companies whilst the small companies and ‘invisible’ miners exploited by some 
actors cause quite substantial damage to the environment and communities. Making 
analysis from contribution made by Long and Long, (1992), the role of different 
stakeholder shows the outcome of their diverse aims and interests. In an attempt to 
support this fact, Escobar (1996) argues that political ecologists should consider the 
different stakeholders and how their influence or discourses affect the participation of 
other stakeholders and their interests (Escobar, 1996). Resource exploitation occurs at 
every level and by various actors ranging from extraction to marketing. That is why 
 161 
Bryant and Bailey, (1997) argue that stakeholder interests, their characteristics and 
actions are significant in understanding political-ecological conflicts. 
 
5.5 Resource Exploitation and Community Governance  
In the sections above, I dealt with various actions and the ways that resource 
exploitation works. Here, I will attempt to show the general networking among 
community actors. This categorisation of the community actors is different from the 
various mining actors discussed above. In chapter two, I identified the community as 
an agent of change from resource exploitation and underdevelopment to sustainable 
community development. I also stated that the community is not only a simple social 
place or location but is also an entity of authority and a socio-economic locus. Hence, 
the categorisation in this section is based on community identification. In doing so, I 
will first identify the composition of the actors. 
 
From the evidence collected, there are social norms that determine the differential 
ability of people to own, control, claim or make use of resources such as land and 
common property. I discussed this evidence above and in chapters 6 and 7. According 
to the table (5.3) below, there are social norms and traditional structures in the 
resource-based communities. This structure, though customary, is the first form of 
discrimination and segregation in the communities. According to the evidence, I have 
identified four sets of people in these communities: (i) the birth right (ii) the 
influential (iii) the long-term residence and (iv) the visitors (short-term residence). 
Hence, I was interested in understanding the social relationships between the natives 
or homogeneous communities and the non-natives. Before going further, I want the 
reader to know that this composition of actors overlap in some cases. In actuality, 
there is a very limited process of separation when we consider mining activities and 
influence.  
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Table 5.3: Community Composition 
Sets of Community People Power Capacity 
The Birth Right Conscious power by 
virtue of birth from 
indigenes 
High 
The Influential: Social, 
Economic/Political Elites  
Attain power due to 
social esteem 
High 
Long-Term Residence Enjoys limited power 
unless he/she can exhibit 
influence  
Moderate 
Visitors: Short-Term 
Residence 
Can hardly be recognised Low 
Source: Author’s construct 
 
From the table above, the ‘birth right’ or natives enjoy an esteemed social 
classification except when they are deprived of the wealth from diamond extraction. 
The next category is the influential group who enjoy relative control over mining 
affairs based on their social status. The last but not least is the distinctive immigrants. 
They have members who belong to the influential group as stated above and as 
explained in chapters 6 and 7. However, the rest of them have limited capacity to 
influence situations in the communities they reside in. With this categorisation, the 
evidence shows that there is a problem of access to resources. I will discuss this in the 
next section. 
 
Access to Resources 
In this section, 12 participants were asked about their access to diamond resources. I 
did not ask them of their identity before the interview. I did it only after the interview 
to have an in-depth understanding of the social structure. This structure, however, 
does not give automatic leverage to some of the actors including the ‘birth right’ or 
‘homogenous’ sectors. I want the reader to know that access here does not mean 
access to the roads and medical facilities and other forms of assets. Here, the use of 
access to resources is about the entrance into diamond mining, in spite of the barriers 
and limitations. The people in the resource-based communities rely on access to 
diamond resources and other public assets because they lack resources of their own. 
Households find it very difficult because they do not have and cannot access the 
different types of capital, opportunities or services. Hence, talking about community 
development and sustainable community development in these communities is 
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fanciful, at least for the time being. Evidence shows that despite the dissatisfaction 
among the indigenes, there is a sense of identity and belongingness. They want to be 
recognised regardless of the prevailing mining situation. According to one outspoken 
respondent in a focus group discussion on community roles: “Everyone is free to do 
business. But there is always the owner of a place… you cannot go to a place without 
recognising the native of that place. That is the only difference” (Kfg1, Koidu). 
 
This might be seen acceptable according to customs. However, it identifies one of the 
barriers to a collective contribution to sustainable community development, because 
there is an implied exclusion of people who are seen as aliens in these communities. It 
brings to attention the silent discontent of some community members and the 
evidence of what I call the ‘heterogeneous community’ who are seen as ‘strangers’ 
(aliens). However some respondents believe that even though others are seen as 
‘strangers’ (aliens), they contribute to the community in their own small ways. One 
businessman’s quote states that: “Most of the businesses are owned by people who are 
not Kono people. But we always see ourselves as strangers. However, we like the 
people because we do business” (Srbm6, Sewafe). 
 
It is obvious that the power to access and exercise influence on these assets rests on 
the first group of people ‘by virtue of birth’ but the power could shift to the 
‘influential’ who can influence decisions indirectly. Some respondents in Sewafe 
ascertained this and one salient quote was: “Those who own money control affairs 
indirectly. People depend on them for financial help. Most of the dealers are 
foreigners (non-Kono). Also, most of the things taking place are influenced by 
politics. If you are a ‘strong’ supporter of a powerful politician, you can control things 
(policies)” (Srm3, Sewafe). In summary, according to the evidence, the role of the 
actors on community assets varies and shifts over time. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have identified the actors who play a crucial role in the mining 
sector. Some of them are accounted for while others are not. The government’s focus 
on the accounted actors leaves a loophole in the mining policies. The ignored actors 
are as destructive as the small-scale companies. I have also discussed the situation the 
miners go through and how exploitation is operated at micro level. Some existing 
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literature identifies some actors as victims of resource availability, but ignores their 
role in the exploitation of the resources. The role of each actor should be considered 
in order to achieve sustainable community development. This is because evidence 
shows that the process of exploitation involves different actors and takes various 
pathways.  
 
The evidence shows that resource exploitation (RE) is a systematic process in 
resource-based communities. The evidence revealed the variation between resource 
curse and resource exploitation, the forms resource exploitation takes, and the actors 
involved. From the evidence, my analysis identifies that resource exploitation is 
influenced by governance structures within the resource-based communities. Also, 
from the evidence, I have been able to identify that resource exploitation commences 
at a micro level and is an overture of resource curse. The role of the actors has also 
been discussed in the evidence. There is evidence of rent-seeking between the 
community actors, which identifies the relationships between resource exploitation 
and community governance in mining communities, through an analysis of key actors 
and their roles at a range of scales. According to some commentators, focus should be 
placed on elites or patrimonialism and clientelism. The role of certain actors is not 
explained as that of perpetrators in the context of the resource-based communities. 
Instead, they identify some of these actors as being the victims of resource abundance. 
Ross, (2001a) noted that the abundance of resources has only benefited the elite and 
their agents or associates under a dogmatic doctrine of patrimonialism and clientelism 
(Le billon, 2001). This set of actors has been seen as the perpetrators of the resource-
curse. Ironically, the evidence shows that it is not only the elite that have gained or 
contributed to resource exploitation. The exploitation occurs in stratified ways from 
financial supporters and dealers through to the group who I have called the ‘invisible 
miners’. Apparently, it is not the resource abundance that causes the exploitation. 
Rather, it is the governance limitations within the communities.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
APPROACHES TO SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
Assessing the impact of community activities towards sustainable community 
development 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter answers the second research objective of this thesis, which ‘examines if, 
and in what ways mining communities utilise their assets and undertake practices that 
contribute towards sustainable community development’. The goal of this chapter is 
to look at which assets are available and if the activities undertaken by the actors are 
sustainable in the resource-based communities. In this chapter I argue that the 
resource-based communities are polarised and do not have a distinctive approach 
towards sustainable community development. In an attempt to arrive at the outcome 
of this chapter’s research objective, I engaged in two methodological strategies. The 
first stage was to make use of the secondary data, which represents an ‘official’ 
discourse on the topic, and the second stage was the sample of respondents, including 
two counsellors who contributed as concern citizens and not in their capacity as 
counsellors, and the focus groups respondents I spoke to in Koidu town, Yengema 
and Sewafe town. Each of these towns represents key mining communities in the four 
chiefdoms I chose, except for Koidu town, which hosts two chiefdoms. I also 
undertook personal observations and assessments of the availability and dilapidation 
of assets. Observation was not a methodological technique but an inevitable one that 
interprets true-life stories in the mining communities. I also questioned and discussed 
the issues with participants independently for verification of the controversial findings 
discussed in open groups. In the section that follows below, I will look at the 
community assets in these resource-based communities. 
 
Firstly, I will categorise the available assets in a narrative way using tables. I have 
done this in order to avoid using quantitative techniques in identifying them, which 
was difficult to do. Also, there is no comprehensive secondary data to show the detail 
of such assets to which people many attribute the excesses of the war. The main 
finding here is the behaviour or attitude of different actors in the community towards 
available assets and how such behaviour impacts sustainable community 
development. As such, I take into consideration the mining documents as a secondary 
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source in order to understand if the policy sufficiently protects assets. On the other 
hand, I will use the primary data from semi-structured interviews to assess the 
behaviour of the actors towards the sustainability of the assets. 
 
Secondly, I will look at the community assets and the activities of the actors. Thirdly, 
from the assets discussed and the actors’ activities, I will assess the sustainability 
approach that exists in the communities using two sustainability approaches: strong 
and weak sustainability. Finally, the primary aim of this research is focussed towards 
achieving sustainable community development, so I will discuss whether the existing 
practices will move the communities towards this outcome. The findings of this 
chapter lay the platform for the third research objective, which is discussed in chapter 
7. The next section will begin by identifying the community assets in perspective.  
 
6.2 Community Assets in Perspective 
This section begins with the identification of community assets available in the 
communities and their composition. Here, I present the sustainability of the 
communities as a prerequisite to achieving sustainable community development in the 
communities. It is explicit therefore, that exploring ‘Sustainable Community 
Development’ co-exists with the quantitative and qualitative improvement of the 
available assets in these communities. I will use both secondary and primary data to 
analyse this section.  
 
Two of the five practical principles of Sustainable Community Development given by 
Roseland et al. (2007) elaborate on equity and long-term thinking that gives emphasis 
to the need for intra and inter-generational equity with respect to environmental, 
social, resources and opportunities; while the other principles distinguish between 
development and growth by emphasising qualitative and quantitative development, 
which comments on environmental quality, quality of life, education, health, cultural 
diversity and freedom. From the previous chapter (5) we learnt of the evidence of 
exploitation and the lack of infrastructural resources. In this section, I will be using 
the term ‘infrastructural resources or assets’ to mean community assets. Roseland 
(2005) and Daly and Howell (2006) identified six types of assets that we can examine: 
(i) Human capital (ii) Natural capital (iii) Economic capital (iv) Social capital (v) 
Physical capital and (vi) Cultural capital. Green and Haines (2002) gave four forms of 
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community capital, which are (a) Human capital (b) Physical capital (c) Financial 
capital (d) Environmental capital. As I have identified these assets, I will examine 
their availability and how they have affected sustainable community development in 
these resource-based communities. The findings show that these assets once existed 
but have eroded over time with limited resilience, as is evident in chapter 5. The 
section below will identify what assets the communities have to make them 
sustainable by looking at the types of assets. I have also included Roseland’s table on 
assets in order to provide a comparison with the table on community assets in the case 
studies and how it deals with their assets.  
 
Table 6.1: Types of Assets 
 
Identified Assets        Composition of Assets 
Natural Capital 
(Ecological or 
Environmental) 
 
Comprises of biophysical resources, living systems and life-
support services of our planet 
Human Capital 
 
 
Covers knowledge, health, skills, competence, motivations, 
emotional and spiritual capacity of the individual that 
enhances the establishment of personal, social and economic 
well-being 
Physical Capital 
(Manufactured or 
Produced) 
 
Includes the stock of material resources such as buildings, 
equipment, infrastructure and machinery 
Economic Capital 
(Financial) 
 
 
It is a derived form of capital from the others’ assets. Involves 
ways of resource allocation, investment, cash, and the 
monetary system 
Cultural Capital 
 
 
An outcome of shared traditions, values, customs, identity, 
heritage, and history.  
Social Capital 
 
 
Operates formal structure (government) and informal 
organisation (social networks). Consists of relationships, 
structures and networks, institutions that enhance shared 
knowledge, understandings and blueprint of interactions 
among a group of people, families, communities, political 
systems etc.  
Source: Roseland (2005, pp. 4-14) 
 
In the table above (6.1), the assets and their composition are outlined. In the table 
below (6.2), I have outlined the assets in the community and summarised the activities 
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of the actors. The first table represents the theoretical composition of the assets 
according to Roseland. The table was also discussed in the theoretical chapter (two). 
The latter is a construct of the researcher that identifies the activities or attitude of 
actors towards these assets.  
 
Table 6.2 Attitudes towards Community Assets in the Four Chiefdoms 
 
Identified Assets          Activities/Attitude of the Actors 
Natural Capital 
(Ecological or 
Environmental) 
 
Flora lost; all potential land including potent agricultural land 
and swamps converted to mining fields 
Human Capital 
 
 
No health and safety measures; no medical opportunities for 
miners. 
Physical Capital 
(Manufactured or 
Produced) 
 
Purely diamond production; relatively agro-based community; 
houses and bridges are destroyed for diamonds 
Economic Capital 
(Financial) 
 
 
Insufficient financial institution; no structure in the marketing 
of diamonds 
Cultural Capital 
 
 
Traditions affect governance; ignorance, customs and gender 
limitations 
Social Capital 
 
 
Mixed social networks or parallel communities; political 
allegiance influence social institutions; passive consent 
Author’s construct 
 
6.3 Community Assets and Activities of Actors 
To understand the context within which the community actors act towards the 
available assets, I have decided to discuss the compositions and state of the various 
assets in the resource-rich communities one after the other. According to the 
Brundtland report, titled ‘Our Common Future’, the development process has to ‘meet 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs’ (WCED, 1987). In that context, the activities of various actors 
on the available assets determine how a community can develop. In chapter 5, I 
identified some of these actors. Discussing these assets will help the reader to gain a 
prior understanding of the sustainability approaches in section 6.3. This is achieved by 
 169 
observation and through responses drawn from the respondents. Observation was not 
deliberately used as a technique. It was inevitable that it would affect the research 
however, because some of the assets such as the natural environment and the various 
‘capitals’ cannot be ignored. In the sub-section that follows below, I will commence 
discussion on the natural capital.  
Natural Capital 
According to Roseland (2005), natural capital encompasses the biophysical resources, 
life support services, and living systems. Precisely, natural capital is the natural 
endowment base that includes ecological elements such as land, flora and fauna. In 
economic terms, land is a factor of production and includes natural resources. In 
mining communities it has been viewed not only as a factor of production but also as 
a unique social and economic amenity. It is a secured form of holding wealth and of 
gaining social and political advantages and family food security (Ghimire, 2001). The 
capacity of the community members to conceptualise what land means to them 
determines how they interact with it. The outlining of community assets and their 
position among the various actors by examining the natural capital, and using both 
secondary and primary data, has proven that, traditionally, land in resource-rich 
communities in Kono district has natural, economic, social and ecological 
implications. 
 
In summary, 8 interviewees in all of the research communities were then asked to talk 
about who owns the land and what it means to them in the communities. It was 
generally acknowledged that holding land is a traditional virtue in the community: 
“Land is owned by us but controlled by the chiefs. A stranger will never hold a piece 
of land… it is given to him for temporary use. He cannot use it for other purposes 
without telling the chief. We can use land for farming, but as you can see it is used for 
mining also” (Yrm4, Yengema). 
 
Ownership seems ambiguous when I consider the secondary source of my data. 
According to the mining policy documents, everything that lays 6ft beneath the earth 
surface is owned by the state (MMR, 2012; Mining Watch, 2009). In addition, land 
ownership has both legal and customary connotations, and shifts from community 
actors to the state as the issue of diamond resources prevail. This inhibits the 
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community’s right to determine how the resources can benefit them. According to 
Gore (1993), entitlement is peoples’ unhindered access to their legal rights and other 
public benefits. This cannot go on without the promotion of social rights, including 
legal rights. According to the evidence, the propositions on legality and customary 
rules are limitations to the promotion of social and legal rights. I have decided not to 
go into an endless debate on it, which may include both legal and customary conflict. 
Here, I am interested in the basic understanding of land and how it is used as a natural 
asset. In legal terms, it is only the surface land that is owned by the chief on behalf of 
the people.  
 
There is also evidence of political influence, which is endemic when I consider the 
secondary data of events that have occurred in different political regimes in Sierra 
Leone. During the one party APC regime of a former Army General, Joseph Saidu 
Momoh’s ‘Equotay’ regime, who was compensated by Siaka P. Stevens for revealing 
an alleged coup in March 1971, productive diamond land was misappropriated to his 
concubines and in-laws (NMJD, 20009). This continued also in the 1992 military 
coup regime of the National Provisional Council (NPRC), which was led by the 
unfortunate Captain Valentine Strasser that toppled Joseph Saidu Momoh. The 
fathers, brothers, military officers and close associates of the regime were awarded 
lucrative mining concessions at on any land of their own. In the birth of a new 
‘democracy’ under the SLPP led government of Dr Ahmed Tejan Kabba, Dr Prince 
Harding, a serving minister in 2005, was among a band of mining gangs that 
destroyed the Kansey bridge that separated two chiefdoms in the heart of the district 
headquarter town, Koidu (Mining Watch, 2009). Since post-independence, politicians 
have been using diamond resources to compensate their political clients. Corruption 
has become endemic as political clients used their influence for rent-seeking. Kabia 
(2006) commented that this patron-client relationship resulted in a flawed that 
affected the distribution of state scarce resources. I agree with his postulation on how 
the patron-client relationship affects distribution of resources, but disagree that 
resources are scarce. What is obvious, as the secondary data emphasise is that the 
available resources for developing national and community institutions are used to 
satisfy the patron-client class.  Because of the prevailing circumstances, Reno (1991) 
noted that: 
 171 
“political leaders ‘convert wealth into political resources, buying the loyalty of some 
and buying weapons to coerce others and thus gather more resources and so on” 
(Reno, 1991: p. 1).  This inter-marriage between corruption and state politics is what 
William Reno termed as ‘shadow state’ (Reno, 1999). This role played by political 
actors shows how power is used to determine the use of resources in political 
ecology. Vayda and Walter (1999) have iterated that political ecology is politics 
without ecology. On the contrary, political ecology and politics should be mutually 
inclusive. This is important because resolving ecological issues in the study of 
human relationships with the environment (Walker, 2005; Peterson, 2000) in the 
context of resource-based communities cannot be achieved without addressing the 
politics of power over resources. 
 
The Kono district was once a densely forested area known for food production. So, I 
put the question to all the focus groups in the Sewafe, Yengema, and Koidu as to why 
the natural landscape has disappeared. Among the responses, the focus group in 
Koidu states: “These communities had viable subsistence agricultural communities 
with enviable flora and fauna but have dissipated over time due to, primarily, mining 
activities; this is all for money… We need money… Money speaks for itself”, they 
concluded (Kfg2, Koidu). 
 
In my further questioning, I was interested to know why people have abandoned 
agriculture for diamond mining. This district was highly productive, producing both 
cocoa and coffee due to its favourable weather conditions. Among the responses, 
there is a social and economic reason for that, as one of the respondents in Koidu put 
it: 
“Cocoa is seasonal. How long can we wait to harvest and sell it when we have family 
members to feed (take care of)? I have 6 children and four other children from family 
members. You can imagine what that means” (Kfg1, Koidu).  
 
Another focus group in Sewafe contributed that: “There is quicker certainty in 
diamond mining than in agriculture” (Sfg2, Sewafe). The findings have shown that 
this natural asset is destroyed for economic gains. Ironically, cocoa, which has both 
economic and ecological value, is destroyed for a quick windfall of economic gain.  
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There is evidence that farmers have no faith in farming annual and perennial crops. It 
is not an issue of the duration it takes for the crops to grow before the farmer realises 
the harvest, but rather it is about short-term lucrative gains linked to their 
psychological needs. Most of these farmers have extended families to provide 
livelihood for. Crops, perennial ones in particular, cannot provide the daily livelihood 
demanded by the residents. Instead, many farmers shift from long-term certainty to 
short-term probability. From this narrative, it shows that diamond mining is a 
‘windfall game’ or activity that can ‘hit the jackpot’ at any time, whilst the production 
of cocoa or coffee is subject to the seasons. With most communities being either 
polygamous or extended, as the respondent identified, the hope for a better life rests 
on the optimistic chance of diamonds rather than the probability chance of partaking 
in agriculture. Within the prevailing political and socio-economic influence, there 
exist various sector declines that can be compared to the Dutch disease or to what I 
call a ‘Zero-sum game’ approach. The outcomes show that the mining sector has 
affected other sectors in what Ebrahim-Zadeh (2003) call resource pull as labour and 
resources are diverted to mining activities. But unlike Ebrahim-Zadeh’s (2003) 
articulation linking the “Dutch disease” to the ‘spending effect’, there is absolutely no 
connection to that when we consider the diamond industry in Sierra Leone. The 
economic deprived communities have limited purchasing power to sustain their basic 
needs even with national production of commodities.  
 
However, regardless of the customary ownership of land, there has been evidence of 
discontent between the people of Kono and Koidu Holdings Ltd. Sometimes, the 
discontent is directed at non-indigenes. According to a secondary source: “The local 
authority and the people of Kono are like strangers in their own land, with mining 
companies having exclusive control over the land and its resources” (NMJD, 2009).  
 
Hence, I asked the interviewees what the reason for their dissatisfaction is. Like the 
early years of political dominion over diamond resources, politics and lack of consent 
from the communities increases discontent and limits the sustainable use of assets. As 
the focus group in Yengema put it: “We are just informed… sometimes the rich 
mining areas are given to politicians without us being informed” (Yfg2, Yengema). 
According to one of the respondents interviewed in Koidu, there is a clash in social 
perceptions between the elders and the youths: 
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“We the youths think differently from our people. They sold this land for nothing. We 
act and they say it is violence. But no one responds when we complain” (Krm4, 
Koidu). Another participant commented that: “Politicians cooperate with local 
‘powerful’ people to mine prospective areas” (Krm3, Koidu). 
 
These discourses justify the consensus emerging from individuals and focus group 
discussions in the research communities that fertile agricultural land, including 
swamps, has been transformed into mining fields through political influence and rent-
seeking community members. This evidence analysis demonstrates that the human-
environmental relationship is based on understanding the social strata and the 
influence of the community actors before exploring the political factor, which is seen 
as external. Ebrahim-Zadeh (2003) commented on how resource pull, labour shift and 
economic shocks (spending effect) affect the manufacturing sector. The issue of the 
‘Dutch Disease’ in mining communities have not only diverted labour from other 
sectors to the mines but have equally diverted natural assets for destructive economic 
purpose for personal and patron-client (political or elitism) purpose. The evidence has 
shown us how political and rent seeking agenda has affected ecology and community 
development. Paulson et al. (2005) argue that power is a social relation construct on 
unbalanced distribution of resources. From a political ecology point of view, the 
relationship between humans and the environment (Zimmerer and Bassett (2003b), 
Neumann (2009); Paulson et al. (2003) should commence from human-human 
relationship (political, social and economic strata) before concentrating on the human 
and environment relationship. In context, this is particularly true of resource-rich 
communities or economies like Sierra Leone where natural resources have already 
being exploited.  Owing to the discontent arising from unequal distribution of wealth, 
there is evidence of internal social conflict among the community actors. The external 
actors exacerbate the situation through powerful influence. With this prevailing social 
conflict, the communities have not been able to thread towards community 
development. Their actions have not given them improved living standards. Instead, 
the natural asset has been degraded and other sectors have been affected. According to 
Frank and Smith (1999), community development is the planned fruition of the 
economic, social, cultural, and environmental factors of community well-being. This 
can be achieved through the utilisation of various assets for the good of all without 
compromising with the existence of future communities. This analysis supports the 
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contribution by Ekin (2000), which explained how the ecological element should 
involve the functioning of both the social and economic strata and their effect on the 
environment and resources. From these discourses the influence of some actors over 
land or natural assets hinders the chances of these resource communities moving 
towards community development. I conclude that holding land and access to it is 
subject to customary rules and that political decisions overshadow customary rules. 
This is also evident of how ineffective governance over resources could inhibit 
sustainability of resources.  
 
Human Capital 
When it comes to human capital, like any other assets, the rural communities are even 
worse-off than the semi-urban communities such as Yengema in the Nimikoro 
chiefdom and Sewafe in the Nimiyama chiefdom. I have called them semi-urban 
because the amenities there are not that different from the rural villages or 
communities. They lack basic essentials for the size of the settlements and 
households. However, I have not dealt with them separately. Instead, according to the 
evidence, I have looked at the problem as one that affects every community. 
According to (Rose 2005), communities need access to good health, knowledge, 
skills, and motivations to enhance their personal, social and economic well-being.  
 
In all of the communities, I asked them to comment on the health and education 
facilities in their populations. The response was a consensus of all the respondents on 
the state of human capital or assets. On health, despite the government’s programme 
for children under 5 and their mothers to receive free treatment, many community 
members have no access to medical facilities along with higher or further education. 
“We earlier welcome government’s assistance to our families… but we are 
disappointed. We have to travel to the big towns to access medical treatment. 
Sometimes, they say there are no drugs” (Krm6, Koidu). 
 
They acknowledged that government’s health facilities are inadequate. It costs people 
to move from one point to another. In addition, the responses show that affordability 
is another problem. Here, affordability means being able to buy and being able to get 
access to even the free drugs. They also stated that there is one medical facility 
provided by KHL for staff and workers only, when I asked them to comment about 
 175 
such limitations. The discourses emerging from the responses on human assets 
illustrate they are limited in resource-based communities. Evidence indicates that 
there is an absence of adequate response within the communities in addressing the 
issue of human capital. Ironically, this district is labelled the ‘bread basket’ of 
diamonds in Sierra Leone. With a vehement ‘no’, one of the respondents in Koidu 
lamented that: “Even though we all suffer, only few people benefit from KHL 
hospital… so… we depend on ‘peppeh doctors’ (quack doctors)” (Krm3, Koidu).    
 
This discrimination of amenities in a location affected by common environmental 
degradation limits the scope of what a community looks like. According to the 
literature, Minkler and Wallerstein (1997) define a community as; (a) a pattern of 
social cohesion (b) a sense of collective identity (c) functional spatial units fulfilling 
sustenance needs (d) being motivated as one to act and participate on issues affecting 
them. In other literature, MacQueen et al. (2001, p. 1929) define a community “as a 
group of people with diverse characteristics who are linked by social ties, share 
common perspectives, and engage in joint action in geographical locations or 
settings’. Minkler and Wallerstein characterise a community as both an ecological 
system and a social system inclusive of all, regardless of the variations of the 
community. Social systems, they argue, include economic, political and ‘subsystems’ 
existing within a particular community and how they coexist with each other outside 
the community systems (Minkler and Wallerstein, 1997). From a community 
development point of view, a community has to work towards matters affecting them 
and enjoy amenities collectively. According to (Rose 2005), communities need access 
to good health, knowledge, skills, and motivations to enhance their personal, social 
and economic well-being. MacQueen et al., (2001 p. 1929) contributed on the well-
being of the community as ‘...a group of people with diverse characteristics who are 
linked by social ties, share common perspectives, and engage in joint action in 
geographical locations or settings’. It is this collective responsibility and purpose that 
can enable the functioning of a formidable community development. Accordingly, 
Frank and Smith (1999) define community development as the planned fruition of the 
economic, social, cultural, and environmental factors of community well-being. This 
can be made feasible with unison of purpose in resource-rich communities.  
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Whilst the literature by Minkler and Wallerstein (1997) identifies salient points on 
identity, engagement in joint action, social cohesion, and participation on issues 
affecting them, it failed to acknowledge the fragility and malleability of communities, 
which are characterised by social class boundaries. This is because the communities 
are characterised by social class boundaries. People are mainly represented within 
issues affecting them instead of participating in community matters. It also failed to 
understand the structural composition of communities. In this sense, not all 
communities are identical and able to work towards a common goal.  
 
There is limited investment in human capital in education, training and health services 
that work towards economic growth, development and sustainability. Here, I have not 
limited training to workers of multinationals such as Koidu Holdings Ltd. I have 
considered training and skills for the general public. However, these are lacking in the 
communities because the appropriate institutions were not available to transform these 
communities, both in the past and at the moment. Most children become dropouts due 
to these constraints. I gained these responses from different respondents on the state 
of education in the district and the constraints they encounter. They commented thus: 
“Our children walk a very long distance to attend secondary school in the urban 
towns” (Krm6, Koidu). “We send them at times to either stay with relatives or friends 
or send them to the government boarding schools in Magburaka in the north. 
Unfortunately, we get mixed results… there’s no one to control them. So, they 
become dropouts and join us again in the mining” (Srm4, Sewafe).  
 
I decided to redirect my focus on the miners’ health and safety issues with their 
financial supporters. Thirteen miners told me that they receive no medical attention 
from their financial supporters except for the minor headache tablets given to them. 
All these participants demonstrated evidence of pale faces and exhaustion as they 
responded thus: “We do not have safety items during work. We often work 
barefooted, no hat, not anything. You can see for yourself. When we are sick, we get 
no medical help except for one or two tablets of paracetamol. In fact, the supporter 
gets angry with you. They will either say you have stolen a diamond and want to run 
away or you do not want to work” (Yrm5, Yengema). Another quote, this time from 
Sewafe says: “It is better to work when you are sick than to stay at home” (Srm5, 
Sewafe). In summary, these miners face serious abuse and exploitation in the hands of 
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their superiors, who have taken advantage of their vulnerability and handpicked them 
for exploitation. This evidence shows the effect of absence of what Osborne and 
McLaughlin (2004) and Brandsen and Pestoff (2006) called ‘co-governance’: the 
communities’ participation and delivery and management of shared public service 
delivery, and co-production: community producing their own policies. Literarily, a 
vibrant human resource has an evidence of being empowered. Basically, communities 
can not participate and deliver goods collectively if they are not empowered. On the 
contrary, in resource communities where government sees itself as the sole policy 
maker and implementer, the absence of adequate and effective human resource 
institutions has undermined community development. These discourses highlight the 
ineffectiveness of the human capital in these communities. Many of these boys who 
could have attained other skills and spread their expertise are embedded in the mining 
communities. With no government policy or Local Agenda 21 community policy on 
health and safety, their welfare is subjected to all forms of exploitations and 
deprivation. It does not surprise me to learn that the only phrases that dominate the 
mining communities are ‘money, money’ or ‘diamond, diamond’! 
 
Economic Capital 
The participants had varying responses because of their individual profiles. This was 
dependent on how the participants told their story in a qualitative way. In this section 
on economic capital, I discuss economic assets such as resource allocation, cash, 
investments, and the monetary system, derived from and in collaboration with the 
other assets. It is undisputable that, as part of a holistic sustainability approach, 
economic capital is vital to having a sustainable community. Primarily, the intent to 
work in mining is in order to have an income. It is obvious that even those who 
diversify their income potential by involving themselves in mining whilst doing other 
primary activities do it for economic reasons.  
 
To generate discussion at the start of the interview, I asked the interviewees why they 
have chosen diamond mining instead of other forms of economic activities. Like the 
response given to me by miners who prefer diamond mining to cocoa, selected 
responses from business people and a farmer were documented thus:  
“We met poverty and we still live in poverty. Who can help us? Those we believe 
(trust) deceive us always, always!” (Srf2, Sewafe). Another response from one the 
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‘traders’ (businessman) went further to demonstrate an economic anticipation that: “A 
single big diamond can change our lives overnight” (Srb5, Sewafe). 
 
The literature by Dobie (2002) suggests that poverty causes over-exploitation of 
natural resources and long-term social and ecological complexities. However, the 
findings show a slight shift from poverty to the notion of anticipating ‘more wealth’. 
Unlike the miners who are deprived, poor and vulnerable, the business people using 
the same miners are relatively better off. Yet they are involved in mining activities 
with the aim that they can get rich or richer. In addition, one of the groups was able to 
expatiate that: “These communities had viable subsistence agricultural communities 
with enviable flora and fauna but have dissipated over time due to, primarily, mining 
activities; this is all for money… We need money… Money speaks for itself”, they 
concluded (Kfg2, Koidu).  
 
“Most of the agricultural land with cash crops such as cocoa and coffee transformed 
into mining zones are owned by relatively better-off community members” (Kfg2, 
Koidu).  
 
“There are more banks than we had decades ago; ehm… but the system is still the 
same. We have no access to borrow because they need guarantees (collateral 
security).” “Where can we get it”? (Krb11, Koidu) 
 
Evidence identified above also indicates that achieving sustainable community 
development faces enormous tests. The mining communities struggle with a lack of, 
or structurally inadequate, financial institutions. This cannot sufficiently justify why 
people involved themselves in mining. However, one thing that is obvious and 
sufficient is that it inhibits people’s chances to be involved in other trades. Hence, it 
causes a sectoral spill-over effect or the ‘Dutch disease’ syndrome. Ebrahim-Zadeh 
(2003) commented on resource pull as labour and resources are diverted to mining 
activities. Accordingly, this may have contributed to why there are so many actors 
involved in mining communities in all the chiefdoms investigated. Also, the issue of 
collateral security and lack of economic incentives for agricultural produce enhances 
the movement of labour and diversion of resources to diamond activities. Farmers 
have no more faith in farming. Realistically, it is not a matter of the duration of the 
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growing period before the farmer realises the dividend; rather, it is about profitable 
gains while waiting on the crop. Unlike the macro-economic aspect Ebrahim-Zadeh 
(2003) analysis linking the “Dutch disease” to the ‘spending effect’ through increase 
in purchasing power, the ‘spending effect’ driven by the quest for more wealth is 
another factor diverting resources from other sectors to diamond mining. Hence, the 
‘Dutch disease’ is not only about the effect on manufacturing, rather it includes spill-
over effects on associated sectors and resources. The farmer will choose to substitute 
mining for agriculture because of the expectation of high returns and not because he is 
really poor. This demonstrates my findings that there is diversification of economic 
activities in the diamond sector, which is as a result of the ‘anticipated more wealth’. 
Paradoxically, this shift from agriculture to the mining sector has destroyed 
community livelihood assets and has catalysed the rate of poverty.  
 
Physical Capital 
Roseland (2005) defined this form of capital as the capacity of a group of individuals 
to affect standards, regulations, put into effect the regulations that determine the 
distribution of resources and the approach they used. In order to evaluate the 
availability and sustainability of physical assets in these mining communities, I 
explained to some of the participants in Koidu, Sewafe and Yengema what I would be 
looking at under this categorisation of assets and asked them to reflect on the state of 
these assets according to their understanding. I interviewed 3 men and 2 women over 
the age of 60 who had slight knowledge of the state of this asset prior to the war and 8 
other men and women. One of the three men was from Yengema and two were from 
Koidu, whilst the women were both from Yengema. I also attempted to know if the 
political elites are unaware of the dilapidated roads and lack of sanitation in the 
mining fields. There is much pessimism from the respondents, whose replies 
demonstrate that even the physical assets have not been sustainable for decades and 
that there is a lack of political will, except for the new ‘Agenda for Change’ initiative 
by the present APC-led government, which aims to construct 20 miles of tarmac roads 
in all the district headquarter-towns. In this respect, the respondents gave the 
following responses, starting from roads to bridges, and houses: “The Kono district 
has always had problem of good road networks. Most of the roads are gravel roads 
constructed by SLST for their mining operation” (Kfg2, Koidu). 
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“Koidu Holding deceives us with stones (granites) on the roads. Is that a good road? 
The roads SLST and NDMC made to connect their mining sites are even better than 
these” (Krm4, Koidu). 
“The politicians do not care because they come here only to tell us lies at election 
time. We will not see them again. Kono has always been neglected. The few roads in 
Koidu town are not sufficient” (Krm4, Koidu). 
  
I was also interested in knowing what is responsible for the state of dilapidation of 
these roads. One of the respondents told me that: “Most of the destruction of roads 
and these buildings you see around the former NDMC vast compounds and other 
areas were done by mining activities” (Yr7, Yengema). 
 
In these mining communities, the achievement of a sustainable community depends 
partly on physical capital, such as good roads, markets, hospitals, health centres, 
storage facilities, toilet facilities and infrastructure. Here, even though some of these 
things are inadequate, as I have explained earlier, I have limited my questions to just 
roads and houses that are affected by mining. According to Ebrahim-Zadeh (2003) 
‘Dutch disease’ proposition, resources and labour are diverted to mining activities. 
The evidence shows that, in addition to the resource-pull, assets are not only diverted 
to mining but destroyed. Decades of mining have progressively degraded the land and 
destroyed the infrastructure (bridges, houses and the former NDMC quarters). From 
the discourses given by the interviewees on the nature of these assets, it illustrates that 
the quest by actors for diamond resources does not take cognisance of ecological or 
sustainable issues. It is ironic to see built houses (certainty) destroyed for diamonds 
yet unseen (probability). It is clear that the actions of the individuals are 
environmentally unfriendly and inhibit the chances of a sustainable community. As 
earlier discussed, a workable sustainable community development approach can be 
realised in mining communities in the absence and involvement of the assets 
mentioned above. From what was discussed so far and acknowledged by the 
participants, assets have been either destroyed or are in bad shape. Even though many 
academics put the blame on poverty and the unemployed youths (Fanthorpe 2003), 
the research unearths motivating factors, which tend towards destruction of these 
assets or capital. One reason is that many decades of mining brought insignificant 
gains to the communities and the second is that there are two groups of parallel 
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communities in Kono: the homogenous group and the heterogeneous group. The 
heterogeneous group or the ‘desperados’ are the immigrants (nationals and foreign), 
whose desire is to get rich or survive and return home. They leave no stone unturned 
to maximise their energy and time. The homogeneous group are the natives who are 
also actively involved in mining or indirectly supporting the heterogeneous group. 
That is why, over the years, this ‘native land group’ have a developed a slogan 
‘Konoye Konofa’ (it means Kono is for the Kono people). In simple terms, it implies 
a ‘stranger’ is a ‘stranger’. The conflict of interest has always been between these two 
groups. But this homogeneity is permeable, weak and fussy. Unlike Somerville 
(2009a), who claimed that heterogeneous communities are those with different 
cultures and background, the very existence of these communities I have called 
homogeneous on the basis of common background and culture are weak, fussy, 
permeable and underpowered.  
Social Capital 
From the literature, Phillips and Pittman (2009) note that social capital or social 
capacity demonstrates the extent to which a community can collaborate together 
effectively to plan, set goals, get things done, make group decisions and develop and 
sustain strong relationships. To generate discussion with the respondents at the start of 
the interview, I asked participants how they see their role in the community. In 
response to this question, the responses were unanimous: “We the youths think 
differently from our people. They sold this land for nothing. We act and they say it is 
violence. But no one responds when we complain” (Krm4, Koidu).  
 
The younger generation have the conviction that the cause of the present degradation 
and destruction in the mining communities is partly the result of the rent-seeking 
attitude of the elders, who care only for short-term gains. There is evidence of 
mistrust and lack of hope. Murray (2000) argues that “building social capital rests on 
a foundation of three requirements: (1) a sense of hope by citizens that a solution is 
possible; (2) sufficient opportunities for engagement with those with the necessary 
motivation and skills; (3) opportunities to nurture community service life-skills” 
(2000, pp. 100-101). From the literature, political ecologists’ theories have linked 
local social oppression and environmental degradation to wider political and 
economic concerns (Blaikie, 1985; Bunker 1985). However, what they have failed to 
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understand is the shortcomings of social capacity in these mining communities. There 
is evidence of a social divide and the emergence of parallel communities. It is not a 
problem solely about social disparity, but includes social exclusion too. The younger 
generation sees themselves as excluded. Social capacity enhances the establishment of 
social networks, structures, institutions and organisations that call for collective action 
and shared knowledge, understanding, and interactions that can bring desirable 
outcomes (Roseland, 2005). Craiz (2005) and Daly and Howell (2006), argue that 
social capital is necessary for capacity building within social relationships and 
opportunities. However, the emergence of a social network in the mining 
communities comes with a misunderstanding that leads to no common desirable 
outcome.  
 
This has affected the process of how the community should approach the attainment 
of community development. The evidence shows that there is a problem of social 
identity and a role that is either rent-seeking or politically motivated. Phillips and 
Pittman (2009) note that social capital or social capacity affects the extent to which a 
community can collaborate together effectively to plan, set goals, get things done, 
make group decisions and develop and sustain strong relationships. Because of this 
disunity between the older population and the youths, the communities have been 
divided into parallel communities who work towards their own interest because they 
have been marginalised and deprived. The young people commented that: “We are 
only recognised when they need our political support. You can not reach them again 
when you need them” (Krm4, Koidu). 
 
Because of the traditional thinking of the old that always sees the young as being 
young in knowledge, the voices of the young are often ignored. Interestingly, even 
though the mining effects on the communities do not only affect the youths, from 
secondary data sources the evidence was that the 2007 December riot was by 
undertaken by the youths only. According to Craiz (2005) and Daly and Howell 
(2006) social capital is necessary for capacity building within social relationships and 
opportunities. The absence of social relationship between the elders and the youths 
has often provoked discontent and community conflict. Prior to the riot, the affected 
community complained and cautioned KHL not to undertake the blasting of rocks in 
the densely populated community of Koidu town but were completely ignored by 
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even the government, police institutions and by the company. One of the respondents 
commented this: “We asked the authorities to stop Koidu Holdings from blasting until 
they found a proper way of doing it. No one listened to us” (Krm4, Koidu).  
 
There is a sense of belongingness among the natives. However, the lack of trust in the 
authorities has created a parallel community within the homogeneous group 
themselves. Hence, the ineffectiveness of working collectively and cooperatively in 
these communities means that the process is unworkable and the outcome is 
unsustainable. Also, from the discourse, the research shows that the conflict starts 
from the micro-level between individuals and groups and amid varying interests and 
conceptions of belongingness. From a political ecologists point of view local social 
oppression and environmental degradation to wider political and economic concerns 
(Blaikie, 1985; Bunker 1985). The views of the ‘old class’ of elders are a long way 
from the reality of things. Partly, the cultural understanding of the old that they know 
more than the young is a contributing factor to the cause of conflicting parallel 
communities among the wider homogeneous community. The analysis of the 
responses from the interview process has shown evidence of social breakdown. This 
has pushed aside the idea of a common vision in a community where some now blame 
others. In the last resort, social neglect and social breakdown provokes environmental 
degradation. 
 
Cultural Capital 
This is not only an important aspect of these community assets but a sensitive one in 
communities that uphold some strong cultural beliefs. This form of capital determines 
the way the communities understand the environment around them, the norms, values 
and the steps towards change (Daly and Howell, 2006). Roseland (2006) explains it as 
the outcome of shared experience through customs, traditions, heritage, history and 
identity. I am only interested in the participation of actors, especially women, when 
we look at customs. Positive or negative outcomes of women’s roles are an indicator 
of governance flaws in the community. Here, I engaged with 2 women and 2 men 
from each of the four communities. The strong perspective of men was that involving 
women in decision-making is a negative. One of the quotes was: “A woman is just a 
woman. They have no common sense” (Srm4, Sewafe). 
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This is one of many instances where women are as seen excluded from community 
matters. Intuitively, men exclusively control diamond activity matters; women play 
insignificant roles. However, I tried to find out if the exclusion is imposed by men or 
accepted by the women. I discovered that it is accepted because of the family 
structure or role. One of the quotes from an established community elder woman 
states that: “We the women have so much daily chores to carry out… going to the 
market, cooking, farming, taking care of the children etc.” (Srw7, Sewafe).  
 
From this discourse, the reader can understand one more way in which social and 
cultural capitals are closely interrelated. They both deal with social relations among 
people. The communities in resource-based communities are accustomed to a 
traditional form of rule and structure, which cannot be ignored in any attempt towards 
sustainable community development in mining communities. Talking about 
community development entails commitment and participation from every community 
member. There are cultural limitations based on gender roles or responsibilities. This 
social limitation affects community development. According to Frank and Smith 
(1999) community development is the planned fruition of the economic, social, 
cultural, and environmental factors of community well-being. We can see that social 
and cultural factors are essential in achieving community development in the absence 
of tradition and complacency. Seyfang and Smith (2007) perceive the community as 
an opportunity to develop new practices and norms that are generally accepted by the 
community in sustainability practice. However, from the evidence, sustainability and 
participation are limited by political, legal and customary (gender) factors. According 
to Rocheleau et al. (1996), gender reflection demonstrates how environmental change 
and conflict is related to gender inequalities. The evidence shows that many women, 
especially the youths, have distanced themselves from community participation and 
have interest themselves in ‘petty’ trading and early marriages. According to this 
quote: “I was given to marriage at an early age even though I had interest in being an 
educated person”. The other commented: “You see, we can not deny our parents. 
They would disown us with a curse” (Srw7, Sewafe). 
  
It was obvious from the participants that the women who are contributors to 
community debates are those who can demonstrate political influence. These are the 
fortunate ones who have reached a high level of literacy and social esteem in society 
 185 
and have ignored cultural limitations. The findings from secondary data and the 
community responses show that the present District Chairlady made it to the top seat 
because of her family reputation, political influence and the geo-politics of the 
district. The Kono district, despite its deprivation, is a political contested community 
that gives leverage to any political party. The just-concluded November 16 elections 
saw a majority vote from the district for the ruling APC. Hence, the culture of partisan 
politics dominates even the local authority. Even though the exclusion of women is 
also associated with illiteracy, the findings show that those who are literate to a 
relatively higher level prefer to involve themselves in personal activities and mining. 
A schoolteacher told me that she would prefer to stay quiet and happy than involve 
herself in community issues that could warrant execution, especially when power 
(regime) changes hands. Summarily, in contrast to Seyfang and Smith (2007) 
comment on new practices and norms that are generally accepted by the community 
in sustainability practice, and Rocheleau et al. (1996) gender inequalities is linked to 
environmental change,  we can see the voluntary and involuntary factors within social 
capital that have existed in these communities over a period of time. Now, I will move 
away from the assets and discuss sustainable community development and 
governance. 
 
6.4 Sustainability Approach: Strong and Weak Sustainability 
This section is in one way or the other linked with the section above (6.3). In this 
section, the reader will learn that there is neither a distinct strong nor weak 
sustainability in resource-based communities. The aim of the thesis is to establish a 
sustainable community under the tenets of the Brundtland report (1987). In trying to 
achieve that, the community needs to acknowledge the assets they have and know 
how to use them for their own benefit, without limiting the gains of the future 
generation. Baker (2006, p. 5) noted that establishing an ecological society implies 
“reconciling economic activity, social progress, and environmental protection”. 
However, even though Baker’s narrative has not included all the assets I identified 
according to Roseland (2005) (see 6.2), some community actors have not reconciled 
these assets due to factors discussed in section 6.2. Instead, they have turned them 
apart (see table 6.2).  
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Here, I am not going to discuss the approaches of each community individually. I 
have earlier discussed in the methodology that these communities share many 
common characteristics including ecological problems. Before I go further, I need to 
summarise the main arguments surrounding strong and weak sustainability. This will 
make my argument clearer when I consider the evidence in order to analyse which 
way the activities of the actors have taken the communities and if the aim of 
sustainable community development is achievable through that. Hamstead and Quinn 
(2005) and Baker (2006) are proponents of strong sustainability and argue that it 
should focus on the qualitative improvement of all forms of assets instead of limiting 
the focus to the quantitative expansion of any one form of capital. They advocate that 
sustainability can be achieved by recognising the finite nature of the earth, working 
towards greater resource protection and the improvement of natural assets, and 
emphasise that the problem is not about the pursuit of economic growth but of its 
pattern, which then causes environmental problems. Roseland (2005) further explains 
that well-being can be improved through different types of community assets (natural, 
economic, environmental, social, human and cultural). On the other hand, proponents 
of weak sustainability say that there should be no limit to the fundamental system of 
economic growth. Rather, they call for infinite growth from the utilisation of natural 
capital in order to develop other forms of economic capital. However, I will use the 
propositions of strong sustainability to make my argument on these approaches. I will 
summarise these discourses by identifying themes or phrases, qualitative 
improvement of all forms of assets, recognising the finite nature of the earth and the 
improvement of natural assets, working towards greater resource protection, and the 
pattern of economic growth, which causes environmental problems. I will then 
discuss each of these themes and interpret them alongside the evidence of the assets 
(see 6.2). 
 
From the discourses on the assets discussed in 6.2, there is no evidence of any 
improvement of assets. What the evidence shows us is the destruction of natural and 
physical capital, and the inefficacy of human, economic, social and cultural capital. 
Considering the evidence, it is apparent that almost the entire flora and most 
agricultural land (including swamps) have been lost; this is partly owing to mining 
activities. It shows there is no qualitative improvement of the natural assets and no 
recognition of the benefit of the natural assets for present and future communities. It 
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has demonstrated evidence of destruction instead of improving or preserving the 
earth. Referring to my assessment of Ebrahim-Zadeh (2003) ‘Dutch Disease’ 
discussed above, I concluded that assets and resources are not only transferred from 
one sector to another, evidences show that assets are destroyed because of mining. 
The reason being that as a result of the network of factors ranging from social, human, 
cultural, and economic, most community actors’ work against resource protection and 
their activities, which are orientated towards personal economic gain, have caused 
environmental problems. The same thing occurs with the other assets. In summary, 
the human capital is characterised by no health and safety measures nor medical 
opportunities for the miners; for the physical capital, houses and bridges (weak 
sustainability) have been destroyed for the natural capital (diamond resources); 
culturally, traditions and customs have governance; above all, the social capital 
framework has led to parallel communities emanating from political loyalty instead of 
community loyalty. In all these summarised assets, the reader will learn that it is not 
only the natural capital that is affected. All the other assets have been affected too. 
Concluding these discourses, the analyses point out that the effect will be felt not only 
by these present communities but also by the next generation of communities. This is 
likely to occur because the present communities inherited a similar impact caused by 
those who came before them. With nothing or little done to acknowledge this fact, 
these communities will not be sustainable both in the short and long run. 
 
6.5 Sustainable Community Development and Governance  
This section on sustainable community development and governance looks at the 
sustainable practices and the involvement of non-state actors in decision-making and 
implementation. According to the scope of this thesis, communities need to exist not 
as just composition of people in a particular location. Rather, it should be a 
composition of people in a location capable of determining their community goals and 
working towards them. In that case, I am interested in what Osborne and McLaughlin 
(2004) and Brandsen and Pestoff (2006) called co-governance: the communities’ 
participation, delivery and management of shared public service delivery, and co-
production (2006). For that reason, I will be discussing two key issues: sustainability 
practice and participation. This is because I have placed my focus on actors in the 
communities in an attempt to solicit their understanding of and capacity to find a 
common ground on community matters. Owing to the commonality of mining 
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activities in the communities, I decided to concentrate on two focus groups in 
Yengema in the Nimikoro chiefdom and in Koidu, which hosts two chiefdoms, 
Gbense and Tankoro. My concern was to find out if the community understands 
sustainability practice, how they participate in it and service delivery, if any. In the 
quest for services, my interest was to know what the communities can do for 
themselves and by themselves. This is precluded by the composition of the 
community. We cannot understand governance and sustainability issues without 
knowing the actors. Indeed, knowing who the actors are in the community will help 
the reader to understand their attitude towards governance and sustainable practices.  
 
Table 6.3: Community Composition 
Sets of Community People Power Capacity 
The Birth Right Conscious power by 
virtue of birth from 
indigenes 
High 
The Influential: Social, 
Economic/Political Elites  
Attains power due to 
social esteem 
High 
Long-Term Residence Enjoys limited power 
unless he/she can exhibit 
influence  
Moderate 
Visitors: Short-Term 
Residence 
Can hardly be recognised Low 
Author’s construct 
 
The table above identifies four groups of community actors, their relationship with 
power and their capacity level. These identifications will be explained in the latter 
part of this section. From the evidence collected and analysed under assets in section 
6.2, there are social norms that determine the differential ability of people to own, 
control, claim or make use of resources such as land. These social norms are 
traditionally structured in the society. This structure is the first form of discrimination 
and segregation in the communities. From the outcome of the research, there are four 
sets of people in these communities listed in the table below: (i) the birth right (ii) the 
influential (iii) the long-term residents and (iv) the visitors (short-term residents). 
Hence, I was interested in understanding the social relations between the natives or 
homogeneous group and the non-natives. There is a clear distinction. However, that 
distinction fades when social feuds exist among the indigenes or the birth right group. 
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In order to evaluate community governance and sustainability practice, the variation 
of nomenclature in the way people identify themselves or are being identified in the 
communities needs to be understood. Certainly, their power relations affect the way 
people react to sustainable practices. In table 6.3 above I have identified, according to 
the evidence from respondents, the composition of the communities and the scope of 
their power relations within their communities. Owing to social factors relating to 
trust, ignorance and lost hope, there is evidence of parallel communities with different 
goals. As such, below, in table 6.4, I have divided these communities into two main 
groups and represented their attitudes or actions towards sustainable practices. From 
the two tables, the reader can understand the relationship between community 
governance and sustainable actions in the communities.  
 
Table 6.4: Types of Communities and their Composition 
Types of Community Composition Actions 
1. Indigenes (General) Rent-Seeking Homogeneous 
2. Their Deprived Youths 
(Social offspring) 
(i) Reactionary  
(ii) Environmentally 
Unfriendly 
Heterogeneous Immigrants:  
I. Nationals  
II. Foreigners  
(i) Desperate to get rich 
(ii) Inactive participants 
(iii) Environmentally 
Unfriendly 
Source: Author’s construct 
 
Before going into the issues in detail, I need to explain the table above. I have 
categorised the actors in the community into two groups. The categorisation was 
possible and came out of the evidence given to me by the respondents during the 
interviews. Here, the categorisation did not take into consideration the social status of 
the actors. I have named one group as homogeneous and another as heterogeneous. 
The first group is inclusive of actors who are indigenes, who by virtue of their 
‘natural’ sense of belongingness exercise exponential power. The latter is those who 
are non-indigenes. Their role is relatively limited except when they attain some socio-
economic status. The former group is divided into two. One group is the core and the 
other group are mainly youths who are dissatisfied with the core. Even though they all 
have relatively ‘natural’ rights, the core has a rent-seeking attitude. As such, there is a 
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discontent, which causes the youths to take an environmentally unfriendly approach 
similar to the heterogeneous group. On the other hand, the heterogeneous group is 
mainly focused on finding the diamond resources. They participation is inactive or 
passive. Because of their desperation to get rich, and probably return to their 
respective homes, they are environmentally unfriendly. 
 
Sustainability Practice 
In chapter 3, I argue that sustainable development emphasises the importance of 
bridging the balance between ecological views and development aspirations. Also, I 
reiterated that it takes into consideration the social relationship existing in the 
community. Here, in an attempt to further understand their relationship, I am 
identifying the participatory analysis of the actors. According to Baker (2006), 
sustainable community development incorporates the promotion of fostering local 
community activities over development decisions. In order to do this, the community 
needs workable social capital, institutions and actors who are capable of engaging in 
the process of community development and sustainability, whereby the communities 
can determine policies and community services, and when, where, and how 
appropriate they are.  
 
However, what happens when some limitations exist? This was the question that I put 
to the respondents during the interviews. The outcome shows policy inadequacies, 
neglect and blame-shifting. Some of the participants demonstrated their indignation at 
being excluded from the debates over core issues affecting them. In addition, there is 
evidence of distrust between the community commoners or the youths and the elite 
core. To demonstrate this, I will use one of the quotes: “Things (policies) are imposed 
on us. There is no feedback on complaints we make. Only in politics can you see the 
‘sweet’ talks and promises” (Yrm4, Yengema). 
“There is lack of trust. They are all liars trying just for their own ‘pot to boil’ (trying 
for their own welfare). Those who have the ‘upper hand’ send their families to good 
schools and abroad whilst we suffer. You see, we all need to benefit from these 
diamonds but that is not happening. So what would you expect if we do not have the 
fair share of the cake (diamond revenue)? The DACDF is used for the chiefs’ glory. 
They build ‘barrays’ (royal huts)” (Yrm5, Yengema). 
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The participants, who are part of what I called the homogeneous group, acknowledged 
being part of the unsustainable mining. They attributed the cause to community 
breakdown and the failure of the authorities to provide the basic needs of society. 
Instead, they are left at the mercy of mining companies. A quote reads: “We the 
youths think differently from our people. They sold this land for nothing. We act and 
they say it is violence. But no one responds when we complain” (Krm4, Koidu). 
 
“I have to take care of my family. No one takes care of them. Not the government. No 
one...” (Yrm4, Yengema). 
 
“We are only recognised when they need our political support. You cannot reach them 
again when you need them” (Srm3, Sewafe). 
 
“We asked the authorities to stop Koidu Holdings from blasting until they find a 
proper way of doing it. No one listened to us” (Krm4, Koidu). 
 
Therefore, the reasons for their outcry were evident in the December 2007 incident 
between the homogeneous group and KHL (now called OCTEA) in which many of 
the protesters were natives. One of the placards read: “We say no to Koidu Holdings, 
papa government should intervene, why are we slaves in our own land? We cry for 
justice. Who will help us?” (NMJD 2009; NACE 2010)  
 
I put this question to the local counsellor who responded to me as a concerned citizen. 
I asked him why some people are dissatisfied. This was what he said: “People are 
heavily loaded with problems. Efforts to meet individual and family commitments are 
enormous. The community cannot rely on the chief or government to resolve their 
issues. All they can do is to do it their own way” (Yrc7, Yengema). 
 
Baker (2006) proposes that sustainable community development incorporates the 
promotion of fostering local community activities over development decisions. The 
Tamarack Institute (2008) argues that the community’s commitment enables them to 
identify their own action plans. In contrast, the evidence shows that, because of 
deprivation, ill-governance, their dissatisfaction, people become mainly concerned 
with how to make life comfortable for themselves, disregarding sustainability 
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practices. The quote reads thus: “There is a culture of negligence or ‘I care not’ in 
people’s way of doing things; people have a saying that it is not your business when 
they are reprimanded by others. Besides, sustainability practice is about policy or 
theoretical and not about daily practice. The policies have brought limited change to 
the purpose it is meant to address. This is because they are inadequate and lack an 
enforceable structure” (Yrc7, Yengema). 
 
Indeed, with the prevalence of social discontent and the desperation to meet 
psychological needs, the people do not consider sustainable mining practices. 
However, as the evidence shows, the mining document itself does not spell out 
detailed sustainable mining practices. The government regulation (MMR, 2012) 
focuses on the requirement for an EIA or SEIA on the big companies and ignores the 
various artisanal mining activities.  
 
MacQueen et al., (2001 p. 1929) define a community as ‘...a group of people with 
diverse characteristics who are linked by social ties, share common perspectives, and 
engage in joint action in geographical locations or settings’. In contrast, there is a 
paranoid shift of blame from the homogeneous communities to the heterogeneous 
ones, which the latter group dispute. Though sustainability challenge is not only a 
matter with non-indigenes, the indigenes on one hand blame the non-indigenes, and 
on the other hand blame their elders. But, the non-indigenes see themselves as 
positive contributors to the communities in various ways. Yet, they are blamed for the 
ecological damage happening in the communities. One prominent quote was that: 
“They blame us for destroying their land. But look at the composition of this group… 
you can see Kono people. Most of the people we do work for are Kono people. Know 
this, the Chiefs mine, teachers mine, traders mine, even the politicians here and from 
Freetown mine. Everybody is interested” (Yrm5, Yengema). 
 
From the evidence, understanding sustainable mining was not a concern until it came 
to blaming ‘strangers’. The respondents explained that finding a sustainable practice 
within the community is hard because every sector of the community is interested in 
mining. Further, in an attempt to find out their interest and level of participation, I was 
able to discover that their focus on survival makes most community members less 
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interested in what is really happening. This further buttresses the earlier points on 
discontent and mistrust among community members owing to parallel visions.  
 
Participation and Representation 
I cannot discuss sustainable community development and governance without 
discussing how the community participates. In the early discourses on sustainable 
practices, there is evidence of factors that limit its functioning. Since the purpose of 
this chapter is to discuss sustainable community development and governance, it is 
implied that the notion of community participation or community capacity to 
participate cannot be left out. I have used the words participation and representation in 
the title above because, most often, representation is presented as participation. In my 
quest for answers, I interviewed eighteen participants on this issue. Some reported 
family or survival reasons, rent-seeking, absence of information, no consent, political 
loyalty and misrepresentative actors. These factors are presented in the following 
quotes below. My first question was posed in order to know if people are willing to 
participate in community issues and, if they are not, why? This quote identifies the 
problem of daily chores or survival: “I have to take care of my family. I leave home in 
the morning to mine and come back late and tired. No one takes care of them. Not the 
government. No one...” (Yrm3, Yengema). 
 
This evidence shows that people give preference to their basic needs rather than 
thinking about general community goals. They have no hope that local and national 
authorities will cater for them. However, another respondent who was a councillor 
attribute the reason to inadequate information: “Little is known by the communities of 
what is actually happening” (Src7, Sewafe).  
 
The quotation on inadequate information demonstrates the limits that are set on the 
chances that individuals have to ask questions and engage with the authorities. In 
essence, the community cannot work collectively. Consequently, those with a relative 
advantage work in their own interest as the quote below states: “People cannot work 
together because once an individual’s mouth is closed (appeased) he forgets about the 
rest” (Src7, Sewafe). 
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As such, the rent-seeking attitude leads to what I refer to as misrepresentation instead 
of community participation. As such, some individuals participate on behalf of the 
community. The actors, with leverage, by virtue of either political or socio-economic 
status, represent the people. In this, the respondents question the decision of those 
actors, implying that they are not aware of who they are representing. The following 
quotes states: “We get surprised when we hear that ‘we’ the people have agreed to 
this or that. That is not so. The meetings we hear of are mostly in Freetown… 
Bintumani. The meetings seldomly held here are for the ‘top brass’ (elites) who 
benefit from the meetings” (Krm6, Koidu). 
 
“We see the same set of people every time claiming to advocate for us. That is not 
true. They are representing their interest. Even the NGOs are more corrupt than the 
politicians (government)” (Kfg1, Koidu). 
 
The issue of NGOs claiming advocacy for justice came up when I referred to them in 
the discussion. Unlike what they claim to be doing on behalf of the communities, the 
communities reject any knowledge of what actually is being done and apparently on 
their behalf. Participation has to be active, especially when the people, on one hand, 
are the direct victims, and on the other, they are the perpetrators. On the contrary, this 
is not the case as this quotes supports: “People who advocate justice for the mining 
communities are not representatives of the people” (Yrc7, Yengema). However, when 
certain people act on the behalf of the community instead of engaging them, other 
respondents claims that political loyalty or allegiance is the reason for that. As this 
quote states: “The cause of things happening in the wrong direction in this district, 
despite what God has given to us, is the absence of professionalism; people are 
chosen to represent the communities in the council on a partisan basis and not on our 
local interests; if SLPP is in power, the councillors should be from the party. If APC 
is in power, they need APC councillors” (Sfg1, Sewafe). 
 
From the evidence, the authorities are answerable only to their own political 
affiliations in order to serve longer in their various capacities. They work in the 
interest of political formations. This shows that even legitimate power can be used for 
coercive purposes. Power could be legitimate and acquired through a position of 
assigned authority and the right to govern (Haugaard and Clegg, 2012). This supports 
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the rent-seeking attitude discussed above. The communities have pre-selected actors 
who (mis)represent them and participate on their behalf with no gain but actually a 
loss. Inferring from the use of power from legitimate to coercive or to a rent-seeking 
purpose is an indication that resource governance structures affect the sustainability of 
resources and that the community exists as a place. According to Phillips and Pittman 
(2009), community development takes the form of developing and enhancing people’s 
ability to act collectively, whilst the outcome means taking a collective action that 
will improve on the community’s physical, economic, environmental, cultural, 
political and social capital. This lacks clarity on how to work towards community 
development by eradicating the vices and educating people. In that case, Frank and 
Smith (1999) discuss a community’s capacity building and include good leadership, 
supportive institutions, inspiration and a willingness to act on issues affecting them. In 
the evidence, a lack of willingness from some community members is manifest. The 
unwillingness is not voluntary; instead, it is caused by deprivation. The people have 
not received what they need in order to survive. They have to fend for themselves. 
Also, the problem is not only about having institutions. The focus should be on how 
those institutions should be managed and who manages them. According to Gwin 
(2005), capacity is the ability that people, societies and organisations have to 
administer their affairs successfully. The promotion of social change is aimed at 
accomplishing human and non-material needs, enhancing organisational efficacy, 
progressing social equity, and developing human and technical capacity towards 
sustainability (Roseland, 2000). However, the power shift and discontent between the 
community elders or authorities and the youths, and a lack of human capital, shows 
that the institutional capacity is insufficient and cannot bring about desirable 
community development. The summary of these discourses shows the absence of 
what Osborne and McLaughlin (2004) and Brandsen and Pestoff (2006) called ‘co-
governance’: the communities’ participation and delivery and management of shared 
public service delivery, and ‘co-production’, which is the community’s capacity to 
produce their own goods and services (2006).  
 
6.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have dealt with the different assets in resource-based communities 
and differentiated these communities from others. Taking into consideration the 
Brundtland report, I have not seen evidence of the communities working towards the 
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benefit of both the present and future generations. In addition, the attitude towards 
activities on all the forms of capital shows that the approaches in these communities 
do not aid the purpose of having a sustainable community. As a result of the depletion 
of assets, the communities are achieving neither strong nor weak sustainability. 
Furthermore, there is a legal limitation of the communities’ role in resource and 
community sustainability. The communities should not be onlookers standing by 
when it comes to what affects them. Their role should be indispensable and 
indivisible. They should not be misrepresented. Instead, they should be adequately 
informed, have the capacity to consent and participate on producing and delivering 
goods and services, and on policy matters. As such, during a period of discontent, 
there is an emergence of polarised communities that have a vision independent of the 
elite community. This, without any doubt, culminates in a collapsed community.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
ENHANCING THE RESOURCE-BASED COMMUNITIES TOWARDS CO-
PRODUCTION AND CO-GOVERNANCE 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter is an outcome of the previous chapters (5 and 6). A summary conclusion 
of the three chapters (5, 6 and 7) is dealt with in chapter 8. This chapter (7) answers 
the third research objective: 
‘Identify both structural and community-based barriers to promoting sustainable 
community development in mining communities and make policy recommendations 
for community development in such communities.’ 
 
The main discourse in this thesis, in an attempt to realise the aim of achieving 
sustainable community development, is to enhance the resource-based communities in 
order to assist them to work towards co-production and co-governance. This is 
defined by Brandsen and Pestoff (2006), and Osborne and McLaughlin (2004), as the 
joint partnership between the state and the communities in participatory policy 
formation and implementation, and in service delivery. However, the discourses from 
the four main case studies in the resource-based communities show that these 
communities are yet to become sustainable. All actors at various levels cause the 
limitations, which are not associated with inadequate policies and elitism alone; it 
includes the actors other commentators perceive as victims of elitism. As such, this 
chapter looks at the limitations in two distinctive categories: community governance 
(7.2) and sustainable community development (7.3). The content of these categories is 
drawn mainly from qualitative sources and triangulation techniques using 
documentary analysis, semi-structured interviews, and focus group discussions.  
 
In chapter 6, I attempted to answer the second research objective. In it I discussed the 
community assets and the practices of the actors, including the sustainability 
approaches. The outcome shows that the sustainability approach was neither strong 
nor weak. Chapter 5 discussed research objective one. It considered community 
governance with a variety of actors. The outcome of the study shows that their 
activities are unsustainable. As such, this chapter is interested in the limitations 
restricting sustainable community development. The main finding shows a direct 
connection between community governance and sustainable community development.  
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7.2 Community Governance  
In this section, I will begin by presenting the structural barriers with both secondary 
and primary data. I will discuss this section in two phases. One will be the structural 
barrier and the second will be the general community barriers. The former includes 
the government’s sole role in responsibility for mining policy formulation and 
implementation, whilst the latter deals with the community capacity. In spite of the 
problem of resources and under development in resource-based communities, the 
national government sees itself as a sole actor or an all-encompassing actor. The 
communities are excluded in the whole process and become a mere political tool. In 
finding sustainable solutions, the communities need to be recognised as able to 
exercise power in shared development projects instead of being seen as a tool of 
government. Flynn (2011) and Price (2009) state that power has the ability to 
influence others decision either in a positive or negative way. Power could be 
legitimate and acquired through a position of assigned authority and the right to 
govern (Haugaard and Clegg, 2012). I have discussed in chapter 6 how legitimate 
power can be used for coercive purposes. The other form of power is exhibiting the 
patron-client relation through reward and compensation to influence others by direct 
or implied threat of punishment or by influencing the decisions of others. Haugaard 
and Clegg (2012) identify that power could be in the form of rewards, which can give 
the individual the ability to influence the behaviour of others by luring them with 
things they may appreciate. Hence, this form of power relation should be a process of 
social, economic and political change. The community is an appropriate agent of 
social change (Gibson-Graham, 2003; Escobar, 2001). In that respect, Hutter (2006) 
argues that there should be a shift from national control on communities to non-state 
actors (community), in both decision-making and implementation. The sub-section 
will discuss the structural barriers. 
 
The Structural Barrier 
In this section, I identify the structural barriers that limit the resource-based 
communities’ capacity to play a partnership role with the state on policy formulation 
and implementation, and also on production and management of goods and services. 
The sole role of the government is not seen as a sustainable actor in finding a 
sustainable solution on resources. Hopkins (2008) and McCarthy (2005) made 
 199 
discourses on the need to bypass the state and/or market processes, with the 
conviction that the community is more efficient on managing resources than the state. 
 
In that case, I will identify two areas of discussion on structural barriers. One visible 
structural limitation is the legal or mining policy leverage of the government as the 
sole policy maker and implementing actor, and the second is the political allegiance 
by some community actors that compromise community development with a rent-
seeking agenda. With these statements, it is obvious that the issue of institutions is not 
a barrier; rather, it is the compromise and illustrates the fusion power roles between 
the local council and the central government.  
 
In summary then, 13 of the 37 respondents reported that there is inadequate 
institutional transfer of power from central to local communities. This is contrary to 
government’s claim that decision-making has been brought to the people (LGA, 
2004). This handicaps the role of the local authorities and the community, according 
to the following quotes: “All ‘decisions’ (policies) concerning the mining are done in 
Freetown. There is no power given to us to decide” (Krm6, Koidu). 
 
“What is often presented as the communities’ consent is far from that; little is known 
by the communities of what is actually happening” (Src7, Sewafe).  
 
“We get surprised when we hear that ‘we’ the people have agreed to this or that. That 
is not so. The meetings we hear of are mostly in Freetown… Bintumani. The meetings 
that are seldomly held here are for the ‘top brass’ (elites), who benefit from the 
meetings” (Krfg1, Koidu). 
 
This is a significant aspect regarding community development. Governance practices 
should not be seen as a means for the establishment of institutions such as the local 
council, but should instead adopt the whole of the community into mining 
policymaking and implementation. Local or community governance should be the 
way the local authority is organised and legitimised within their jurisdiction. It needs 
to include how the local space plan and policies are formulated, how the decisions are 
made, and how those who make and implement these decisions are accountable for 
any controversial outcomes. The exclusion of the community in policy formulation 
 200 
and implementation signifies the lack of community capacity. Gwin (2005) explains 
that people should have the ability to administer their affairs successfully. However, 
when the state becomes the sole determinant of resources, political influence and 
control of mineral resources supersedes ecological interest. That is why Hopkins 
(2008) and McCarthy (2005) made discourses on the need to bypass the state and/or 
market processes, with the conviction that the community is more efficient when 
managing resources than the state. However, the communities can barely work 
towards community development. And with growing discontent perpetrated by 
individualism above collectivism, the government actors use the power influence to 
their advantage. 
 
The secondary data confirms the discourse on community exclusion in policymaking. 
The government of Sierra Leone’s 2009 Mineral Policy document made mention of 
‘Community Development’ and exerted political leverage on the ministerial position. 
It gives overriding powers to the Minister of Mines to determine the community 
development agreement between the investor and the primary host, in pursuant of 
section 141 (1) of the Mineral Act 2009 (MMR 2009). The excerpt stipulates that 
“pursuant to section 141 (1) of the Act, a Community Development agreement is 
decided by the Minister”. Another phrase stipulates that: “The licence application may 
be considered by the Mineral Advisory Board and certified to the minister, but the 
licence shall not be finally decided nor the licence issued until the Community 
Development agreement had been agreed and the Minster has approved it”.  
 
Here, the reader will note that the communities have no representation in mining 
policies affecting their well-being. Also, the above excerpts demonstrate that the 
communities cannot determine and control the vast resources around them. In 
addition, the government approach towards community development is limited. The 
mining policy has taken community development as a project rather than a process of 
sustainable change. Such action contrasts Osborne and McLaughlin (2004) and 
Brandsen and Pestoff (2006) ‘co-governance’: the communities’ participation and 
delivery and management of shared public service delivery, and co-production: 
community producing their own policies. Nonetheless, the facts have shown that, over 
the years, the resource-based communities have been seen as a tool or instrument of 
the state, dictated by and provided for. Another clause that supports this structural 
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barrier is the communities’ incapacity and lack of empowerment according to an 
excerpt in the Mineral Mines document that stipulates: “The licence holder is required 
to report annually to the Minister of Mines on activities and expenditure in respect to 
the Community Development agreement using Form C20 of the Third Schedule” 
(MMR, 2009).  
 
The document did not make mention of the communities consultation, consent and 
communication with the Minister or verse versa. This contrasts with the government’s 
2004 Local Government Act. Unlike the intended purpose of the Act, the above 
discourse shows that decentralisation has not brought ‘decision-making’ to the 
resource-based communities. This contrasts Gwin (2005) proposition that people 
should have the ability to administer their affairs successfully. Apparently, this 
structural flaw was exemplified when the community’s request to temporary halt the 
dangerous blasting of Kimberlite rocks in the heart of two chiefdoms in Koidu town 
in 2007 was ignored until two people were killed. Because the issues are unresolved, 
another incidence occurred on the 19th December 2012 with another two deaths. This 
justifies my proposition that legitimate power can be used for coercive purposes.  
 
Paintin (2008) argues that despite the provision of local and district councils to 
identify and resolve the community’s concerns and social predicaments, they lack 
capacity, are under-funded, and barely have a clear vision of programmes for action. 
Even though I may agree with Paintin that capacity is a factor within the local 
councils, it is obvious that the way ‘rent-seeking’ positions are acquired, the partisan 
element in electing councillors or representatives, and the political dominance of the 
Minister of Mines provokes and exacerbates incapacity and inhibits the enhancement 
of sustainable community development. 
 
The institutionalised decentralisation set out by the government of Sierra Leone has 
not been meaningful and has failed to deliver because the community is just a 
recipient and subordinate, and not a competitive autonomous body capable of 
determining their own jurisdiction, and have no Local Agenda 21. Even though I 
agree with Agrawal and Ribot’s (1999) concept of democratic decentralisation, where 
local officials are elected by their own people, the research shows that even though 
the mining communities elect their own councillors, according to this quote below, 
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the process is a ‘partisan democracy’ and lacks the hegemony needed to work 
sustainably. One respondent states that, “people elect councillors who belong to the 
party they support instead of the individuals they trust” (Yrm8, Yengema). 
 
The data has shown that there is no joint partnership between the state and the 
communities in participatory policy formation and implementation, and in service 
delivery. Hence, the main discourse in this thesis, which aims to achieve sustainable 
community development through co-production and co-governance, which Brandsen 
and Pestoff (2006), and Osborne and McLaughlin (2004) highlighted, does not exist. 
There is no effective community involvement. The communities are often represented 
by other actors than being representatives themselves. As Gaventa (2004) argues, 
citizenry participation has to move people from being users or choosers of public 
service policies deliberated by others and made by others, to ‘makers and shapers’ of 
decision-making themselves on matters affecting them all. However, Agrawal and 
Ribot (1999) state that granting local communities’ management power over natural 
resources is a complex task. It implies that the central authority should have 
dominance over resources. However, the eco-anarchists condemn hierarchical forms 
of social organisations or rule and call for decentralised, autonomous and local forms 
of institutionalisation based on ecological principles or social ecology (Bookchin, 
1996). 
 
This conforms to Baker’s (2006) contribution on governance that calls for society to 
work towards collective goals. Without this, there is no prospect of community 
development. Gibson-Graham (2003) and Escobar (2001) see the community as an 
appropriate agent of social change. In that case, Hutter (2006) argues that there should 
be a shift from national control on communities to non-state actors (communities) in 
decision-making and implementation. As such Hopkins (2008) and McCarthy (2005) 
made discourses on the need to bypass the state and/or market processes, with the 
conviction that the community is more efficient on managing resources than the state. 
These contributions strengthen the co-governance and co-production argument 
required for resource-based communities.  
 
The communities need to be acknowledged, consulted, represented and should be able 
to hold accountable those who represent them or the government or non-government 
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institutions that work contrary to their community goals. In addition to the discourse, 
using the community as an instrument ignores community participation (Gilchrist, 
2003). This is because the powerful actors or elites override the deprived poor in the 
community. Unfairly enough, some of these actors have legitimate power to 
adjudicate over the affair of the communities or state. Instead, they use legitimate 
power for illegitimate purpose. Literally, participation is required in the communities’ 
own affairs and on matters relating between them and the government. It needs to 
conform to what Osborne and McLaughlin (2004) and Brandsen and Pestoff (2006) 
call Co-governance: the community’s capacity to be able to play a partnership role 
with the state on policy formulation and implementation. This can be possible if the 
community participates as co-partners to include the sense of identity, belongingness 
and common community goal. Otherwise, the participant’s motives will be hidden 
from the community and their real loyalty could be to another agent of authority, 
which could either be the state or a corporation. This implies that the community 
should not be under state or corporate pressure to adhere to their whims and caprices. 
Graham et al. (2003) explained that governance is: ‘the traditions, institutions and 
processes that determine how power is exercised, how citizens are given a voice, and 
how decisions are made on issues of public concern’ (Graham et al., 2003, p. 1).  The 
communities have to be motivated by a sense of identity (expressive) and not the 
individual member or actor’s allegiance to functional and political actors 
(instrumental). People should have the ability to administer their affairs successfully 
Gwin (2005) for the sustainability of the community. What I have discovered from the 
secondary sources and primary data from respondents is that participation is piece-
meal. In this study, I argue for an analysis of participation in sustainability, which 
includes (a) who participates (b) why he participates (c) how far he/she participates 
(d) with whom he participates and (e) to whom he accounts. The representation of 
advocates in a so-called stakeholders’ meeting is not a sufficient approach. Such 
advocacy is just a minor step towards community development. 
 
As such, achieving sustainable community development should consider the change 
in power dynamics within the community needed in order to have actors who work 
towards community goals. Those who are involved within and between the 
community and the state should have the capacity to withdraw consent if their 
capacity a community is undermined. This demonstrates the importance of the 
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community as an agent of social change where the individual’s liberty is dependant on 
the protection of their civil liberties. As Etzioni (1998, p. 42) states: “The preservation 
of the individual liberty depends on the active maintenance of the institutions of civil 
society.”  
 
In essence, the process of empowering the community to be an agent of social change 
should be devoid of top-bottom political control but rather should be engaged in 
bottom-up community participation. According to Gwin (2005) people should have 
the ability to administer their affairs successfully. The community as an agent of 
change should move away from resource exploitation and underdevelopment to 
sustainable community development. In addition, the section will identify the 
community not as a mere social place or location but an entity of authority and socio-
economic locus. Earlier, I discussed whether political ecology is about humans and 
place. Realistically, political ecology goes beyond humans and place to reach an 
understanding the relationship between humans and the environment. As such, the 
idea of community becomes an appropriate agent of social change through connected 
concepts of ‘local’ and ‘place’ (Gibson-Graham, 2003; Escobar, 2001). According to 
Escobar (2001), the concept of place provides the understanding of social movement. 
Alongside this narrative, I address the issue of ‘place’ as a community with set of 
actors involved in decision-making and the provision of community services. Hence, 
in communities, especially those with natural resources, there is the need for 
community governance for the provision of services and the creation of policy. There 
should be a shift from national control of communities to involving non-state actors 
(community) in decision-making and implementation (Hutter, 2006). This will mean a 
shift from government, as a determinant of policymaking and implementation and 
service providers, to governance resulting in sustainable community development.  
 
Community Barriers 
The discourse above has identified the structural or institutional limitations pertaining 
to sustainable community development in resource-based communities. Here, I am 
going to identify the community barriers based on the social and political 
relationships among the actors. In addition to policy exclusion of the communities, 
other respondents say the problem is not only about policymaking by the central 
government in Freetown. This was in response to a question I posed on what else they 
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think limits their communities from developing. They claimed that some community 
actors assigned with certain responsibilities adopt a rent-seeking agenda and so fail to 
act in the interests of the community. They offer loyalty to the whims and caprices of 
the ruling political party or government: “Despite what God has given to us, there is 
an absence of professionalism; people are chosen to represent the communities in the 
council on a partisan basis and not on our local interests; if the SLPP is in power, the 
councillors should be from the party. If the APC is in power, they need APC 
councillors. This is our democracy” (Sfg1, Sewafe). 
 
The response shows that officials serving local institutions serve a national interest 
and their position shifts as the political interregnum changes. This gravely affects the 
chances that the communities have to work towards the collective benefit of the 
community. There is also evidence of inadequate information flow in these 
communities. They are ignorant and not informed of what goes around them. A 
community member in the village between Sewafe and Bumpeh in the Nimikoro 
chiefdom was not even aware of who mines, what comes to the community, and 
which rights he has to the resources in his community. This was often the case 
following the question I asked the respondents about their perception of the mining 
activities in this chiefdom: “I have no interest to know because no one cares for me” 
(Srm8, Sewafe). This evidence identifies a degree of discontent and loss of hope and 
trust among some community members. This level of discontent comes as a result of a 
lack of services available to the communities. As such, many community members 
have accepted their marginalisation and some, according to evidence in chapter 6 and 
7, carry out unsustainable activities. 
 
In addition to the above discourses, there is evidence that certain people are excluded 
on the basis of their origin. This brings attention to the ‘silent’ discontent of some 
community members and demonstrates the evidence of what I called the 
heterogeneous community who are seen as ‘strangers’ (aliens). One of the 
respondents states that this group makes several contributions to the community, even 
though they are marginalised. He puts it this way: “Most of the businesses are owned 
by people who are not Kono people. But we always see ourselves as strangers. 
However, we like the people because we do business” (Srb6, Sewafe). Some of the 
indigenes acknowledged their role but emphasised that their native rights should be 
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acknowledged too. As he put it: “Everyone is free to do business. But there is always 
the owner of a place… you cannot go to a place without recognising the native of that 
place. That is the only difference” (Kfg1, Koidu). 
 
This demonstrates one of the barriers, implying an exclusion of people who are seen 
as aliens in these communities. However, some liberals believe that even though 
others are seen as ‘strangers’ (aliens), they are often powerful enough to influence 
situations in the communities. It is obvious that the power to access these assets rests 
on the first group of people by virtue of birth, but the power could shift to the 
‘influential’ group that can affect decisions indirectly. Intuitively, that is why the 
indigenes feel threatened and require acknowledgement of their native rights. Some 
respondents in Sewafe ascertained this and one salient quote was: “Those who own 
money control affairs indirectly. People depend on them for financial help. Most of 
the dealers are foreigners (non-Kono). Also, most of the things taking place are 
influenced by politics. If you are a ‘strong’ supporter of a powerful politician, you can 
control things (policies)” (Srm3, Sewafe). 
 
The findings suggest that some community members have access to resources not 
because of entitlement but because of unfair individual capacity. There is also 
evidence of competitiveness rather than cooperativeness in the communities. That is 
why the ‘influential’ or elite has been able to have dominion over the right to 
determine the affairs of the community when it comes to mining activities. Some of 
the respondents blame the non-natives for being behind the destructive mining 
activities in their communities. This is one of the quotes: “They blame us for 
destroying their land. But look at the composition of this group… you can see Kono 
people. Most of the people we do work for are Kono people. Know this, the Chiefs 
mine, teachers mine, traders mine, even the politicians here and from Freetown mine. 
Everybody is interested” (Yrm5, Yengema). Next in the explanation of community 
barriers are the issues of community capacity or social capacity. The absence of these 
social capitals signifies a significant threat.  
 
Empowerment 
Here, the same group of respondents were interviewed in the same case studies on 
community about operating as an agent of change. The institutionalisation taking 
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place under the Local Council Act of 2004 is not a sufficient step towards a 
sustainable community development. It will only bring about an increase in what I 
have referred to as community work or activities, but is not necessary an effective 
approach to sustainable community development, if it fails to exercise social capital. 
According to Ife and Tesoriero (2006), empowerment joins with social justice and 
human rights by increasing the power of the disadvantaged. Here, I am using both the 
responses from interviews and documentary records to discuss this section. During 
my discussion with the respondents in the field, I was interested to know how they 
responded to how the local council establishment has impacted on their community. 
Basically, I wanted to know if the communities are agents of change. In all of the case 
studies, there is a consensus of evidence that the communities have not been operating 
like that. Many reported that very few people gained from the diamond wealth. Hence 
there is distrust and discontent, according to this quote: “They are all liars trying just 
for their own ‘pot to boil’ (trying for their own welfare). Those who have the ‘upper 
hand’ send their families to good schools, and abroad whilst we suffer. You see, we 
all need to benefit from these diamonds but that is not happening. So what would you 
expect if we do not have the fair share of the cake (diamond revenue)? The DACDF is 
used for the chiefs’ glory. They build ‘barrays’ (royal huts)” (Yrm4, Yengema). 
“Look at Kono, eh... Mining has been going on before I was born. But look at the 
condition of the district. Go to Ghaya and you would see how the buildings (former 
NDMC quarters) are falling. Look at the roads in Sewafe! No electricity. Poor 
medical care…. Kono should not be like this” (Yrm2, Yengema). 
 
I asked the local councillors in Yengema why some people are dissatisfied. He 
responded to me as a concerned citizen. This was what he said: “The greatest problem 
we have is that things retrogress in our communities; more destruction of roads and 
bridges, the rich become richer, those connected with the system benefit the most, and 
those unconnected work it their own way” (Yrc7, Yengema). He further reiterated that 
the problem is systematic and people toe the line and tolerate the inefficiencies: 
“People work according to the system” (Yrc7, Yengema). 
 
It was evident that the communities’ activities as agents of change are based around 
rent-seeking perceptions on one hand and the will to change them, if people wish to, 
on the other hand. The communities have not been an agent of change because of 
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historic factors too. Instead of power being transferred to the community to 
cooperatively make and implement policies, and to jointly provide goods and services 
to the communities, few people were empowered for political reasons.  
 
According to secondary data, Siaka P. Stevens, in an attempt to lure votes, gave 
power to the deprived or disadvantaged, as Ife and Tesoriero named them, by asking 
the youths to mine freely (Davis, 2002). This was a political strategy that was 
unproductive and unsustainable. It was the beginning of ‘legalised’ illicit mining and 
that form of power does not conform to social justice and sustainable community 
development. It only appeased the jobless who were deprived and allowed them to do 
‘free for all’ mining, for the benefit of the politicians, to the detriment of the resource-
based communities. Hence, the communities became driven with parallel 
communities, as discussed in chapter 7, and demonstrated evidence of unsustainable 
practices.  
 
Evidence of this parallel situation emerged during the 2007 riot in Koidu town where 
photo news and a report in the NMJD Mining Watch Newspaper showed a group of 
staff throwing stones on their own people. The writer put it this way: “Koidu 
Holdings’ local staff at war with their own brothers” (NMJD, 2009).  
 
The conflict even took another extreme step when, in the Marikana riot in South 
Africa on August 16th 2012, one saw the state security defending Koidu Holding 
Limited (KHL) against what was seen as a ‘just protest’, killing two protesters. One of 
the respondents who were among the protesters gave this quotation when asked why 
they protested: “We asked the authorities to stop Koidu Holdings from blasting until 
they find a proper way of doing it. No one listened to us” (Krm4, Koidu). Another 
quote reads: “We the youths think differently from our people. They sold this land for 
nothing. We act and they say it is violence. But no one responds when we complain” 
(Krm4, Koidu). The youths feel marginalised by their people when they speak out. 
Apparently, they think there is no solution to their concerns because no one is ready to 
acknowledge their plight and engage with them.  
 
The research also shows that there is not only a conflict of interests and social unrest 
but there is evidence of social-gender exclusion. There is evidence of voluntary and 
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involuntary exclusion. The ‘cry for help’, which most bitter and deprived community 
members expressed in these communities was exclusively done by the men. Though 
the traditional setting has always been attributed to such exclusion, evidence shows 
that there is an attitude of self-exclusion. Women have accepted it or limited 
themselves to certain community roles, which is enforced by their high rate of 
illiteracy and dependence on men, as illuminated by this quote: “We the women have 
so much daily chores to carry out… going to the market, cooking, farming, taking 
care of the children etc.” (Sr8, Sewafe)  
 
Most of the women are of the view that matters pertaining to policies and politics are 
for men and that women are just responsible for household chores. 
 
Participation 
The primary and secondary evidence in the case studies shows that there is a wide 
range of impacts of individual and community participation. Participation is an 
important aspect of the communities’ drive towards governance and sustainable 
community development. In this section, drawing on the evidence of ten respondents, 
the study shows that there is evidence of an ignorance of participation, an inability to 
participate and an avoidance of participation. Partly, these limitations to participate 
are not due to high the illiteracy rate or an unwillingness to do so. Rather, it is 
constrained by survival needs and the inadequacy in meeting the length and breadth of 
these needs. This is what one of the quotes states regarding individual participation:  
“I have to take care of my family. I leave home in the morning to mine and come back 
late and tired. No one takes care of them. Not the government. No one” (Yrm4, 
Yengema). 
 
The quotation shows that with little or nothing to be hopeful for in the communities 
they belong to, people ignore their responsibility towards their community. They 
prioritise their individual needs rather than the community needs. The ‘concerned 
citizen’ councillor in Yengema puts it this way: “People are heavily loaded with 
problems. Efforts to meet individual and family commitments are enormous. The 
community cannot rely on the chief or government to resolve their issues. All they 
can do is to do it their own way” (Yrc7, Yengema).  
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From the evidence, there is verification of the existence of structural barriers in 
decision-making and implementation. Communities have not been involved in any 
form of mining policy development nor in its implementation. The communities have 
been dependent on the state and other unrepresented actors acting on the behalf of 
them. In addition, even when they are represented, evidence shows that there is no 
flow of communication between the state institution (Ministry of Mineral resources), 
the self-proclaimed advocacy of ‘Just mining’ and the community. The institutional 
establishment through the LGA of 2004 has not been meaningful and effective. 
Despite its establishment, the theoretical transfer of power from the state to the 
communities has not been put into practice.    
 
We need to understand also that participation is not the same as involvement. This is 
what the authorities over the years have failed to understand. Escobar, (1996) has 
illustrated this by explaining how political ecologists take into consideration the 
different stakeholders and how their influence or discourses affect the participation of 
other stakeholders and their interests. Hence, we need to talk of meaningful 
participation among stakeholders that enshrines legal accountability for the benefit of 
the community. What is obvious from the findings is that communities are 
misrepresented by representatives who are not answerable to them. Hence, working 
towards community goals prove futile. The NGOs, which claim to be advocating for 
‘Just mining’ are not answerable to the people. So, who are they representing or 
advocating for? Two of the quotes answer that: “We see the same set of people every 
time claiming to advocate for us. That is not true. They are representing their interest. 
Even the NGOs are even more corrupt than the politicians (government)” (Krm1, 
Koidu). 
 
“We get surprised when we hear that ‘we’ the people have agreed to this or that. That 
is not so. The meetings we hear of are mostly in Freetown… Bintumani. The meetings 
seldomly held here are for the ‘top brass’ (elites), who benefit from the meetings” 
(Krm4, Koidu). 
 
From documentary sources, the websites of NGOs such as NMJD (the Network 
Movement for Justice and Development) claim to be advocating for ‘just mining’ by 
adopting multi-stakeholder discussions. In the actual sense, the multi-stakeholder 
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discussion is attended by elites who are not representatives of the communities. The 
participants are limited by action, inaction and discursive attitudes. As Popple and 
Redmond (2000) commented on communities being perceived as an instrument, the 
approach works in contrast to the core values of community development, which 
intends to act as a liberating framework for the most needy or deprived in the 
community. Whilst government is known legally as the executive head of the state, 
there should not be a top-down process of governance in communities. The 
communities need to be acknowledged, consulted, represented and should be able to 
hold accountable those who represent them or government or non-government 
institutions, which work contrary to their community goals. Etzioni (1998, p. 42) 
states: “The preservation of individual liberty depends on the active maintenance of 
the institutions of civil society.” In essence, viewing the community as an agent of 
social change should be devoid of top-bottom political control but rather engaged in 
bottom-up community participation. With these identified suppositions, there is 
evidence of what I call parallel communities. The actors, especially the youths, have 
distanced themselves from those they blame for their predicament. Hence, this has 
brought in a culture of shifting blame from one set of actors to another, including the 
non-indigenes. 
 
7.3 Sustainable Community Development 
Here, I am looking at the barriers based on the pillars of sustainable development or 
what others call assets. The section will deliberate on how local communities are 
affected by improving their own living standards, education, social welfare, and 
agricultural improvement. According to Frank and Smith (1999), community 
development is defined as the planned fruition of the economic, social, cultural, and 
environmental factors of community well-being. This process is not limited to only 
present welfare needs. Rather, the essence of achieving community development 
should consider the needs and aspirations of future generations.  
 
Twelve respondents were interviewed and the findings show that the limitations of 
sustainable community development are owing to the scramble for survival and the 
political competitiveness, which overshadow cooperativeness. The evidence also 
proves that the limitation was partly caused by individual unawareness.  
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Limitations to Sustainability 
Retrospecting on the discussions in section 7.2, this section explains that the 
limitations affecting sustainable community development operate in a form of a game 
theory whereby some sectors grow at the expense of others in what I have described 
as a ‘zero-sum game’. It shows that the activities in one economic sector like mineral 
extraction are offset by a loss in other sectors (resource pull effect) (Humphreys et al., 
2007), and consequently the payoff sums fall to zero. Ebrahim-Zadeh (2003) argues 
that countries with resources that experience similar decline in other sectors arising 
from one sector (natural assets) are said to have caught the “Dutch disease”. The cycle 
of such practices in the mining communities has affected the mining areas, which 
were one time rich in fauna and flora and had a high agricultural productivity in 
cocoa, coffee and rice. According to one of the quotes in chapter 6, the respondent 
states: “These communities had viable subsistence agricultural communities with 
enviable flora and fauna but these have dissipated over time due to, primarily, mining 
activities; this is all for money… We need money… Money speaks for itself”, they 
concluded (Kfg2, Koidu). 
 
Most of the community actors valued the diamond resources more than the other 
natural assets because quick money is needed for their daily activities, which they 
presume can be achieved through mining. As one respondent put it: “Cocoa is 
seasonal. How long can we wait to harvest and sell it when we have family members 
to feed (take care of)? I have 6 children and four other children from family members. 
You can imagine what that means” (Kfg1, Koidu). Another focus group in Sewafe 
contributed that: “There is quicker certainty in diamond mining than in agriculture” 
(Sfg2, Sewafe).  
 
Inevitably, the prospect of working towards progressive and sustainable community 
development has become an illusion during the years of mining activities. So what 
these communities have seen over and over again is the shift of labour from other 
sectors to the mining sector (the resource pull effect). In the process, other assets are 
destroyed. I realised that the problem was not only about labour shift and destruction 
of assets. Instead, it could be as a result of the lack of knowledge among community 
members about the short-term and long-term impacts of their actions. Ebrahim-Zadeh 
(2003) attributed al the “Dutch disease” to unfavourable balance of trade in the 
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resource country through what he called the “spending effect”. In this case, there is 
more competitive influence for imported goods than domestic goods because of 
abundant wealth or income. According to the evidence in this thesis, the argument of 
the resource pull effect holds true. However, the case of the “Dutch disease” in 
resource communities in particular and the national economy in general is illusive.  
 
The communities are economically deprived and struggling to meet their basic 
existence needs. The findings show that the natural resources and other assets are 
destroyed in the excavation of diamond resources (another natural asset). In this piece 
of work, I have named such an action as a ‘paradox of the mine’ or a ‘paradox of 
resources’. The paradox occurs because the various actors’ individual goals 
overshadow community goals. The actors have no faith in the community they live in 
and realise that they have nothing to gain from the resources. This is exemplified by 
dissatisfaction and discontent. As such, there is an emergence of parallel community 
actors who involved themselves in all sorts of unsustainable mining activities and 
have little or no regard for sustainability practice. According to Baker, “the objectives 
of sustainability require the protection of the natural resource base upon which future 
development depend” (Baker, 2006, p. 5). Baker’s proposition conforms to the 
Brundtland commission’s report on sustainable development, which states that it is 
development that ‘meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
the future generations to meet their own needs’ (WCED 1987). Hence, I was 
interested in finding out how much understanding the respondents have about 
sustainability practices. 
 
Sustainability Awareness 
In this section, I present the findings from both qualitative and quantitative data to 
address the communities’ awareness of sustainability practices. Analysing the 
characteristics of the actors in chapter 5 and the sustainability approaches in chapter 6, 
it is evident that these communities lack sufficient sustainability knowledge and 
approaches. As a result, this leads to competitiveness for psychological or existence 
needs instead of cooperation, which in turn leads to ignorance, negligence, and policy 
inadequacy.  
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In summary, ten of the respondents show evidence of paying more interest to their 
own psychological needs, a further eight reported not having any idea of a 
sustainability consciousness or values (see table 7.1), eight showed evidence of 
negligence (see table 7.1), and seven said the problem lies in policy inadequacy.  
 
Table 7.1: Sustainability Limitations 
Factors Definition Respondents 
Koidu 
Respondents 
Yengema 
Respondents 
Sewafe 
Psychological 
needs 
Participants 
reported that 
they are 
more 
concerned 
with their 
basic needs 
Kr1, Kr4, Kr 5, 
Kr6 
Yr2, Yr5, Yr6 Sr1, Sr2, SR3 
Sustainability 
consciousness 
(awareness) 
Participants 
reported that 
they do not 
acknowledge 
the long-
term impacts 
of their 
actions 
Kr1, Kr4, Kr 5, 
Kr6 
Yr2, Yr5, Yr6 Sr1, Sr2, SR3 
Negligence Participants 
reported that 
all they need 
is money to 
have a better 
life 
Kr1, Kr4, Kr 5, 
Kr7 
Yr2, Yr4, Yr6 Sr1, Sr3, SR4 
Policy 
inadequacy 
Participants 
reported that 
the policies 
do not 
address all 
the main 
issues. 
Kr1, Kr3, Kr4, 
Kr6 
Yr1, Yr4, Yr6 Sr1, Sr2, SR3 
Author’s construct  
 
In the table above (7.1), the replies of the respondents regarding sustainability 
practices are outlined. The first column represents the factors responsible for the 
limitations on sustainability. These factors affect the tenets of community 
development, and their spill-over effect on subsequent communities limits sustainable 
community development. The second column explains the factors. The last three 
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columns list the respondents who entered into to the discussion. In addition, I will 
highlight the sustainability practice limitations and the legal policy deprivation in the 
communities’ management role over the diamond resources, which is a ‘legitimate but 
unfair’ limitation on community development.  
 
Here, the respondents interviewed in the four case studies (Koidu belongs to two 
chiefdoms) reported similar concerns. There was a general consensus around the 
issues discussed that are affecting community development. This should not surprise 
the reader since these communities have similar characteristics in location, 
composition of people, and mining activities, as I discussed in chapter 5. 
 
Evidence reveals that the participants prioritise their basic needs above anything else. 
With nothing to gain from the wealth of the community, a number of participants 
think things might not change for the common good. As these quotes put it: “We met 
poverty and we still live in poverty. Who can help us? Those we believe (trust) 
deceive us always, always!” (Krm2, Koidu) 
 
“I have to take care of my family. I leave home in the morning to mine and come back 
late and tired. No one takes care of them. Not the government. No one” (Yrm4, 
Yengema). 
 
The prospect of community development is limited under such circumstance. Even 
though the homogeneous community have a common social identity, they have no 
common economic identity. This makes the various actors to work towards self-
seeking agendas through political allegiance and resource exploitation. Cohen and 
colleagues’ argument on locality development portrays community identity as a sense 
of belongingness Social planning focuses on how problems affecting the community 
are resolved, and social action is comprised of both aspects of locality development 
and social planning, as well as community engagement and community participation 
(Cohen et al., 2008). The evidence has shown that the homogeneity element in 
cultural approaches or by location cannot be used to depict common community 
goals. Achieving community development works with collective purpose of using the 
available resources to attain sustainable development. 
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The community should be seen as ‘a group of people with diverse characteristics who 
are linked by social ties, share common perspectives, and engage in joint action in 
geographical locations or settings’ (MacQueen et al., 2001, p. 1929). On the contrary, 
the evidence shows that the communities cannot pursue collective community 
development goals because the local authorities appear to be powerless and are 
disconnected from the deprived members of their own communities. Under such 
circumstances, Peterson (2000) argues that there will always be conflicts of interest 
and social unrest. According to the evidence, individualism or competitiveness 
overshadows cooperation among the actors. Seyfang and Smith (2007) explain that 
the community is an opportunity for new practices and norms, which are generally 
accepted by the community regarding sustainability practice. Some theorists such as 
Dobie (2002) suggest that poverty is the cause of exploitation of natural resources and 
long-term social and ecological complexities.  
 
However, the findings demonstrate contrasting views. Firstly, even though poverty is 
prevalent, there is a slight shift from poverty to the notion of anticipating ‘more 
wealth’. There are some actors who are not relatively poor but still involve themselves 
in mining activities. Secondly, there is the factor of incapacity in transferring the 
diamond wealth into community wealth. Despite the DACDF, the community cannot 
provide community services. They have experienced years of expanding mining 
activities with a high level of ecological damage and underdevelopment. The actors 
often have different motives and interests, which overlap politically, socially, 
economically and ecologically. These overlapping roles inhibit the societal cohesion 
that is needed to develop a sustainable community. As such, the communities have 
failed to attain improved productivity, economic growth (Haynes, (2005), social and 
economic equality (Calvert, 1989), improved institutions, and attitudes and 
development policy (Haynes, 2005). 
 
The decision to focus on daily needs is not limited to men alone. Women are also 
affected when participating in the discussion on community goals: “We the women 
have so much daily chores to carry out… going to the market, cooking, farming, 
taking care of the children etc.” (Srw8, Sewafe) 
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The respondents also demonstrated evidence of an ignorance regarding sustainability 
practices and the process of community development. I have used the word ignorance 
with regard to the state of sustainability in relation to consciousness or awareness. 
This is a perpetual problem deduced from the replies of the respondents. In spite of 
the community assets destroyed, the actors or respondents are ignorant of the 
ecological implications caused by their activities. Ignorance stems from the 
desperation to survive amid unequal and uneven distribution of the diamond resources 
and the spill-over effect on community assets. The people’s immediate concern is to 
meet psychological or basic needs instead of caring for the long-term effects on 
present and future communities. It indicates another level of rent-seeking among the 
non-elites. This further justifies my discourse on parallel communities discussed in 
chapter 6. Indeed, achieving sustainable community goals is marred by uncertainties 
at the local level and among the actors: “Everybody is interested in the things that 
matter most to them… we need to think of today’s concerns before thinking of what 
to come” (Yrm8, Yengema).  
 
Very close to and associated with ignorance is the attitude of negligence among the 
players. There is a culture of ‘I care not’ in Sierra Leone. It is not peculiar only to the 
mining communities. In fact, because it is prevalent in every part of the country, it has 
become an endemic characteristic in the minds of people. The attitude affects people’s 
intra-personal and inter-personal understanding of matters because no one wants to 
take responsibility. Instead, they adopt the idea of apportioning blame. As the 
participant put it: “There is a culture of negligence or ‘I care not’ in people’s way of 
doing things; people have a saying that it is not your business when they are 
reprimanded by others” (Yrm8, Yengema). 
 
As such, when grievances increase, there exists a clash among the various actors. The 
community often engulf into social disorder and becomes violent. But the negligence 
and silence is often surmounted when they consider it is time for a change. Indeed, the 
culture of negligence is not deliberate but is subversively preceded by economic 
deprivation, political patronage and social exclusion. As such, individuals become 
more interested in their daily survival as opposed to engaging in sustainability 
practices or community goals that could leave them undecided between sustainability 
and governance. In that case, some respondents claimed the cause of arrested 
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community development is due to the inadequacy of mining policies, which are seen 
by some as simply piece-meal documents: This quote states: “Sustainability practice 
is about policy or theoretical and not about daily practice. The policies have brought 
limited change to the purpose it is meant to address” (Krm12, Koidu). Evidence of 
boomerang mining policy reforms over the years are sufficient to justify the quote 
above (Krm12). Mining policies have been changed several times as several political 
regimes have changed over time. Limited progress has been made through changes in 
rent-tax and royalties, but the communities’ control over their affairs is at a 
crossroads.  
 
The above discourses show that there is an implied legal limitation in the form of 
policy or government mining regulation. The mining policy clearly bestows power 
and control over resources to the Ministry of Mineral Resources. The government’s 
legal policy of owning and controlling resources below 6ft is what I call ‘legitimate 
limitation’. The communities are not part of the mining policy when it is enacted nor 
are they part of their implementation. That is why Hopkins (2008) and McCarthy 
(2005) made discourses on the need to bypass the state and/or market processes, with 
the conviction that the community is more efficient on managing resources than the 
state. Wenger (2008) states that a community is about people sharing their passion for 
something they do and can learn activities better by interacting often. This is why 
communities need to be empowered freely and participate impartially. In addition, the 
document has an insignificant inclusion of community development and fails to 
outline the role of the communities. Further evidence shows the absence of Local 
Agenda 21 at national and local level. In summary, there are no local sustainability 
visions at community level to address ecological protection, community capacity, 
social equity, and policymaking and implementation.  
 
In addition to the attitude of negligence is what I have identified from respondents in 
Sewafe, Yengema and Koidu as a subservient culture. I have not differentiated it from 
the negligence. Even though we have seen few people revolting against Koidu 
Holding Limited, there is a common culture of silence arising from the way power has 
been used by the political elites. There is a group of people who, by virtue of the 
culture of dwelling on the past, are fearful and have a lack of interest in participating 
and contributing to community development issues. This has affected how other 
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stakeholders can participate in affairs affecting them. It demonstrates how some 
stakeholders influence or how discourses affect the participation of other stakeholders 
(Escobar, 1996). One of the respondents, a ‘petty’ trader in Sewafe, was asked about 
her community role and she responded that: “I am aware of being a native of Kono 
and that insecurity has put me far away from participating in something that will risk 
my life” (Srw8, Sewafe). As such, like others, her reluctance to engage is not based 
solely on illiteracy or negligence but is a response to the old practices of intimidation.  
 
7.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I discussed several issues that limit sustainable community 
development. I categorised them into two parts. One aspect is community governance 
and the other is sustainability practice, which moves towards sustainable community 
development. Under community governance, I identified two areas of concern from 
secondary sources and evidence given by respondents: one is the structural barriers 
and the other is the community barriers. Contrary to the co-governance and co-
production argument in this thesis, the communities appear to be passive recipients of 
state policies. Despite the LGA Act of 2004, the communities cannot decide on 
mining policies nor have they got fair representation. Absolute powers on mineral 
resources lie at ministerial level with the minister having a final decision to make on 
what they refer to as community development. Under the community barriers, 
evidence shows a rent-seeking attitude within community elites. They owe allegiance 
to national politics. However, the rent-seeking attitude is also identified within the 
non-elites. This buttresses the discourse in chapter 7 on parallel communities with a 
formal and informal nature, and subservient activities that are capable of causing 
ecological damages.  
 
This contradicts Wenger (2008), who states that a community is about people sharing 
their passion for something they do and can learn activities better by interacting often. 
Positively, that is what is expected of people co-existing together in a place and 
having common concerns. Negatively, with the apparent emergence of illicit and 
breakaway homogeneous groups, their sense of belongingness is just defined as an act 
of community birth right, whilst their actions are centred on commonality. As such, 
their attitude and actions make the communities unsustainable and undeveloped. In 
summary, the actors shift from one sector to the mining sector. Alongside this, they 
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destroy the community assets, as evidence shows that people find it difficult to 
cooperate within community development for a number of reasons. 
 
 
 
 221 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 222 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
Findings, implications and recommendations 
 
8.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will give a comprehensive statement of the lessons and implications 
of the findings and contributions to the body of knowledge on resource use and 
achieving sustainable community development, and will also make general 
contributions to the subject area. The empirical contributions of this thesis can be 
found in chapters 5, 6 and 7. Within these chapters, I have contributed to the 
contextual description of political ecology and sustainable community development 
by linking it to the body of literature in chapter 2. In chapter 1, I dealt with three sets 
of theoretical concepts: community governance, community development, and 
sustainable development. I have identified theories that are relevant and provided 
additions to the body of literature. The development process is influenced greatly by 
human actions through activities and governance structures, which give an outcome 
that is desirable or undesirable. As such, the body of knowledge changes and the 
paradigm shifts over a period of time. Hence, there is always a need for academic 
research to fill the gaps where and when necessary.  
 
In the thesis, I made two major contributions. The first contribution is topic-based, 
which relates to the empirical and theoretical contributions on political ecology, 
community governance, and sustainable community development. The second 
contribution concerns the general theories that link communities and sustainable 
development. In this contribution, I will discuss the need for an extension of further 
research on sustainable community development. The contributions of this thesis are 
outlined below and reference is made to where the particular contribution is found in 
the thesis. For clarity, I will state them in sub-sections. I will first discuss the general 
contributions on political ecology including community governance, and subsequently 
narrate the contributions to sustainable community development. 
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8.2 Political Ecology 
The first contribution in this thesis is to the political ecology literature. The concept 
commenced as a framework involving the intricacies between local people, national 
economies, global political economies, and the ecosystem (Blaikie and Brookfield, 
1987; Schmink and Wood, 1987). My first contribution to political ecology is centred 
on the role of the actors. The thesis offers evidence on the role of the actors and 
resource exploitation. Contributions by Zimmerer and Bassett (2003b), Neumann 
(2009), and Paulson et al. (2003) have shown the relevance of the revolving issues on 
political ecology, its relationship with other disciplines and the connection between 
humans and their environment. However, they fall short of identifying the unequal 
human relationships with the environment at community levels. It is obvious from the 
study that some humans exert more influence than others. In the general political 
ecology literature the unequal power relation has been focussed on the relationship 
between the capitalist North and the resource rich but underdeveloped South. Some 
proponents even argued that, as the world becomes more globalised, political ecology 
in the developing world should link local production process and decision-making 
with a global political economy (Walker, 2005; Bassett, 1988). 
 
In contrast, this study shows that the study of political ecology should be considered 
at the level between the state and the resource-based communities, and among the 
various actors within the community. In addition, the social relations affecting the 
power roles among the actors are very significant and cannot be ignored. Unlike 
Walker’s idea (2005) of linking local production process and decision-making with 
the global political economy, this thesis focuses on cooperation between the state and 
the communities in relation to local production, decision-making and implementation. 
It is often incorrect to link local production and decision-making to global economy 
when the internal governance structure is as equally detrimental as the global 
upheaval. When the cause of the problem is focused on the global, we may deviate 
from the pertinent issues affecting the communities emanating from inadequate and 
ineffective national policies or governance mechanisms. For instance, when Blaikie’s 
(1985) and Bunker’s (1985) contributions on developing countries attempted to link 
local social oppression and environmental degradation to wider political and 
economic concerns, they failed to acknowledge the role of the various actors.  
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Furthermore, the idea of whether political ecology is politics without ecology or vice 
versa is contentious. Vayda and Walters (1999), state that political ecology has 
become politics without ecology. According to them, the political aspect of political 
ecology is concerned with the issue of power whilst ignoring the influence of power 
on ecology itself. On the other hand, Walker (2007) and Paulson et al. (2003) have 
focused on the political and ignored the whole ecological aspect. However, this thesis 
reveals that by virtue of the role of the actors and the need for sustainable 
development that politics and ecology are mutually inclusive. This is because, from 
evidence of the destruction of assets by actors, a community without sustainability 
practices could potentially collapse. One visible contribution that can be added to 
political ecology literature concerns the use of power. Evidence shows that the use of 
power on natural resources and sustainable development is not limited to legitimacy 
or illegitimacy. From primary and secondary data, it has become apparent that 
legitimate power can be used for either coercive or rewarding purposes, which is 
evident in the patrimonialism and clientelism relations that have been going on in 
Sierra Leone since the colonial era. Therefore, the power role of various actors is 
subject to their willingness to act sustainably or unsustainably. This makes it difficult 
to employ a comprehensive sustainable approach on resource use. In addition, the 
self-interest of various actors at national and global levels has impeded the chances of 
a sustainable solution on the political ecology of resource use. Evidence from 
secondary sources in the research shows that some actors act positively only when the 
resources are a threat to them. On this basis, I could argue that a global commitment 
to sustainable use of mineral resources might only arise when those resources become 
threatened on a global scale. 
 
Some commentators attribute the problem to a lack of institutions. In chapter 5, I 
found that the failures of institutionalisation and the reviewed mining policies are not 
sufficient reasons for underdevelopment in the communities. Moore (1993) argues 
that the availability of national and local policies on resources, the access to them and 
the roles and conflicts between different stakeholders were initially neglected. 
However, this thesis reveals that national policies are available but are inadequate and 
ineffective. Major focus has been given to the macro aspect of the mining whilst 
neglecting the micro aspect that operates at the community level. The government of 
Sierra Leone’s mining policies focus on major companies whilst the small companies 
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and ‘invisible’ miners cause quite substantial damage to the environment and 
communities. Hence, the interest of a political ecologist should not be focussed on 
resource conflict resolution. Rather, it should focus on acknowledging the scope and 
limitations of each actor’s ability to avoid conflict. But the use of the relationship 
between conflict and resources has a distinction. Unlike Collier, Hoeffler, and Kabia, 
who link diamonds to armed conflict, greed and grievance, I argue that socio-
economic conflicts arising from community and national greed have ensued at 
community scale and have not caused armed conflict. The conflicts have often 
occurred in two forms: on one hand this is seen among the community actors; but on 
the other hand, it ensues between the community and the corporations. In essence, I 
have distanced this community conflict from the national scale conflict because these 
community conflicts have not been managed effectively and, in the case of Sierra 
Leone, they became a source of attraction by warlords to recruit actors of various 
capacities who destroyed almost all forms of capital or assets in order to get 
diamonds. In this juncture, I see the greed factor and the reaction through grievances 
as evidence of bad governance that is demonstrated through unequal distribution of 
wealth. 
 
Some academics limit their focus on poverty and unemployment to the youths in the 
mining sector. For instance, Nightingale (2002) developed the ‘Pressure and Release’ 
model that explains social vulnerability by highlighting the different levels of 
structural causes of vulnerability such as endemic poverty and lack of institutions that 
make certain places and people susceptible to physical events (Wisner et al., 2004). 
However, I disagree that lack of institutions is a significant factor. The government of 
Sierra Leone has established institutions to govern people and resources but they have 
been ineffective and misrepresentative. This thesis agrees with Nightingale that 
pressure on resources could partly emanate from poverty. Instead, it is the ‘ill-
governance factor’ over resource-wealth distribution that has pushed people into 
poverty. In chapters 6 and 7, it is stated that the reason that some of these actors 
involve themselves in the diamond trade is not only because of poverty. The findings 
show a slight shift from poverty to the notion of anticipating ‘more wealth’. Not all 
mining actors are relatively poor. There are two sets of actors I will identify here to 
elucidate this argument. The first group are the miners or exploited labourers. They 
are in the mines to get wealth. The second group are the financial supporters 
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(businessmen, farmers and other elites). They are relatively better off but are involved 
in mining because of the anticipation of extra wealth.  
 
There is evidence that deprivation and exclusion from the gains of the resources and 
the neglect of the youths has provoked the emergence of what I call ‘parallel and 
invisible’ groups or communities within the resource-based communities (see chapter 
6). I found also from the focus groups and individual participants that even though the 
majority of the youths are illiterate, that is not a sufficient reason for their 
involvement in mining. The majority of the miners are motivated by the quest for self-
improvement and are driven to get rich due to the uneven distribution of resources. 
Therefore, years of uneven distribution have provoked discontent and conflict.  
 
In summary, they involve themselves in mining by exploiting vulnerable miners in 
order to get richer. In chapter 6, there is evidence that farmers have no more faith in 
farming. It is not a matter of the duration it takes for the cash crops to grow before the 
farmer realises the dividend, but rather it is about short-term profitable gains linked to 
psychological needs. In addition, evidence in chapters 5 and 6 show that the 
behaviour or attitude of different actors in the community towards available assets 
limits sustainable community development. This attribute is connected to the 
prevailing social exclusion, economic deprivation and political control in the form of 
legal limitations. 
 
When it comes to conflict, commentators either attribute national or global conflict to 
the abundance of resources. Little attention is paid to the rivalry among community 
actors. According to Ross (2001b) and Le Billon (2001), the availability of resources 
shortens or prolongs resource violence. They also explained that the dependency on 
natural resources may exacerbate civil conflicts, which could exacerbate resource 
dependence (Ross, 2001b). I made a number of contributions here. Firstly, resource 
abundance could lead to conflict because of inappropriate governance; this in turn 
increases the over reliance of various actors on the natural resources (‘paradox of 
abundance’). Secondly, resource dependence is a problem during a conflict and not 
before it. Thirdly, resource dependence is a consequence of war and not a driver of 
the conflict. Fourthly, resources are not the problem but rather it is the people who 
manage them. 
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Ross and Collier labelled Sierra Leone a ‘resource-cursed nation’ that has experienced 
brutal war owing to ‘Blood diamonds’ exploited by actors I call ‘Blood Diamond 
Merchants’ who had leverage over the diamond resources through geo-political 
situations and security vulnerability. However, from the evidence of this thesis, the 
resources are not the only curse in these resource-rich countries. There is what I call 
the ‘state-corporate curse’, which shows that the failure of the state to exhibit its 
responsibility and deliver, and its complacency towards the corporations and 
companies who have ignored their corporate responsibility, has provoked discontent, 
ignited social conflicts and limited the chances of sustainable community 
development. As such, in the thesis I found out that the resource-cursed theory is 
argued about at macro level or at national and international level by establishing that 
the Kimberlite Process Certification Scheme KPCS and the establishment of 
institutions is presumed to be governance.    
 
However, resource-exploitation has been ignored at various levels with much 
emphasis laid on the increase in diamond exports. As such, in leaving aside the 
framework of the literature developed in chapter 2, it is justifiable to say that in the 
midst of power relations and ecology, resource exploitation operates at micro level 
and exacerbates the resource curse at national and global levels with threats towards 
sustainability on the following grounds:  
 
a) Resource exploitation is methodological or structural 
b) Resource exploitation occurs when powerful actors exercise influence over the 
weak in order to control resources at a given time and location  
c) Resource exploitation can occur between individuals (e.g. supporters and miners) 
d) Resource exploitation could operate when the state’s interest is against national 
economic growth and development by giving too much in concessions to multi-
national corporations and other influential actors. 
e) Resource exploitation can occur through the forced labour of the vulnerable by 
armed groups and their agents  
f) When the state agents collaborate with locals and foreign actors to manipulate the 
local communities 
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g) Resource exploitation occurs even in the presence of sustainable corporate 
responsibility or socially responsible investing; regardless of whether there are 
legitimate mining practices 
h) Resource exploitation occurs in the absence of the principles of sustainability 
i) Resource exploitation occurs when the communities are ignorant, negligent and not 
well informed. 
 
8.3 Community Governance 
The second contribution offers an explanation of the community governance 
structures in the light of the existing theoretical and empirical research on political 
ecology and governance (chapter 2). Absence of an effective community governance 
structure has inhibited the prospect of sustainable community development. The 
contributions were made on the nature of the actors (chapter 5) and how control over 
resources changes in chapter 7. I drew from the literature on governance in chapter 2 
that the idea of governance is about who makes a decision, who sets the rules, and 
how and when they do it. Graham et al. (2003) further explained that governance is: 
‘the traditions, institutions and processes that determine how power is exercised, how 
citizens are given a voice, and how decisions are made on issues of public concern’ 
(Graham et al., 2003, p. 1). I critique this contribution on the basis that it focuses on 
governance as the interrelationship between the state and the people. They ignore the 
governance that happens within the community or that should exist within it. Also, 
they ignore the fact that governance cannot work without the communities being 
entrenched in decisions making and in ‘equity’ participation on goods and service 
delivery. Communities should be able to be in partnership with other actors on 
policies, production and service delivery. Without this, we cannot talk of community 
development. It is on this basis that this thesis argues that achieving a sustainable 
diamond mining industry that can benefit present and future communities requires a 
governance initiative that incorporates co-governance and co-production in the 
resource-based communities. 
 
In chapters 6 and 7, I explained how partisan governance inhibits community capacity 
and provokes social repercussions in decision-making. In an attempt to provide an 
account of how the officials manage the institutions, the study shows that they serve 
their own political interests and that their loyalty changes from one national 
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government to another. It shows that the officials have a rent-seeking agenda, that 
their responsibilities are politically motivated, and that they ignore cooperative 
networking with the communities. I also looked at institutionalisation through the 
government’s decentralisation legislation, resources and responsibilities, and argue 
that decentralisation without capacity is inefficient. Also, the drive for 
decentralisation through institutionalisation is theoretical and not a practical means to 
transform these resources communities into sustainable development loci. Evidently, 
there are institutions, but they are ineffective because officials are influenced by 
political decisions and rent-seeking behaviour, instead of administrative assignment.  
 
From the research, in spite of the problem with institutions and poverty, there are 
cultural limitations based on gender roles or responsibilities and even sometimes on 
ethnicity. According to Rocheleau et al. (1996), gender reflection demonstrates how 
environmental change and conflict is related to gender inequalities. It is true that some 
actors in the communities are discriminated against owing to gender roles, but there 
are also circumstances where some community actors are marginalised because of 
their voluntary acceptance of their gender role and choose to exclude themselves. I 
have decided not to comment on the area of ethnicity because it has no relevance to 
this study. However, I can conclude that there is a relationship between community 
governance and sustainable community development. 
 
8.4 Sustainable Community Development 
I discovered that there are communities that exist by location, by composition 
according to their common goal, but not necessarily by common community goals.   
MacQueen et al., (2001 p. 1929) define a community as ‘...a group of people with 
diverse characteristics who are linked by social ties, share common perspectives, and 
engage in joint action in geographical locations or settings’.  
 
Frank and Smith (1999) define community development as the planned fruition of the 
economic, social, cultural, and environmental factors of community well-being. This 
can be made feasible with unison of purpose. The Tamarack Institute (2008) argues 
that the community’s commitment enables them to identify their own action plans. 
Hence, the research revealed that not all communities are ‘homologous’. Based on the 
fragility and malleability of the communities, actors identify and engage in joint 
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action, and partake in social cohesion and participation on issues that personally 
benefit them. They deviate away from matters affecting the general community. This 
is because the communities are characterised by social class boundaries. People are 
mainly represented within issues affecting them instead of participating in such 
matters. The choice of participants affects the ultimate achievement of sustainability. 
The role of the community in sustainability is linked with participation in decision-
making by all without limitations. Seyfang and Smith (2007) perceive the community 
as an opportunity to develop new practices and norms that are generally accepted by 
the community in sustainability practice. However, from the evidence, sustainability 
and participation are limited by political, legal and customary factors. With that, there 
is an emergence of parallel communities and invisible miners, and resource conflicts 
have emanated from the micro level between the elderly and the youths and between 
the elites and the communities owing to diverse interests and purposes and diverging 
conceptions of ‘belongingness’. I infer that the issue of sustainability in these resource 
communities requires decision-making, participation and a desirable outcome by/with 
the community actors and government institutions in the absence of individual and 
rent-seeking behaviour. 
 
Another addition of this thesis to the literature on sustainable community 
development is on the approaches of strong and weak sustainability. The proponents 
of strong sustainability argue that there should be focus on the qualitative 
improvement of all forms of assets instead of limiting the focus to a quantitative 
expansion of any one form of capital (Hamstead and Quinn, 2005; Baker, 2006). In 
contrast, the proponents of weak sustainability advocate that there should be no limit 
to the fundamental system of economic growth. Here, also, I have made a few 
contributions according to the findings. Firstly, the communities have experienced 
retarded transformation. Assets are destroyed often for the accruement of anticipated 
wealth. Secondly, mining policies have focused on the resources without sufficient 
focus on the role of the community actors’ role in achieving policy formulation and 
implementation, and sustainability. Thirdly, to summarise the situation as being one 
where more assets are destroyed and the wealth from the diamonds is yet to benefit 
the communities, there is neither strong sustainability nor weak sustainability in the 
resource communities. 
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This idea that the policies and approaches undertaken in these communities have 
brought neither strong nor weak sustainability is supported in chapter 7. This shows 
that governmental approaches are not proactive but rather are politically motivated by 
geo-political considerations. Within the prevailing political and socio-economic 
influence, I also contributed that there exist various sector declines that can be 
compared to the Dutch disease or a ‘Zero-sum game’. In chapters 5, 6 and 7, the 
outcomes show that the mining sector has affected other sectors. There is evidence of 
destruction of assets amid growing social, political and economic discontent. As such, 
this has contributed to community collapse, as community actors cannot exist as one 
social entity. But unlike Ebrahim-Zadeh’s (2003) analysis linking the “Dutch disease” 
to the ‘spending effect’, there is absolutely no connection to that when taking it in 
context on the diamond industry in Sierra Leone. The communities are deprived and 
have limited economic purchasing power to sustain their basic needs even with 
national production of commodities.  
 
Ebrahim-Zadeh’s (2003) comment on resource pull is evident in the communities and 
even beyond with more labour and resources diverted to mining activities. Talking 
about sustainable community development co-exists with the quantitative and 
qualitative improvement of the available assets in these communities. However, 
evidence in chapters 5-7 show that resource exploitation goes beyond diamond 
resources and affects community assets. The findings show that these assets once 
existed but have eroded over time with a limited resilience. Probability is prioritised 
over certainty. Probability for demands for diamond resources (natural assets) 
supersedes certainty of available assets (physical assets) and other ecological assets. 
The actors do not take cognisance of ecological or sustainable issues. It is ironic to see 
built houses (certainty) destroyed for diamonds yet unseen (probability). It is clear 
that the actions of the individuals are environmentally unfriendly and inhibit the 
chances of sustainable community development.  
 
In the literature in chapter 2 and the evidence in chapter 6, it is demonstrated that the 
communities need to exist not as a composition of people in a particular location; they 
should be a composition of people in a location capable of determining their 
community goals and working towards them. In this thesis, I am interested in what 
Osborne and McLaughlin (2004) and Brandsen and Pestoff (2006) called ‘co-
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governance’: the communities’ participation and delivery and management of shared 
public service delivery, and co-production: community producing their own policies. 
However, the evidence has shown that, over the years, the resource-based 
communities have been seen as a tool or instrument of the state, dictated by and 
provided for. The evidence shows a shift from community governance to a 
government role over resources contrary to what Osborne and McLaughlin (2004) and 
Brandsen and Pestoff (2006) call co-governance and co-production. Co-governance is 
the community’s capacity to be able to play a partnership role with the state on policy 
formulation and implementation, and co-production is the collective production and 
management of goods and services. Furthermore, the outcomes from the evidence 
show two forms of governance limitations: customary ownership and legal ownership. 
Land ownership has both legal and customary connotations, and shifts from 
community actors to the state. Customarily, land is the property of the community. In 
legal terms, it is only the surface land that is owned by the chief on behalf of the 
people. There is also evidence of political influence, which is endemic. In addition, 
chapters 6 and 7 reveal evidence of cultural limitations. There are social norms that 
determine the differential ability of people to own, control, claim or make use of 
resources such as land. These social norms are traditionally structured within the 
society. This structure is the first form of discrimination and segregation in the 
communities and some community actors are discriminated against on the basis of 
‘birth right’. 
 
The communities should be motivated by a sense of identity (expressive) and not the 
individual member or actor’s allegiance to functional and political actions 
(instrumental). According to the evidence in chapters 6 and 7, participation in 
community development should include (a) who participates (b) why he/she 
participates (c) how far he/she participates (d) with whom he/she participates and (e) 
to whom he/she accounts to. The representation of advocates in so-called stakeholders 
meeting is not a sufficient approach. Such advocacy is just a step towards community 
development.  
 
In chapter 6, I argue that the communities cannot be limited to being recipients and 
subordinates; they should be seen as a cooperative autonomous body that is capable of 
jointly making and implementing policies, and jointly providing and delivering the 
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services in their communities. Governmental policy and governance mechanisms are 
limited to just community development rather than sustainable community 
development. I have argued that community development is limited because the 
communities cannot work towards the provision of services such as health, 
agriculture, education etc. Sustainable community development, on the other hand, 
works with the entitlement, capacity and participation of the community on health, 
resources, education and available assets and on the provision and delivery of services 
and policies. 
 
In addition, the thesis contributes to the idea that working towards a sustainable 
environment cannot be achieved without empowerment. The existing literature in 
chapter 3 is used as a framework towards the contribution on empowerment in the 
communities. This was dealt with through participation and representation. The 
evidence discussed in chapters 6 and 7 show that communities cannot participate. 
Instead, they are represented by other actors. Ironically, those who represent them are 
not accountable to them. This explains that even though empowerment fosters a 
sustainable environment, it can be misleading and even ineffective when it is 
influenced by ill-thought out political approaches. In chapter 7, I explained how the 
Brundtland report comments on how the human and ecological relationship is 
problematic due to the lack of institutional and infrastructural capacities.  
 
Also, it is proven that there are governance-related issues affecting the establishment 
of sustainable community development: ignorance, negligence and self-exclusion 
emanating from insecurity and gender roles. Paradoxically, people in the community 
are interested in the daily tasks of survival rather than the general problems affecting 
them. This is why long-term neglected issues have led to destruction of assets and the 
emergence of parallel communities.    
 
In another contribution, I expanded the body of literature on sustainable development 
as a changing dynamic in order to integrate resources, communities and other actors 
rather than allowing just a few actors to have the right to determine the destiny of the 
resource-based communities. I have also made some more general contributions on 
sustainable development, which are discussed in chapters 6 and 7. Here, I have 
attempted to discuss the theoretical concept of sustainable community development, 
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as discussed in chapter 3, by examining the issue and emphasising it as an aspect of 
further research in resource-based communities.  
 
In a simplified manner, just working towards community development is insufficient 
for resource-based communities. The evidence in chapters 6 and 7 show no effective 
process of community development and no on-going prospect of a sustainable 
community. In chapter 5, the evidence identifies unaccounted-for actors who do 
everything possible to survive. In chapter 6, the evidence shows that these actors 
destroy every form of assets in order to access diamond resources. Working beyond 
community development towards sustainability should be the paradigm in 
government policies and in the enacted Local Agenda 21 community policy in the 
resource-based communities. Without this, as evidence has shown of inherited 
ecological mishaps, the present actions will affect the future communities too. This is 
why the Brundtland report discussed in chapter 3 is taken as a prefix in discussing 
sustainability in the investigated communities.  
 
I also made contributions to the literature on social capacity. It was evident that the 
collapsed communities are preceded by social breakdown between the elderly and the 
youths, the homogenous group (native) and the heterogeneous groups (alien and 
parallel group) and between the community authorities and elites. As such, the thesis 
contributed to the argument that entitlement is not about right but concerns the 
individual capacity to influence change. As such, it is evident that there is 
competitiveness instead of cooperation within the communities. Everyone in the 
community suffers directly or indirectly from ecological mishaps but not everyone 
enjoys the wealth from the resources. There is a problem of social disparity and social 
exclusion. This is evident in the social divide and the emergence of parallel 
communities, as discussed in chapter 6. Any work aiming towards community 
development has to deal with the social capacity situation. It enhances the 
establishment of social networks, structures, institutions and organisations that call for 
collective action and shared knowledge, understanding, and interactions that can bring 
about desirable outcomes (Roseland, 2005). It is also necessary for capacity building 
in social relationships and opportunities (Craiz, 2005; Daly and Howell, 2006). The 
evidence in chapters 6 and 7 show the contrary. The emergence of social networks in 
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the mining communities comes with misunderstanding and with no common desirable 
outcome. 
 
The younger generation claimed that degradation and destruction in the mining 
communities is as a result of the rent-seeking attitude of the elders, who care only for 
short-term gains. The evidence in chapters 6 and 7 illustrate the problem of social 
identity and role and such rent-seeking or politically motivated behaviour. As a result 
of this disunity between the older population and the youths, the communities have 
been subdivided into parallel communities who work towards their own interests 
because they have been marginalised and deprived. Traditionally, the old see the 
young as being ‘young’ in knowledge. As such, the voice of the young is often 
ignored. Partly cultural, the understanding of the old that they know more than the 
young is a contributing factor to the cause of diverging parallel communities among 
the homogeneous community.  
 
Also in chapter 6, there is a sense of belongingness among the natives that exists 
alongside a lack of trust in the authorities. As such, the effectiveness of initiatives to 
work collectively and cooperatively in these communities is undermined. These 
prevailing circumstances in the community are what I call a misplaced priority. The 
communities have become segregated and the actors have a self-interested purpose. 
Also, from the discourses, the research shows that the conflict starts from the micro 
level between different individuals and groups amid varying interests and purpose.  
 
The community should not be under state or corporate pressure to adhere to their 
whims and caprices. The communities should be motivated by a sense of identity 
(expressive) and not the individual member or actor’s allegiance to functional and 
political actions (instrumental). According to the evidence in chapters 6 and 7, 
participation in community development should include (a) who participates (b) why 
he/she participates (c) how far he/she participates (d) with whom he/she participates 
and (e) to whom he/she accounts to. The representation of advocates in so-called 
stakeholders meeting is not a sufficient approach. Such advocacy is just a step 
towards community development.  
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Another contribution attempted to explain the general issues that cut across the whole 
body of literature. This is an area researchers can investigate further in order to 
understand the social strata and influence of the community actors. There will be no 
political solution without understanding the social strata of the community. It is 
evident that ineffective governance over resources inhibits the sustainability of 
resources. The evidence in chapters 6 and 7 shows that actors at all levels are driven 
by economic needs because of social exclusion and economic deprivation arising 
from unfair political dominance by rent-seeking actors. Therefore, the community 
needs an equitable distribution of wealth and not a transfer of funds under the 
government’s DACDF. Also, the thesis has shown that a social norm is a structured 
form of discrimination. These are traditionally arranged to determine the differential 
ability of people to own, control, claim or make use of resources such as land. Hence, 
in order to evaluate community governance and sustainability practices, the 
nomenclature of variations in the way people identify themselves or are being 
identified in the communities needs to be understood. Working towards this requires 
policy or service delivery under the taxonomy of community governance and 
sustainability requires hope for a solution to a problem, a favourable political 
atmosphere of engagement at community level, and between the community and the 
state at another level, and the sustainability of the process and outcome of actions 
taken.  
 
8.5 Policy and Practical Recommendations 
The outcomes of research should help policymakers and inspire researchers involved 
in further research that emanates from gaps in existing theoretical contributions. The 
first objective of this thesis attempts to identify the relationship between resource 
exploitation and community governance in mining communities through an analysis 
of key actors and their roles at a range of scales. Drawing from the stakeholder theory 
used as a theoretical argument in this thesis, the roles of the different actors were 
revealed to be unequal, and the power over the resources is also dynamic. From 
national government to community level, the power to control resources relies on 
legal grounds. Within the communities, the power lies with who has the economic 
power to influence political control over natural resources. So in this thesis, the cause 
of the problem in the four chiefdom communities is exacerbated by poverty chains, 
negligence, ignorance, and self-acclaimed cultural limitations arising from gender 
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roles. With the economic activities centred on diamond mining with no subsistence 
from agriculture, most of the fertile agricultural lands including swamps have been 
transformed into mining zones by individuals and both small and large companies. 
Government EIA and ESIA legislation focuses on corporations and ignores the 
simultaneous destruction caused by small mining companies. In addition, the ‘sway’ 
miners are not effectively monitored and cause much ecological damage. In general, 
one of the daunting challenges faced by the mining communities is the social 
disconnection prevailing in the resource-based communities. The problems of the 
communities are compounded by the discontent in which the local authorities blame 
the government and the community blames the elders, the youths blame the elders, 
and majority of the natives blame the migrants.   
  
The second research objective examined if and in what ways mining communities 
utilise their assets and undertake practices that contribute towards sustainable 
community development. In chapter 6, I discussed the various assets in the 
communities, which are either available or deteriorating as a result of human 
activities. The destruction of these assets is due to the desperation for survival 
emanating from socio-economic deprivation. The existing infrastructure is destroyed 
for potential diamond gains. There is evidence of bridges collapsed, houses dug and 
roads narrowed for mining activities. This is as a result of an ignorance and 
negligence towards the sustainability of the assets. In summary, there is no distinct 
approach of either strong or weak sustainability. Almost all forms of capital or assets 
are destroyed for diamond resources. In addition, there is an irony regarding land 
ownership. On one hand it is said that land is communally owned; but on the other 
hand it is owned by the chief on behalf of the people, whilst in legal terms the state 
owns anything that is 6ft below the earth’s surface. So the notion of who controls the 
land and the resources appears to be subject to a misunderstanding. Legally, the 
government thinks that it has control while in a real sense they are controlled by large 
companies or corporations through economic pressure, which results in unfair terms 
of investment. With such unfortunate circumstances, there is more pressure on the 
assets, and this is exacerbated by increasing numbers of immigrants from the North of 
Sierra Leone. There is a non-linear form of discrimination among those who have the 
birth right; the influential; the long-term resident
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has also given rise to parallel communities that work selfishly for their own good 
instead of community gain. 
 
Institutionalisation through local council establishment has created a limited capacity 
basis for the communities and has not influenced people’s capacity and participation 
positively. The majority of the community members are more interested and involved 
in their basic daily needs because the institutions are yet to deliver. The lack of 
capacity and the defunct nature of the institutions inhibit people’s interest in taking 
initiatives, decisions and control, and in working towards sustainable practice. Above 
all, the essence of this thesis, which is an argument for communities to be sustainable 
through co-governance and co-production, cannot be achieved.  
 
In summary, the availability of government mining policies and Mineral Acts on how 
mining should be carried out from exploration to extraction is incomprehensive. There 
is inadequate cooperation between the communities and government on policy 
formulation and on the production and delivery of goods and services. The present 
mining policy incorporates community development in principle, but does so 
inadequately. It is a step in the right direction but its content and implementation is 
inadequate.  
 
Unlike Sierra Leone and D.R. Congo, which have shown imminent threat of resource 
exploitation, other countries have shown signs of the development gained from the 
available resources. For instance, Botswana, Namibia and Canada have made 
sustainable growth from their vast natural resources through improved governance 
mechanisms. Though I have named other countries with good examples in the 
diamond mining industry, I have compared two contrasting resource countries in Sub-
Saharan African. Like Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe is an example of bad governance 
initiative on diamond mining, and on the other hand Botswana is a good example of 
good governance initiative on diamond mining. But the latter has been called the 
‘African Miracle’ because of the grand political and socio-economic successes 
associated with their natural resources. Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe share some 
features in common on their natural resources; both have natural resources to provide 
investment environment and prospective growth and development; they both share the 
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Kimberley experience or governance initiative but not effective policy regulation and 
implementation of its mining industry. Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe’s rich natural 
resources could have led to its economic recovery and prosperity if only there is an 
effective governance initiative and viable economic distribution of wealth. 
Zimbabwe’s economic success was lost as the country became an aid recipient nation. 
Like Sierra Leone where the Minister of Mines has vested rights on mineral resources 
(Mines and Mineral Act 2009), ZMMA has vested mining rights in the President of 
Zimbabwe (Mines and Mineral Act, 1961). In addition, the Minister is vested with 
powers to decide what is and what is not a mineral, the sole authority to market prices, 
regulate royalties, determines representations from the Chambers of Mines and 
regulate on matters arising when necessary (Robb, 2012). This analogy contrasts co-
governance and co-production in resource communities. The policies are undermined 
and determined by the state as a dominant player without a functional involvement in 
resource-based communities.  
 
Unlike Zimbabwe and Sierra Leone, Botswana is a good model of resource-rich 
countries with good use of natural resource use. The economy depends more on 
diamond mining (The Worldfact Book, 2011) and has efficient mining laws that have 
benefitted the entire country (Robb, 2012). With stable economy and effective 
regulation, Botswana’s economic growth grew at an average of 9 percent annually, 
largely from diamond revenues (Department of State, 2011). The country exports 30 
percent of world diamond sales by value, which was one-third of GDP and 70 percent 
of the country’s export (Our Diamonds, 2012). In contrast to Zimbabwe’s legitimate 
sales that accounted for $20 million, Botswana earned $3.6 billion from its diamond 
sales in 2009 (Mutsaka et al., 2010). We have seen that the discrepancy between 
Botswana and Sierra Leone/Zimbabwe is not only on the economic growth but also 
on the structure of mining. Botswana has moved from exploration and extraction into 
cutting, polishing, and marketing, and has provided incremental jobs opportunities 
and revenue for the economy (Department of State, 2011). In 2008, the former 
President of Botswana, Festus Gontebange Mogae was awarded the Mo Ibrahim Prize 
for Achievement in African Leadership (Howden, 2008) for the country’s good 
governance enshrine in the rule of law and effort in curbing corruption. Botswana has 
maintained the country’s consistent stability and prosperity, distribution of wealth, 
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poverty declination and unbiased opportunities across other sectors without being 
engulf in the so-called ‘Dutch Disease’.  
 
I have discussed how the demand and supply for diamonds could be official and 
unofficial means, and is driven by wants/desire, purpose and price. Diamonds are 
needed for jewellery and industrial uses. The role of DeBeers in the diamond history 
is obvious in controlling the flow of production and sales of diamonds. The economic 
and social yarning for the gem stone has led to spontaneous environmental impacts. 
Although diamonds are needed for jewellery and industrial purposes, in recent times it 
has been linked to war in countries such as Sierra Leone, DR Congo and Angola; 
diamonds have become a tool of war in these countries, leading to widespread deaths 
and destruction by those I call ‘Blood Diamond Merchants’. As such, my 
recommendations for the establishment of sustainable community development in the 
mining communities, especially those investigated in this thesis, are as follows:  
 
Firstly, there should be an unequivocal, effective and efficient review of all mining 
policies with the legal right of the resource-based communities to consent and dispute. 
This is what I call adaptive governance; that is, governance that conforms to the needs 
and inspiration of the prevailing circumstances and community composition. Many 
failings have occurred in the quest for remedies within mining activities because most 
of the so-called stakeholder meetings are undertaken by representation and not by 
community participants.  
 
Secondly, as a result of the usefulness of stakeholder participation, the policies should 
be reviewed and assessed by the communities at a level they can understand. In 
addition to this, the contents of the websites of certain actors advocating on behalf of 
the communities should be verified and accounted for. No actor should be allowed to 
exploit the communities for rent-seeking gains. 
 
Thirdly, the past mining institutions and activities had spill-over effects that have 
affected these present communities, and the prevailing evidence suggests that the 
present actions will also affect the future communities at a even greater extent. Hence, 
the policies should protect existing assets. To achieve that, the resource communities 
should be fully informed, fully involved and fully educated in sustainability practice. 
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Power and control over resources and policies should not be in the hands of a 
selective few.  
 
Fourthly, no serving government official should be a shareholder in any of the mining 
corporations. This argument comes from an unverified accusation that the former 
president, Ahmed Tejan Kabba (1996-2002), was a shareholder of Koidu Holdings 
Limited (now OCTEA). Also, from the words of a practising lawyer in Sierra Leone, 
Former President Joseph Saidu Momoh was a shareholder in the Rutile Company. 
Recently in the Financial Times, dated 14th September 2012, it is alleged that the 
President of Liberia Ellen Johnson Sirleaf appointed her son Robert Sirleaf to head 
the National Oil Company of Liberia (NOCAL). When the issue was raised, the 
president was prompted to defend her actions by arguing that her son was working for 
free. If and when such actions continue, there will be further evidence of what I have 
called earlier the ‘state-corporate’ curse. 
 
Fifthly, like the DeBeers, multinational corporations have become so power in the 
diamond industry in spite of corporate responsibility. This ‘cartel’ operative can be 
mitigated at international and internal level through regulations that are accompanied 
with penalties. If it becomes difficult for individual governments to do that, a regional 
approach system through economic bodies such as the Economic community of West 
African States can make a difference through legislations governing member states. 
 
8.6 Recommendations for Further Research 
As my research focuses on the sustainability of resource communities by working 
jointly in the policymaking and implementation and in the production and delivery of 
services, it also gives a sense of questions for further researchers.  
 
Evidence has shown that there have been no sustainable practices even though mining 
activities have been going on for decades. Past policies and activities have affected 
succeeding generations and it is very likely that it will affect future generations. 
Hence, sustainable community development is still an emerging area of interest in 
Sierra Leone’s resource-based industries. The government’s inclusion of community 
development is limited in text and in practice. Therefore, in empirical terms, there is a 
need for further research in these resource-based communities in order for them to 
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move away from being cursed and collapsed towards sustainability. Now that I have 
identified the micro approach towards sustainability, unlike the macro approach 
targeting corporations and top-bottom policy making, it would be worthy to look at 
how to change the status quo in legal and practical terms. 
 
Another issue arising from my research is that despite the illiteracy and cultural 
structures, there should be ways to influence people’s motivation towards the 
sustainability of their communities and resources. This concern arises from my 
empirical findings that the majority of the people are illiterate and ignorant of the 
right thing to do or actions to take. These shouldn’t be excuses for not changing the 
welfare of resource communities. So, further research should look at how to improve 
on people’s capacity, despite their limitations, and how they can make them active 
and accountable participants in their communities. 
 
One more issue relates to the ethos of investment. Investors are required to invest 
responsibly, and corporations are expected to work according to their corporate 
responsibilities. In addition, the government needs to act in the interests of the 
communities. Therefore, despite corrupt accomplices and the ignorance and illiteracy 
of the community, deception should have no place in investment communities. My 
argument is that, if every actor behaves responsibly, it will mitigate the limitations on 
sustainable community development. 
 
Finally, I would like to see more work done on sustainable development research and 
resource governance. Until now, the policies taken under the auspices of the United 
Nations Environmental Agency have created universal policies on sustainable 
development without taking into consideration the disparities in governance 
structures, and the development process in respective countries and communities. In 
effect, the prerequisites of individual states need to be addressed separately under the 
framework of the Brundtland report (WCED, 1987) but no single policy is applicable 
to all the nations at any particular time. Local Agenda 21 initiatives can be established 
in every state, and should be workable with legal penalties in the resource 
communities. Even though having an internal legal system is almost impossible, 
adopting a domestic legal framework for resource investment may indirectly curb 
global actors. Hence, further researchers can consider how and when to adhere to 
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sustainable principles, taking into consideration the prevailing governance structures 
and assets.  
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